R. BRYAN HARWELL, District Judge.
Plaintiff Arnold Parson, Jr., proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the above-captioned Defendants. The matter is before the Court for resolution of Plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of United States Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West, made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the R & R to which specific objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error in the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court summarily dismiss Defendants Collins, Smith, Atkinson, Foxworth, Shaw, Floyd, Troy, and Harper without prejudice because Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint contains no substantive allegations of wrongdoing by these defendants. R & R at 2-5; see ECF No. 24 [complaint]. Plaintiff objects only to the dismissal of Defendant Harper, arguing Harper must be a named party in order for service to be perfected on Defendant Marion County (on which service has been authorized). Pl.'s Objs. at 1-2. Plaintiff indicates Harper is the Chief Administrative Officer of Marion County. Id. Plaintiff also states he "reserves the right to adjoin and serve the Clerk Sabrina Davis as proper party to receive service of process for the County of Marion in accords with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(6)."
The Court readily disposes of Plaintiff's objections. As the Magistrate Judge explains, county officials such as Defendant Harper do not need to be "named as defendants in order to effect service of process on Defendant Marion County." R & R at 3. In other words, Marion County can be served without Harper (or Davis) being a named defendant. Regardless, Plaintiff's arguments are moot because the Magistrate Judge authorized service of process on Marion County,
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the entire record, including Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, the R & R, and Plaintiff's objections. For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules Plaintiff's objections, adopts and incorporates the R & R [ECF No. 29] by reference, and