MICHAEL BAYLSON, District Judge.
1. Dale Meisel, Warden;
2. Nancy Afflerbach, Treatment Manager;
3. Edward Sweeney, Director;
4. Steve Miller, Treatment Supervisor;
5. Carol Sommers, Treatment Supervisor;
6. Cindy Egizio, Prison Services Manager;
7. James Bloom, Deputy Captain Warden of Security;
8. Janine Donate, Deputy Warden of Treatment;
9. Cliff Knappenberger, Internal Affairs Investigator; and
10. Michelle Ramos, Counselor.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on grounds that the Prison Litigation Reform Act's ("PLRA") administrative exhaustion provisions,
For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion and Plaintiff's Motion shall be denied. Both parties shall supplement the record as detailed in the accompanying Order.
At the time of the events giving rise to this litigation,
The Policy distinguishes between "grievable" and "not grievable" issues. Policy at ECF 6 of 12 (1.A, 1.B). "Staff actions" are considered grievable, while "Housing unit or cell assignment" is not. Neither term is defined under the Policy. Edward Sweeney, the prison's Director of Corrections, asserts that "alleged failure to keep identified and reported enemies separated" and "alleged failure to protect an inmate from assault by another inmate" are both "staff actions" under the Policy. ECF 34-7 Def. Ex. "C" at 3 of 12 (Sweeney Aff.) ¶¶ 10-11.
The Policy further distinguishes between a "Formal Grievance," which is "written on Lehigh County Prison's multi-part `Inmate Formal Grievance, Part 1' form," and an "Informal Grievance," which is submitted either verbally "or in writing via an `Inmate Request to Staff.'" Policy at ECF 5-6, 11-12 of 12 (Definitions; Sample Forms). Under the Policy, an inmate must first attempt to resolve a grievance informally.
An inmate may appeal a formal grievance decision to the prison's warden. "At the conclusion of the appeal, administrative remedies will have been exhausted. . . ."
On October 19, 2011, Plaintiff was involved in a physical altercation with inmates Leroy Harrison and Rueben Rivera.
At some unspecified time after the October incident but prior to April 17, 2012 (believed to sometime in January,
On April 10, 2012, Plaintiff wrote an "Inmate's Request to Staff" form stating that he had a problem with inmate Remark Bell on the 2C unit. ECF 39 at ECF 53 of 60.
On April 17, 2012, Plaintiff submitted an "Inmate's Request to Staff" to "Steve" to inquire why Plaintiff had not been let out of administrative segregation to the general prison population.
On April 19, 2012, Plaintiff filled out a Formal Grievance form. ECF 39 at ECF 55 of 60; ECF 28-3 at ECF 4 of 6 ("The April 19, 2012 Grievance"). The grievance form, in essence, stated that Plaintiff was unfairly being kept in administrative segregation and that he should be allowed to return to unit 3D. It specified that Plaintiff had a known enemy on unit 2C such that it would be inappropriate to send him there.
Plaintiff was released from administrative segregation on April 30, 2012. That same evening, Rivera entered Plaintiff's cell and cut him above the back. ECF 39 at ECF 37 of 60.
On May 4, 2012, Plaintiff received a decision on his April 19, 2012 Grievance. ECF 39 at ECF 58 of 60. The decision, apparently signed by Defendant Sommers, stated, "The classification committee decided not to send you to 3D where you and Jose Cruz assaulted another inmate. Jose Cruz still resides on 3D. You had a named enemy on 2C. Therefore, you need to remain on 3C1 A/S status." Plaintiff appealed the May 4 ruling the same day he received it, arguing that he had been sent to unit 2C despite the fact that the April 19, 2012 Grievance stated sending him there would result in contact with a known enemy.
On May 18, 2012, Defendant Meisel send Plaintiff a memorandum rejecting his appeal as moot, stating, "You were moved to H/U 3d on 10 May 12." ECF 39 at 59. The prison placed Plaintiff back on 3D notwithstanding the earlier statements that Plaintiff could not be placed there because he "co horted" with a fellow inmate named Jose Cruz. It is unclear if Cruz remained on 3D when Plaintiff was transferred or what prompted the prison's change of opinion.
Defendants have characterized Plaintiff's April 19, 2012 Grievance as "concerning the subject matter of Plaintiff's lawsuit." See ECF 34-1 Def. Ex. "A" ¶¶ 13-14 (Requests for Admission to Plaintiff).
Despite this characterization, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (which argues that Plaintiff's claims are barred for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies) fails to even once mention the April 19, 2012 Grievance. It instead mentions five other unrelated grievances Plaintiff made during 2011 and 2012, which Defendants argue demonstrate that Plaintiff was cognizant of how the grievance process worked. ECF 34 at 2.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. An issue is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."
"42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), enacted as part of the PLRA, provides that a prisoner may not bring a § 1983 suit with respect to prison conditions `until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.'"
Defendants' Motion argues that the PLRA bars Plaintiff's claims because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The argument has two sub-issues:
The Court is not persuaded by Defendants' arguments.
First, it is far from clear that Plaintiff's complaint is grievable under the Policy. Although Defendant Sweeney asserts that Plaintiff's allegations are "staff actions," they could be construed as not grievable "housing unit or cell assignments." Plaintiff arguably is contending that he was aggrieved on April 19 by the prison's pending decision to place him in unit 2C, despite the fact that his enemy was residing on that housing block.
Even assuming that Plaintiff's complaint is grievable, Defendants' Motion ignores entirely Plaintiff's April 19, 2012 Grievance. That grievance specified that Plaintiff had a known enemy on unit 2C and that Plaintiff should not be sent there. Plaintiff was nevertheless assigned to unit 2C on April 30, and Rivera cut him there the same evening. The prison's May 4 decision purporting to resolve Plaintiff's April 19 grievance did not address why Plaintiff was placed on unit 2C despite his complaint of having an enemy there. Plaintiff timely appealed the May 4 decision only to have Defendant Meisel reject the appeal as moot, again without explaining why Plaintiff's request not to be sent to unit 2C was initially not honored.
The "primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued."
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion shall be denied because Defendants have not carried their burden of showing a failure to exhaust. Because Plaintiff has cross-moved for summary judgment on the merits, the Court will examine his claims.
"The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners against the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. This constitutional limitation on punishment has been interpreted to impose a duty upon prison officials to take reasonable measures to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners."
Summary judgment cannot be granted in Plaintiff's favor because numerous questions of material fact exist. Specifically, the record is unclear as to who played a role in the decision to place Plaintiff in 2C, whether any of the decision makers knew about Plaintiff's altercation with Rivera, whether Rivera was still residing on unit 2C at the time of Plaintiff's release from administrative segregation to that unit, and why Plaintiff was put there if Rivera was also present. The current record before the court appears silent as to Defendants Afflerbach, Sweeney, Miller, Egizio, Donate, and Knappenberger; appears as to Bloom to show that he had awareness of Plaintiff's October 2011 incident with Rivera; appears to demonstrate as to Ramos and Sommers that they were involved in processing the April 19, 2012 Grievance; and shows that Meisel denied Plaintiff's appeal of how that grievance was handled. As detailed in the accompanying Order, the Court will accept supplemental submissions from the parties to clarify these questions.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's cross-Motion for summary judgment shall be denied.
Unlike his Eight Amendment claims, Plaintiff's negligence claims are not actionable because Pennsylvania law prohibits them.
Plaintiff argues that under New York law, a prisoner may maintain a negligence claim against a state correctional facility. ECF 39 at ECF 7 of 60 (citing
Plaintiff's primary cause of action in this litigation arises under a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court accordingly has jurisdiction over that claim pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
A negligence claim, unlike a claim under Section 1983, arises under state law. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, this Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any claim that is "so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy." In determining which state's law to apply to Plaintiff's negligence claim, over which the Court has supplemental jurisdiction, the Court must look to Pennsylvania's choice-of-law rules.
"In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties" unless another state has a more significant interest under principles of conflict of laws.
Therefore, this Court examines Plaintiff's negligence claim under Pennsylvania law.
Pennsylvania, unlike New York, has passed a law entitled the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the "Act"). 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8541, 8542 (2016). "Under the [Act], local agencies such as school districts are given broad tort immunity. The Act provides that, `no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.' 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8541."
Section 8542 of the Act provides for eight exceptions where a local agency can be held liable for negligence: 1) vehicle liability; 2) care, custody, or control of personal property; 3) real property; 4) trees, traffic controls and street lighting; 5) utility service facilities; 6) streets; 7) sidewalks; and 8) care, custody or control of animals. Plaintiff's claim for negligence does not fall within any of these categories. The key question, then, is whether Defendants as employees of a county prison are covered by the Act. If they are, Plaintiff cannot assert a negligence claim against them.
One court concluded that prison officials such as a warden are covered.
As explained above, Defendants have failed to carry their burden to prove that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment shall therefore be denied.
Plaintiff's Cross-Motion on the merits of his Eight Amendment is denied. Because Defendants are immune from negligence under Pennsylvania law, however, summary judgment is granted in their favor on any claims Plaintiff has sounding in negligence.
An appropriate Order follows.
