Savage, District Judge.
Plaintiff Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company filed this subrogation action against defendant Philadelphia Housing Authority ("PHA") for damages sustained to its insured's home caused by a fire that originated in an adjacent vacant building owned by the PHA. Dismissing the amended complaint,
In its second amended complaint,
We conclude that Allstate has alleged facts that bring the claim within the real estate exception, exposing the PHA to liability. Those facts, if proven, will show that the PHA filed to maintain and repair its property, creating a dangerous condition that caused or contributed to the cause of the fire. Therefore, we shall deny the PHA's motion.
On January 14, 2018, a fire occurred in a vacant property owned by the PHA.
In its second amended complaint, Allstate alleges that the PHA property had been vacant and abandoned since 2005.
In 2012, the Department of Licenses and Inspections ("L & I") issued a violation for failure to clean and maintain the lot.
On January 14, 2018, a fire started in the kitchen area of the property.
Allstate alleges that the fire could not be extinguished and spread because there was no running water or working smoke detectors.
In moving to dismiss, the PHA argues that, as a Commonwealth agency, it enjoys sovereign immunity.
The Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity Act grants the Commonwealth and its agencies
To impose liability under the real estate exception, the plaintiff must satisfy three requirements. The plaintiff must show: (1) the injury was caused by a dangerous condition; (2) the dangerous condition was a condition of the real estate; and (3) absent immunity, it could recover damages from the person who caused the injury. Cagey v. Commonwealth, 645 Pa. 268, 179 A.3d 458, 463 (2018) (citations omitted). Allstate's allegations meet this test.
Addressing the first and second requirements, the PHA argues that the fire did not derive, originate, or have as its source the PHA real estate itself.
Allstate counters that the second amended complaint sufficiently alleges that the physical condition of the property itself caused its insured's damages.
"The term `dangerous condition' is unambiguous and plainly encompasses any condition that presents a danger." Cagey, 179 A.3d at 464. The PHA argues that the property's dangerous condition may have facilitated the plaintiffs' harm, but it did not cause it.
Allstate has also sufficiently pled that the dangerous condition derived, originated from, or had as its source the PHA real estate. It has alleged that the property was "unsafe for the purpose for which it was intended." Dean v. Dep't of Transportation, 561 Pa. 503, 751 A.2d 1130, 1134 (2000). The doors, windows, locks, and smoke alarms were either non-operable or non-existent. The property was so unstable and unsafe that L & I ordered its demolition. Consequently, it was not fit for its intended use as a habitable dwelling. In essence, Allstate alleges that a dangerous condition allowing unfettered access to the property by trespassers existed and that condition was created by a defect in the maintenance and repair of the property.
Allstate alleges that the doors, locks, windows, and smoke alarms were either inoperative or non-existent. If they did not exist, they were not a part of the property. However, if they were inoperative, they were a condition of the property.
Allstate also alleges that the property was structurally unsound. The structural integrity of the property is a condition of the property. If it was compromised by the PHA's failure to maintain it, it was a dangerous condition and defect in the property. When the property collapsed as a result of the dangerous condition, it caused the harm to Allstate's insured's property.
Allstate's allegations, if proven, show that the PHA's negligent failure to maintain and repair its property made it unsafe, and a dangerous condition or defect in the real estate caused the insured's harm. See Thornton v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 4 A.3d 1143, 1152 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 365 (1965). Although Section 365 speaks to physical harm, courts have held that the rationale for imposing liability on a landowner for harm caused by disrepair of a structure applies to property damage. See Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111, 113 (1977) (denying summary judgment to defendant where a fire occurring on defendant's dilapidated property almost totally destroyed plaintiff's adjacent house); Schropp v. Solzman, 314 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Iowa 1982) (affirming judgment to plaintiff for water and mud damages to property caused by negligence of adjacent landowners); Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615, 717 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1986).
In a factually similar case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "[a] property owner can reasonably be expected to know that the visible conditions of vacant property in a state of disrepair may attract, for various purposes, children or adults, who, having entered the property, might act, either negligently or intentionally, in a manner that would cause a fire." Ford, 379 A.2d at 113. In Ford, the defendant owned a rental property on the lot adjoining the plaintiff's home. The rental property had been vacant for almost ten years and was dilapidated. Id. Two fires broke out. Id. The second one almost totally destroyed the plaintiff's home. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "[w]hen one negligently maintains property so as to create a fire hazard to an adjoining property and fire harm results, we refuse to conclude, as a matter of law, that the negligent conduct in maintaining the fire hazard was an insignificant cause. This issue is therefore one for the jury to consider." Id. at 114.
As alleged by Allstate, the PHA failed to take any action to eliminate or mitigate unreasonable risks for over a decade. It ignored multiple violation notices to secure and later to demolish its property. Vandalism was foreseeable and occurred frequently on the property. Accepting the allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Allstate, we conclude that Allstate has stated a cause of action against PHA for negligence in failing to maintain and repair its property, rendering it unsafe and dangerous. See Sections 364, 365, and 448 of the Restatement of Torts (Second).
Allstate contends that even if a trespasser started the fire, the PHA can be held liable as a joint tortfeasor.
The fact that a squatter started the fire does not absolve the PHA from liability. A Commonwealth entity can be jointly liable with another tortfeasor, provided an exception to immunity applies. See Powell v. Drumheller, 539 Pa. 484, 653 A.2d 619, 622 (1995); Crowell v. City of Phila., 531 Pa. 400, 613 A.2d 1178, 1184 (1992); Kiley by Kiley v. City of Philadelphia, 537 Pa. 502, 645 A.2d 184, 186 (1994); Dean, 751 A.2d at 1132-33. Stated differently, just because the injury was caused by a third party does not mean the governmental agency is immune. So long as a dangerous condition of the real estate contributed to the injury, the exception applies.
Under Pennsylvania law, a governmental entity can still be held liable even if another party also caused the injury as long as the governmental agency's negligence was a substantial cause in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. Powell, 653 A.2d at 624-625. The Powell court instructed that the "determination of whether an act is so extraordinary as to constitute a superseding cause is normally one to be made by the jury." Id. For a governmental entity to escape liability, the negligence of a third party must be an intervening cause that supersedes the governmental entity's negligence.
The PHA argues that the acts of the squatter were an intervening cause that supersedes its own negligence and relieves it of liability. "In determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause, the test is whether the intervening conduct was so extraordinary as not to have been reasonably foreseeable." Bleman v. Gold, 431 Pa. 348, 246 A.2d 376, 380 (1968). See also Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940, 945 (3d Cir. 1973); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 1966).
Whether the acts of a third party were so extraordinary to render them a superseding cause is a factual question for a jury to decide. Id. (citing Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1122 and Ford, 379 A.2d at 115). So also is the question of whether there was a dangerous condition or defect in the property that caused the harm to the adjacent property. Thornton, 4 A.3d at 1153.
Because Allstate has alleged that a dangerous condition in the PHA's real estate caused its insured harm, it has satisfied the real property exception to Commonwealth immunity. Therefore, we shall deny the defendant's motion.
