1. In the Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), Magistrate Judge Hey found that the February 16, 2010 decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to deny Plaintiff Erin M. Whittle's application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits as of June 27, 2008 was not based on substantial evidence, and recommended that the Court reverse and remand the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with the R&R.
Ms. Whittle timely filed her Objections to the R&R, which was limited to the R&R's recommendation that the case be remanded. Ms. Whittle argues that the case instead should be reversed with an award of benefits because Defendant "already agrees that Ms. Whittle continues to be mentally disabled" in the period following the ALJ decision at issue. According to Ms. Whittle, another ALJ issued a March 23, 2012 decision—three days prior to the R&R—which granted Ms. Whittle's claim of disability from February 17, 2010 to the date of the decision.
The Court overrules Ms. Whittle's Objections. The district court "may choose to remand to the Secretary for a further hearing or simply . . . award benefits." Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir.1984) (emphasis added). The decision to award benefits is made only when "the administrative record of the case has been fully developed and when substantial evidence on the record as a whole indicates that the Claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits." Gilliland v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 1986). "Such a decision is especially appropriate when the disability determination process has been delayed due to factors beyond the claimant's control." Brownawell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 358 (3d Cir. 2008).
Ms. Whittle's arguments in her Objections do not provide grounds for reversing the ALJ decision with an award of benefits based upon these criteria. Indeed, insofar that Ms. Whittle's Objections predominantly rely on matters extrinsic to the record instead of raising any specific errors in the R&R's findings and conclusion that an award of benefits is inappropriate, this Court need not review Ms. Whittle's Objections de novo.
Furthermore, upon this Court's careful, independent consideration of the administrative record, the parties' briefing on the Plaintiff's Request for Review, the Plaintiff's Objections, and the applicable law, the Court does not conclude that the circumstances here warrant the direction that benefits be awarded in lieu of remand. This case does not present the considerable inexplicable delays or unlikelihood that the record will change upon remand that have warranted an award of benefits in other cases. See, e.g., Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2000); Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 1984). Additionally, the ALJ might have propounded legitimate reasons for crediting the evaluation of the non-examining, state agency psychological consultant over Ms. Whittle's treating physicians' opinions, and thus, contrary to Ms. Whittle's Objections, the record does not mandate a result on the determination of disability. See Raymer v. Massanari, No. Civ.A.97-5762, 2001 WL 1526265, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2001); see also Morales, 225 F.3d at 317-18.
