REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SHIVA V. HODGES, Magistrate Judge.

Wilton Q. Greene, III, ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights during his incarceration at Perry Correctional Institution ("PCI") in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"). Plaintiff asserts claims against SCDC employees Cecil Hawkins, M. Toth, and J. Glenn ("Defendants") for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and failure to provide him with outside recreation.

This matter comes before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 42, 47].1 Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the dismissal and summary judgment procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendants' motion. [ECF No. 45]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 56-58], it is ripe for disposition.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the record in this case, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff claims Toth and Glenn denied him outside recreation at PCI for a year. [ECF No. 13 at 5]. He also alleges Hawkins is responsible for a five-month delay in his dental evaluation, causing him severe pain. Id. at 6. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this case.

II. Discussion

A. Standard on Summary Judgment

The court shall grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;" or "showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

B. Analysis

Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a) provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Id. This requirement "applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of every level of available administrative review. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). Those remedies neither need to meet federal standards, nor are they required to be plain, speedy, and effective. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524.

Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires "using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis in original). Thus, "it is the prison's requirements, and not the [PLRA], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Defendants have the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 683 (4th Cir. 2005).

The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is twofold. First, it gives an administrative agency "an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court." Woodford, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (internal citations omitted). Second, "[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court." Id.

According to the affidavit of Sherman Anderson, SCDC Chief for the Inmate Grievance Branch, inmates must make an effort to informally resolve a grievance by submitting a Request to Staff Member Form to the appropriate supervisor/staff member. [ECF No. 42-2 at ¶ 7]. After informal resolution is attempted, the inmate is to complete a Step 1 grievance. Id. If the inmate is not satisfied with the response from a Step 1 grievance, he may then file a Step 2 grievance. Id. at ¶ 6.

Anderson states, and Plaintiff has not disputed, that although Plaintiff filed one grievance related to the alleged lack of recreation and two grievances related to the alleged delay in his dental care, all of the grievances were returned for Plaintiff's failure to attach a Request to Staff showing he had attempted informal resolution. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. Plaintiff was advised that he could resubmit the Grievance within eight days of receiving a response to a Request to Staff. Id. Plaintiff failed to resubmit any of the grievances. Id. Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants' arguments that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. [ECF No. 56]. Therefore, the undersigned recommends Defendants be granted summary judgment, for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 42, 47].

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached "Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must `only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).