OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL PAPAK, Magistrate Judge.

Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential") filed this action in interpleader against Tamisha Rae Dunn (the domestic partner of Prudential's insured at the time of the insured's decease), minor child I.R. (Prudential's insured's minor daughter), and Kristeena Robinson ("Robinson," Prudential's insured's former wife) in her capacity as guardian ad litem to I.R. on May 10, 2016. By and through its complaint in interpleader, Prudential alleged that prior to his decease, its insured Sean Robinson (Prudential's "insured") received life insurance coverage under a group insurance plan (the "Plan") Prudential issued to CUNA Mutual Group, the insured's then-employer. Prudential further alleged that the insured designated I.R. as his sole beneficiary in connection with Plan benefits on October 15, 2015, that on or around November 5, 2015, the insured expressed his intention to change that designation to name Dunn as his sole beneficiary of Plan benefits, and that on December 25, 2015, the insured died, triggering a $221,000 life insurance benefit under the Plan. Prudential further alleged that on December 31, 2015, the insured's former employer made a claim on the Plan for the benefit on behalf of I.R., and that Dunn made a similar claim, on her own behalf, on February 8, 2016. By and through its complaint, Prudential sought judicial resolution of the competing claims for Plan benefits made on behalf of I.R. and Dunn. This court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this interpleader action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).

On July 11, 2016, Dunn filed a cross-claim against I.R. and Robinson seeking this court's declaration that she (Dunn) is the sole valid designee for purposes of determining the beneficiary of the insured's Plan benefits, and on that same day Robinson filed a cross-claim against Dunn on I.R.'s behalf seeking this court's declaration that I.R. is the sole valid designee. On August 3, 2016, Prudential deposited money in the amount of the disputed life insurance benefit into escrow for the benefit of the insured's beneficiary, following which it was discharged from this action. Effective March 17, 2016, I granted summary judgment in Robinson's favor, declaring that I.R. was the sole valid designee. Effective April 4, 2017, Dunn appealed my decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Now before the court are Robinson's bill (#43) of costs, by and through which Robinson seeks award of her costs incurred in connection with litigating this matter in the amount of $693.05, Robinson's motion (#45) for disbursement of funds, by and through which Robinson seeks disbursement to I.R. of the insurance benefits Prudential deposited into escrow prior to being discharged from this action, Robinson's motion (#46) for interpleader disbursement, by and through which Robinson seeks the same relief sought in connection with her motion for disbursement of funds, and Dunn's motion (#49) to stay disbursement of the insurance benefits to I.R. pending resolution of her appeal from this court's decision. I have considered the motions, oral argument on behalf of the parties, and all of the pleadings and papers on file. For the reasons set forth below, Robinson's bill (#43) of costs is granted, and Dunn is directed to pay Robinson's costs in the requested amount of $693.05, Robinson's motion (#45) for disbursement of funds is denied as moot with leave to refile if appropriate following resolution of Dunn's appeal, Robinson's motion (#46) for interpleader disbursement is denied as moot, and Dunn's motion (#49) to stay is granted, and farther proceedings in this action are stayed pending resolution of Dunn's appeal from this court's judgment.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Bill of Costs

The entitlement of a prevailing party in a federal lawsuit to recover its costs, other than attorney fees, is governed by Federal Civil Procedure Rule 54(d)(1). In relevant part, Rule 54(d)(1) provides that such costs "should be allowed to the prevailing party" except where federal statute, the rules of civil procedure, or a court order "provides otherwise." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). "By its terms, the rule creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party, but vests in the district court discretion to refuse to award costs." Association of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000), citing National Info. Servs., Inc. v. TRW, Inc., 51 F.3d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1995). "A district court need not give affirmative reasons for awarding costs; instead, it need only find that the reasons for denying costs are not sufficiently persuasive to overcome the presumption in favor of an award." Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). However, in the event a court declines to award a prevailing party its costs under Rule 54(d)(1), its reasons for so declining must be specified. See Association of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 591, quoting Subscription Television, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Theatre Owners Ass'n, 576 F.2d 230, 234 (9th Cir. 1978). It is the burden of the party against whom costs are to be taxed to establish grounds for denying award of costs. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 944-945, citing National Info. Servs. v. TRW, Inc., 51 F.3d 1470, 1471-1472 (9th Cir. 1995).

The expenses that the district courts are authorized to tax as costs under Rule 54(d)(1) are enumerated at 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920; see also Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-445 (1987). Although the district courts have broad discretion to allow or disallow a prevailing party to recoup the ordinary costs of litigation, the court may not rely on that discretion to tax expenses beyond those enumerated at Section 1920. See id.; see also Frederick v. City of Portland, 162 F.R.D. 139, 142 (D. Or. 1995). Nevertheless, the district courts enjoy independent discretion to construe and interpret the expenses enumerated at Section 1920. See Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Lab., Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-178 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).

II. Stay of Enforcement of Judgment Pending Appeal

The district courts are authorized to "stay the enforcement of a judgment pending the outcome of an appeal" under appropriate circumstances. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 421 (2009), quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9 (1942).

Id. at 433-434 (internal quotation marks, modifications, and citations omitted). The first two of the four enumerated factors are considered "the most critical." Id. at 434. If a stay applicant satisfies those two factors, the court must then weigh the remaining two factors. See id., 435.

ANALYSIS

I. Robinson's Bill (#43) of Costs

Robinson seeks award of her costs in the amount of $693.05 as the prevailing party in this action for the deposition transcripts of Dunn and of the corporate representative of Prudential's insured, which were recorded for purposes of and in the course of this litigation. It is well established that "[flees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case" are expenses that may properly be taxed as a prevailing party's costs under Rule 54(d)(1). 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). At oral argument in connection with the motions now before the court, counsel for Dunn specified that Dunn did not seek stay of proceedings in connection with Robinson's bill of costs, and that she did not object to the subject expenses. Accordingly, Robinson's bill (#43) of costs is granted, and Robinson is awarded her costs in the total amount of $693.05.

II. Dunn's Motion (#49) for Stay; Robinson's Motions (#45, #46) for Disbursement

Robinson seeks disbursement to I.R. of the life insurance proceeds Prudential deposited into escrow prior to being discharged from this action, while Dunn seeks a stay of enforcement of this court's judgment in Robinson's favor pending resolution of Dunn's appeal from this court's decision. I consider first the merit's of Dunn's motion for stay of enforcement of this court's judgment.

Under Nken, supra, four factors govern this court's discretion whether or not to grant the requested stay. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. As to the first Nken factor — whether Dunn has made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits — it is well established that "more than a mere possibility of relief is required" in order to satisfy the test. Id. (internal quotation marks, modifications, citations omitted). Here, as indicated at some length in my Opinion (#41) and order dated March 17, 2017, Dunn and Robinson's competing claims to be the insured's sole designee presented a close question of law and fact, such that I rate Dunn's likelihood of success on the merits to be substantial (although I do not consider it more likely than not that she will prevail on appeal). I accordingly find that Dunn has satisfied the first of the four factors. See, e.g., Alliance For The Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding in the preliminary injunction context that the "strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits" factor is satisfied by a showing of "serious questions" going to the merits of the applicant's case).

As to the second Nken factor — whether Dunn faces irreparable injury absent a stay — I agree with Robinson that, as a general rule, an injury that can be adequately compensated through an enforceable award of money damages does not constitute irreparable injury. Here, however, in the event the benefits were disbursed to I.R., the proceeds of the benefits were spent in whole or in part, and the Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed this court's decision and found that Dunn were the sole designated beneficiary for purposes of the insured's life insurance benefits, there is no indication that an award of money damages would be enforceable against I.R., a minor child who has not been established to have any source of income or of wealth apart from the award of benefits at issue here. Because of the risk that an award of money damages would not be adequate to shield Dunn from the loss in whole or in part of her interest in the insured's life insurance benefits, I find that Dunn has satisfied the second of the four factors. See, e.g., Nemee v. County of Calaveras, Case No. CV F 12-2, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20373, *39-40 (D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2012).

Because Dunn has satisfied the first two Nken factors, it is appropriate to weigh the remaining two Nken factors to determine whether stay is appropriate here. As to the third Nken factor — whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure I.R. and/or Robinson, I.R.'s guardian ad litem and, according to evidence proffered by Robinson in support of her opposition to Dunn's motion for stay, conservator — I agree with Robinson that in the event I.R. needed to spend moneys from the subject funds for her support, education, or care prior to resolution of Dunn's appeal, if the funds were at that time unavailable to her she would suffer injury. However, there is no indication in the record that such an injury is likely to occur, nor is there any indication that if such an injury did occur, the injury would be substantial. To the contrary, it is clear that, in the event that Robinson prevails on appeal, the subject funds will be available to her in their entirety as of the date the appeal is ultimately resolved. Delayed availability of the funds does not seem, under the circumstances, to constitute a substantial injury to I.R. or to Robinson in her capacity as I.R.'s guardian and conservator.

As to the fourth Nken factor — the public interest — it appears clear that the public interest in the outcome of these proceedings is for the courts to determine correctly the identity of the insured's beneficiary, and for the life insurance benefits to be available in their entirety to that beneficiary at the time the determination is made. The requested stay is well calculated to insure that, once the identity of the beneficiary is determined on appeal, that person will receive the entire benefit due.

Because Dunn has satisfied the first two Nken factors, and because the remaining two Nken factors weigh in favor of issuing the requested stay, Dunn's motion (#49) for stay is granted, and enforcement of this court's judgment is stayed pending resolution of Dunn's appeal. Because Dunn's motion for stay is well taken, Robinson's motions (#45, #46) for disbursement of the life insurance proceeds currently being held in escrow are denied as moot. Robinson shall have leave to refile her motion (#45) for disbursement if appropriate following resolution of Dunn's appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Robinson's bill (#43) of costs is granted, Dunn is directed to pay Robinson's costs in the requested amount of $693.05, Robinson's motion (#45) for disbursement of funds is denied as moot with leave to refile if appropriate following resolution of Dunn's appeal, Robinson's motion (#46) for interpleader disbursement is denied as moot, Dunn's motion (#49) to stay is granted, and further proceedings in this action are stayed pending resolution of Dunn's appeal from this court's judgment.