MARGARET B. SEYMOUR, Chief District Judge.
Petitioner H. Dewain Herring is a prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections who currently is housed at the Broad River Correctional Institution. Petitioner, represented by counsel, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting that he is being held in custody unlawfully. Petitioner seeks relief in the form of vacatur of his conviction.
This matter is before the court on Respondent's
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility for making a final determination remains with this court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portions of the Report and Recommendation to which a specific objection is made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or may recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
On February 15, 2006, Petitioner was indicted in Richland County, South Carolina, for murder and pointing and/or presenting a firearm. ECF No. 4-1 at 19 & 21. Prior to trial, Petitioner moved to exclude various evidence seized during three searches of his home. ECF No. 5-15 at 31; see ECF No. 5-16 at 1-24. On May 21, 2007, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of both offenses. Id. at 16-17. Petitioner was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for murder and five years imprisonment for pointing and/or presenting a firearm, to be served concurrently. Id. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on May 29, 2007. ECF No. 1-2 at 1. On Petitioner's motion, the South Carolina Supreme Court certified the case for review on February 5, 2009, transferring jurisdiction from the appellate court. See ECF No. 1-3 at 1; S.C. App. Ct. R. 204(b).
Petitioner raised the following issues in his appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court:
ECF No. 1-4 at 7. On June 16, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion to recuse Chief Justice Jean Toal. ECF No. 1-8. Petitioner explained that he was challenging the validity of a search warrant that was obtained by telephone and fax pursuant to an administrative order issued by Chief Justice Toal, as well as the validity of the order itself. ECF No.1-8 at 3-4. Petitioner's motion was denied on June 18, 2009. ECF No. 1-9.
The South Carolina Supreme Court heard oral arguments on June 23, 2009. ECF No. 1-10 at 1. On December 21, 2009, the supreme court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence by published opinion. ECF No. 1-10; State v. Herring, 692 S.E.2d 490 (S.C. 2009). On January 20, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing, requesting that the supreme court reconsider its ruling and apply the holding of State v. Belcher, 685 S.E.2d 802 (S.C. 2009), which was issued on October 12, 2009, between the date of the oral argument and the ruling in Petitioner's case. ECF No. 1-11. The petition for rehearing also restated Petitioner's request that Chief Justice Toal recuse herself from participation in the case. Id. The supreme court denied the petition for rehearing on May 14, 2010, and remitted the case to the lower court. ECF No. 1-12; ECF No. 1-13.
The South Carolina Supreme Court summarized the facts of Petitioner's case as follows:
State v. Herring, 692 S.E.2d 490, 492-93 (S.C. 2009) (footnotes omitted).
Petitioner filed the within § 2254 petition on October 21, 2010. ECF No. 1. Petitioner asserts the following ground for relief:
ECF No. 13 at 7. The petition is governed by the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which became effective on April 24, 1996.
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and any inferences drawn from the facts should be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings; rather he must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings cannot be granted unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct. Petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). "Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011).
A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if it either applies a legal rule that contradicts prior Supreme Court holdings or reaches a conclusion different from that of the Supreme Court "on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if it "unreasonably applies" a Supreme Court precedent to the facts of the petitioner's claim. Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). The court's "review is . . . deferential because [the court] cannot grant relief unless the state court's result is legally or factually unreasonable." Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 163 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999)).
The trial judge instructed the jury that because Petitioner was charged with murder, the prosecution must prove that he "killed another with malice aforethought." ECF No. 5-14 at 35. The trial judge instructed the jury that:
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 38-39.
Before the South Carolina Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the Mouzon language concerning "general malignant recklessness" constituted reversible error for several reasons. Petitioner argued that the prosecution's sole theory of the case was that he aimed the gun and fired at the door with actual malice, while the defense theory of the case was that he accidentally or recklessly discharged the gun without aiming at the door. ECF No. 1-4 at 45. Accordingly, Petitioner argued, there was no evidence of "some middle ground mental state of `super recklessness' that would warrant a charge of the Mouzon language." Id. Petitioner further argued that South Carolina Code § 16-3-60, which defines the mental state for involuntary manslaughter as "reckless disregard for the safety of others," had supplanted or overruled the common law principle stated in Mouzon that "recklessness with regard to the lives and safety of others could rise to the level of malice to support a conviction of murder." Id. at 46.
Petitioner also argued that the crime of murder based on the Mouzon recklessness standard was unconstitutionally vague because "[t]here is no articulable means by which to differentiate between the recklessness required for involuntary manslaughter and that which would elevate an offense to murder." ECF No. 1-4 at 47. Finally, Petitioner argued that the Mouzon charge unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof with respect to his mental state because "if the jury accepted the defense evidence [which] established that [he] acted with recklessness, at most," the burden would be shifted onto him "to prove that the recklessness involved in this case did not rise to the inarticulable, undefined standard of recklessness that could be deemed malice." Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court summarily rejected Petitioner's arguments, citing to an earlier case upholding the Mouzon instruction and an earlier case holding that "in determining prejudice[] from jury instructions, [a] court must find that, viewing the charge in its entirety and not in isolation, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that violates the Constitution." ECF No. 1-10 at 14 n.7.
A petitioner alleging that his right to due process was violated by an improper jury instruction "must show both that the instruction was ambiguous and that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190-91 (2009) (quotations omitted). "In making this determination, the jury instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record." Id. at 191 (quotation omitted). "[T]he pertinent question is whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Id. (quotation omitted).
Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the jury instructions did not equate the mental state required for murder with that required for involuntary manslaughter. The trial court instructed the jury that one who unintentionally kills another while engaged in "a lawful act with reckless disregard for the safety of others" is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. ECF No. 5-14 at 38-39. On the other hand, the trial court instructed the jury that malice "signifies . . . a general malignant recklessness of the lives and safety of others or a condition of mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief." Id. at 35-36. A "malignant" recklessness suggests a state of mind significantly more culpable and destructive than "mere" recklessness. This is especially true when the instructions imply that a "malignant recklessness" is synonymous with "a condition of mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief."
Petitioner, focusing on the disjunctive "or," contends that the instruction defines "two separate and alternative means of proving malice." ECF No. 26 at 6-7. It is immaterial whether the two descriptions are considered to be "two separate and alternative means of proving malice" or simply two phrases attempting to express the same indefinite concept. The question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors, hearing the "malignant recklessness" language in the context in which it was presented, understood it to mean that Petitioner could be convicted of murder based on the "simple" recklessness associated with involuntary manslaughter.
The adjective "malignant," as well as the description of malice as involving "a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief," distinguished this more culpable recklessness from ordinary recklessness. Petitioner's defense at trial was that he accidentally fired his gun while taking it from his glove compartment. The court finds that it is not reasonably likely that, if the jurors believed Petitioner's theory, they could have considered such an accident to be "malignant recklessness." Accordingly, the South Carolina Supreme Court's holding that these jury instructions did not violate Petitioner's right to due process was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Petitioner's trial counsel requested that the trial court instruct the jury on accident, as follows:
ECF No. 5-16 at 29. The trial judge denied this charge as inapplicable to the facts of the case because "the defense of accident is only allowable when the defendant is involved and engaged in a lawful act." ECF No. 5-13 at 7-8. Trial counsel also requested that the involuntary manslaughter charge include a statement that "[o]ne who causes the death of another by the negligent use of a deadly weapon or instrumentality may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter." ECF No. 5-16 at 25. Additionally, trial counsel requested that the involuntary manslaughter charge include the following:
ECF No. 5-16 at 27. The trial judge did not give either instruction to the jury.
Before the South Carolina Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give the accident charge because evidence introduced at trial showed that Petitioner was engaged in a lawful activity at the time of the shooting. ECF No. 1-4 at 42. Specifically, Petitioner noted that he had a valid concealed weapon permit and that his theory at trial was that the gun accidentally discharged while being transferred from the glove compartment of his car. Id. at 42-43. Petitioner also argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that negligent use of a deadly weapon constitutes involuntary manslaughter because this was a correct statement of the law, and because it was necessary to counterbalance the jury instruction stating that "[i]f a person using a deadly weapon deliberately and intentionally without just cause or legal excuse takes the life of another, malice may be inferred." Id. at 43-44; ECF No. 5-14 at 37.
The South Carolina Supreme Court summarily rejected Petitioner's argument as to the accident instruction, citing to an earlier case holding that "for homicide to be excusable on the ground of accident, it must be shown that the killing was unintentional, the defendant was acting lawfully, and due care was exercised in the handling of the weapon." ECF No 1-10 at 14 n.7. The supreme court also cited an earlier case holding that "to warrant reversal, [the] trial court's refusal to give [a] requested charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to [the] defendant." Id. The supreme court similarly rejected Petitioner's argument as to involuntary manslaughter with a deadly weapon, citing an earlier case holding that "failure to give requested jury instructions is not prejudicial error where instructions given adequately cover the law." Id.
Regardless of whether any evidence introduced at trial supported Petitioner's theory that the shooting constituted an excusable accident, there is no constitutional error resulting from the trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction on accident. As stated above, an erroneous or omitted jury instruction violates due process only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted a defendant without finding every necessary element to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner's requested instruction stated that a killing is excusable if it is unintentional, occurring during the course of a lawful activity, and not the result of negligence. However, the trial judge instructed the jury that malice, an essential element of murder, requires conduct that is willful, deliberate, intentional, or at least done in "a general malignant recklessness of the lives and safety of others or a condition of mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief." ECF No. 5-14 at 35-36. If the jurors believed that the shooting occurred unintentionally while Petitioner was engaged in a lawful activity and not behaving negligently, they could not have convicted Petitioner of murder under the instructions given.
Similarly, the trial court did not commit constitutional error in refusing to give an instruction stating that a defendant who causes the death of another by the negligent use of a deadly weapon may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The trial court correctly and adequately instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter, and these instructions would apply to the use of a deadly weapon in "reckless disregard for the safety of others." ECF No. 5-14 at 38-39. Furthermore, there was no need to "balance" the instruction stating that "[i]f a person using a deadly weapon deliberately and intentionally without just cause or legal excuse takes the life of another, malice may be inferred" with an instruction stating that the use of a deadly weapon does not necessarily imply malice. Id. at 37. The instruction does not suggest that the use of a deadly weapon necessarily implies malice, but rather states that malice may be inferred if this use was "deliberate[] and intentional[] without just cause or legal excuse." The South Carolina Supreme Court's holding that the trial court's omission of Petitioner's requested jury instructions did not violate his right to due process was not an unreasonable interpretation of clearly established federal law.
In State v. Belcher, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered the long-accepted jury instruction stating that "malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon." Belcher, 685 S.E.2d at 804. The supreme court held that this instruction "is no longer good law in South Carolina where evidence is presented that would reduce, mitigate, excuse or justify the homicide." Id. at 804. The supreme court, noting that malice necessarily includes the absence of justification, excuse, or mitigation, described this instruction as "only a half-truth." Id. at 808. For example, if a defendant intentionally uses a deadly weapon in self-defense, "[t]he absence of justification, excuse, or mitigation cannot be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon standing alone." Id. The supreme court held that its ruling would be "effective in this case and for all cases which are pending on direct review or not yet final where the issue is preserved." Id. at 810.
In his petition for rehearing, Petitioner argued that the South Carolina Supreme Court erred in failing to apply the holding of Belcher, which was decided after oral arguments but before the ruling in his case. ECF No. 1-11 at 15-17. However, the jury instruction given at Petitioner's trial differs significantly from the instruction at issue in Belcher. The trial judge instructed the jury that "[i]f a person using a deadly weapon deliberately and intentionally without just cause or legal excuse takes the life of another, malice may be inferred." ECF No. 5-14 at 37. Rather than simply stating that malice may be inferred from "the use of a deadly weapon," the instruction also informed the jurors that Petitioner must have "deliberately and intentionally . . . take[n] the life of another" and that this must have been "without just cause or legal excuse." This language adequately answers the criticism put forth in Belcher by forbidding the jury to infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon if there was just cause or a legal excuse. More importantly, there is no reasonable chance that the instruction given permitted the jury to draw an improper inference of malice or shifted any burden onto Petitioner. Petitioner's theory at trial was that he had accidentally or recklessly discharged the gun, and the "deliberate[] and intentional[]" language would not permit an inference of malice if the jury believed this theory. Because the holding of Belcher is not relevant to Petitioner's case, there can be no constitutional error.
At trial and on appeal, Petitioner argued that a search of his home conducted pursuant to a warrant was illegal because the warrant had been obtained by a State Law Enforcement Division ("SLED") officer over the telephone and by fax, without the officer's personal appearance before a magistrate and without his affidavit being sworn before the magistrate. ECF No. 1-8 at 3. Petitioner contended that the magistrate instructed the officer to follow this procedure, which was approved in a July 26, 2001 order by Chief Justice Toal. Id. Petitioner argued that Chief Justice Toal's order was contrary to the South Carolina Constitution, to various South Carolina statutes, and to holdings of the South Carolina Supreme Court. Id. at 3-4. Petitioner maintained that Chief Justice Toal's recusal was required by due process in order "to ensure a fair and impartial hearing and disposition of [his] challenge to the authority of the Chief Justice to issue the order allowing the telephone and facsimile warrant procedure." Id. at 4. Petitioner's request for recusal was denied without comment. ECF No. 1-9.
The Magistrate Judge found that the South Carolina Supreme Court had not unreasonably misapplied clearly established federal law in denying Petitioner's motion for recusal. ECF No. 28 at 21. The Magistrate Judge distinguished In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), the primary case cited by Petitioner, in which the Supreme Court held that a judge allowed under state law to conduct secret, one-person grand jury proceedings could not act as the judge in a criminal contempt action arising from these proceedings. The Supreme Court found that because the judge played a significant role in the "accusatory process," he could not "be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused." Id. at 137. The Magistrate Judge found that "alleged bias stemming from a justice's ostensible interest in defending a position or rule she previously adopted is not the type of `interest in the outcome' proscribed by Murichson." ECF No. 28 at 21-22. Rather, the Magistrate Judge found that the situation is more akin to a litigant requesting recusal by an appellate judge in an appeal arguing against precedential authority previously authored by that judge. Id. at 22. The Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner had not demonstrated that "this case was one of those `rare instances' or consisted of `extreme facts' that would constitutionally mandate recusal." Id. (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2265, 2267 (2009)). The Magistrate Judge further noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the administrative order was proper, and that Chief Justice Toal's recusal apparently would not have affected the result of Petitioner's appeal. Id.
This court agrees with the Magistrate Judge and finds that Chief Justice Toal's participation in Petitioner's case did not "pose[] such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that [it] must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented." Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 (quotation omitted). Although Petitioner argues that the Chief Justice acted as "a judge in [her] own case" and "as a judge of her own conduct," such a characterization is not accurate. Rather, the Chief Justice was being asked to reconsider her earlier position regarding matters of legal interpretation. Although Chief Justice Toal was required to construe the authority of the chief justice under the South Carolina Constitution, this is not the sort of "personal interest" in the outcome that the Supreme Court has found to be unconstitutional.
Furthermore, even assuming that Chief Justice Toal's participation in Petitioner's case was improper, habeas relief would not be available in this situation. Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the Supreme Court has never "explicitly ruled that prejudice is presumed when a judge who should be disqualified from sitting on a case nevertheless participates in the ruling." ECF No. 29 at 7. The first case cited by Petitioner, Murichson, involved a trial judge who presided over a contempt hearing when he should have recused himself. See Murichson, 349 U.S. at 134-136. The other case cited by Petitioner, Caperton, involved a 3-2 decision by a state supreme court where the interested justice was in the majority. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2256. However, the Supreme Court has never considered whether participation in a ruling by a judge who should be disqualified necessarily taints the ruling if that judge's vote is not outcome-determinative.
Petitioner argues that the South Carolina Supreme Court unreasonably found that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated by various police actions. Petitioner recognizes that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that the participation of Chief Justice Toal denied him a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims. For the reasons explained above, the court rejects this argument. Plaintiff further argues that the state court's "willful refusal to apply the correct and controlling legal standard" deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims. ECF No. 29 at 8. If a habeas court finds that a petitioner had a procedural mechanism available to raise Fourth Amendment claims in state court and that this opportunity was not impaired, it need not inquire further into the merits of these claims. Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1265 (4th Cir. 1978). In this case, Petitioner, represented by skilled counsel, raised his Fourth Amendment claims by motion in the trial court, had a suppression hearing, and ultimately had these claims resolved by published opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court. This court is satisfied that Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to present his claims, and will not consider the merits of these claims further.
Petitioner objects that "the Magistrate Judge in her summary of evidence simply adopt[ed] the factual recitation from the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion and fail[ed] to consider material exculpatory evidence."
The court has carefully reviewed the record and concurs in the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the case dismissed.
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, as effective December 1, 2009, provides that the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A certificate of appealability will not issue absent "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). The court concludes that Petitioner has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, the court denies a certificate of appealability.
