MALACHY E. MANNION, District Judge.
Pending before the court is the July 28, 2015 Report and Recommendation of Judge Karoline Mehalchick (the "Report"), which recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. (Doc.
The factual background and procedural history of the case is set forth in detail in Judge Mehalchick's Report and is adopted herein. On June 13, 2013, the pro se plaintiff, Stephen Aguiar ("Aguiar" or "Plaintiff"), filed the instant Bivens
In the amended complaint, Aguiar seeks money damages and injunctive relief on the grounds that various BOP staff at FCI-Allenwood, including Warden Recktenwald ("Recktenwald"), Associate Warden Butler ("Butler"), Captain Bergen ("Bergen"), Special Investigator Supervisor Lyons ("Lyons"), and Special Investigation Staff Technician Cook ("Cook"), (collectively "Defendants"), and an unidentified Facebook employee (the "John Doe Defendant")
When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of the report to which objections are made.
For those sections of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, "satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation."
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery [including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file] and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
In their motion for summary judgment, defendants Recktenwald, Butler, Bergen, and Lyons argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed record reflects that these defendants lacked personal involvement in the alleged misconduct. (Doc.
As Judge Mehalchick found, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights. The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that government officials performing "discretionary functions," are shielded from suit if their conduct did not violate a "clearly established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person would have known."
Analyzing Defendants' actions in this case, Plaintiff is unable to make out any violation of his constitutional rights. The special investigations staff monitored Plaintiff's emails through the TRULINCS system. After discovering that Plaintiff was communicating with unauthorized contacts on Facebook through his sister, the prison issued him an incident report, after which his right to telephone use and commissary privileges were suspended for three months. Then Defendant Cook informed Facebook via email that Aguiar was allowing a third party to administer his Facebook page, resulting in a breach of prison security and violation of Facebook's user agreement. (Doc.
In Plaintiff's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's July 28, 2015 Report and Recommendation ("Objections"), Plaintiff argues that Judge Mehalchick only mentions that Defendant Cook provided Facebook with information regarding Aguiar's account, and in doing so, ignores the fact that Defendant Cook made a request to Facebook to disable Aguiar's account and prevent him from re-establishing an account. Regardless of whether Defendants affirmatively requested that Facebook disable Aguiar's account, evaluating each of the actions above, Plaintiff did not suffer an infringement of his constitutional rights. It is well-settled that prisons are allowed to monitor inmates' outgoing non-legal communications.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants disclosed private information to Defendant, including "details gleaned from movant's TRULINCS Communications that were not publicly available." (Doc.
To the extent that Plaintiff claims he was improperly punished in the prison's issuance of the incident report and the revocation of his privileges, the incident report was later expunged on technical grounds. Moreover, Plaintiff violated the TRULINCS Statement Program, which does not allow inmates to access the Internet and which prohibits prisoners' correspondence with unauthorized contacts. (Doc.
In the Report, Judge Mehalchick liberally construed Plaintiff's allegations as a First Amendment challenge to an informal prison policy of indirectly restricting inmates' access to social media platforms with email function, and still concluded that Plaintiff fails to allege deprivation of his constitutional rights. (Doc.
Evaluating the Turner factors above, first, there is a valid, rational connection between the prison's practice of indirectly cutting off inmates' access to this social media platform and security of the prison and protection of the public. Second, there are multiple alternative means for inmates to communicate with the public, including in-person visits, telephone calls, postal mail, and emails via TRULINCS. Third, permitting inmates to communicate via third party agents on Facebook would require incredible prison resources to monitor such communications for unauthorized contacts. Fourth, Aguiar has offered no meaningful alternatives to the arrangement, which weighs in favor of the prison's informal policy. Therefore, using the Turner analysis, the policy in question did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not argue that their conduct was "reasonably related to a penological interest," and that they failed to undergo a Turner analysis in its summary judgment briefing. (Doc. 87 at 4). Plaintiff thus asserts that Judge Mehalchick "erred in advancing arguments for Defendant[s] that were never made."
Under either analysis — evaluating the actions taken by prison officials and evaluating the prison's informal policy as a whole — Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a deprivation of his constitutional rights, which is the first prong of the qualified immunity test. Because the first prong of the qualified immunity test is dispositive, the court does not reach the second prong.
In light of the above, the court finds no clear error on the face of the record. As such, the report of Judge Mehalchick will be adopted in its entirety and the defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted. Further, the claims against the John Doe Defendant will be dismissed. An appropriate order shall follow.
Larrick B. Stapleton, Esq., Ardmore, PA, for Appellant.
Timothy S. Judge, Esq., Office of United States Attorney, Scranton, PA, for Appellees.
Before RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Jon Baumgardner appeals the District Court's order granting defendants' motions to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, will summarily affirm the District Court's judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Because we primarily write for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary for our discussion. Baumgardner is an inmate currently confined in the Federal Correctional Institution, Allenwood, Pennsylvania ("FCI-Allenwood"). He filed this Bivens action against various FCI-Allenwood medical health service and staff employees (the "BOP Defendants"), as well Dr. David J. Ball, a private orthopedic surgeon, alleging mistreatment and deliberate indifference, inter alia, in connection
In August 2008, Baumgardner was seen by a physician assistant at FCI-Allenwood. He complained of a burning sensation and numbness in his foot and heel and he asked for direction relating to rehabilitation. After conferring with Dr. Ball, the physician assistant educated Baumgardner on stretching exercises. According to Dr. Ball, at that time, Baumgardner was approximately eight weeks out from surgery and he was free to resume all normal activities. About ten days later, Baumgardner saw Dr. Ball and was treated for heel pain. He expressed concern about physical therapy. Dr. Ball's medical notes state: "He did relate some disapproval of the fact that he did not get any physical therapy after his surgery . . . I showed him how to do stretching by going up a step. I also told him he could use weights and a stationary bicycle for his stretching and strengthening." See Exhibit 2, Att. 2 to Defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment at 37-38. Dr. Ball further noted that other than some mild swelling, Baumgardner "otherwise had an excellent result with his Achilles tendon repair." Id. Again in September 2008, Baumgardner saw Dr. Ball, who recommended certain stretching exercises and encouraged him to use the stationary bike to increase his range of motion and strength.
Thereafter, there are numerous entries in Baumgardner's medical records showing that he was treated for pain related to his Achilles injury, including treatment for hip pain, back pain, heel pain, and a wound at the incision site. See Exhibit 2, Att. 2 to Defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. In November 2008, Baumgardner had an x-ray of his hip, which was negative. In December 2008, Baumgardner was examined for his continuing right hip and back pain and an MRI was ordered. The MRI was completed in February 2009 and showed "some slight bilateral hip joint degenerative change," but no fractures or bony destructive lesions. Id. at p. 61. In March 2009, Baumgardner received a lumbar x-ray, which was negative. As a result of continuous back pain, Baumgardner received another MRI in June 2009, which did not show anything. From September 2009 through July 2010, Baumgardner was seen by medical staff at FCI-Allenwood for hip and back pain. He received pain medication and heel pads for his shoes.
In July 2010, Baumgardner initiated this action. He claims that the defendants knew of his condition, but failed to timely provide treatment. He alleges that the medical staff was not properly trained, experienced, licensed, or qualified for their positions. Baumgardner alleges intentional mistreatment in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, cruel and unusual punishment and deliberate indifference to his medical condition in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment, and retaliation by withholding privileges from inmates who complain in violation his rights under the First Amendment. He also brought claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et. seq. ("FTCA"), the
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review of a district court's order granting or denying summary judgment, applying the same standard as the district court. See Tri—M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir.2011). We will affirm only if "drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. We also exercise plenary review over the District Court's dismissal order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000). To survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). We will affirm a district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim "only if, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint." McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir.2009). We may summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a substantial question, and may do so on any basis supported by the record. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir.2011) (per curiam).
Baumgardner claims that the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. However, there is nothing in the record to support such a claim. In the context of Eighth Amendment claims based on medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). "To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm." Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir.2009). For instance, a plaintiff may make this showing by establishing that the defendants "intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] medical care." Id. (quotation marks omitted). However, "[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law." United States exrel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n. 2 (3d Cir.1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Baumgardner claims that the defendants violated his Eight Amendment rights by not providing him with post-operative physical therapy. He claims that inmates who had similar surgery received
Moreover, a prisoner's disagreement with proper medical treatment does not imply a constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir.2004). Here, Baumgardner argues that he should have been treated by a professional physical therapist. The record shows, however, that Dr. Ball provided Baumgardner with stretches and exercises to perform to help his recovery. The fact that these exercises were not prescribed by a physical therapist is irrelevant. The record evidence shows that Baumgardner was treated for his injury and there is no evidence from which we can draw a reasonable inference that the defendants consciously disregarded Baumgardner's medical needs and delayed his treatment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ("the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference."); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 428 (3d Cir.2006) (requiring "that a person consciously disregard `a substantial risk of serious harm'").
The record also does not support Baumgardner's retaliation claim. A prisoner litigating a retaliation claim must show that the conduct provoking the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected, that he suffered some "adverse action" at the hands of the prison officials "sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights," and that the constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial motivating factor in Defendants' conduct. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir.2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Baumgardner alleges that the defendants withheld physical therapy as punishment and as a means to discourage complaints about inadequate medical treatment. However, these allegations are vague, nonspecific statements that cannot withstand a motion to dismiss and there is no evidence in record to create an issue of material fact to
We agree with the District Court's decision to dismiss Baumgardner's FTCA claim for medical negligence because he failed to file a certificate of merit ("COM"). The FTCA requires a court to apply the tort laws of the state in which the alleged tort arose. Gould Elec. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir.2000). Here, the alleged tort of medical malpractice occurred in Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania's law applies. Pennsylvania law requires a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice to file a COM.
Baumgardner did not file the required COM, nor did he make a substantial effort to comply with the rule or provide a reasonable excuse for failing to do so.
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Daniel M. Pell, York, PA, for appellant. Ronald M. Katzman, Goldberg, Katzman & Shipman, Harrisburg, PA, for Thomas J. Weber, Esquire; Goldberg, Katzman & Shipman, P.C. a/k/a Goldberg, Katzman, P.C.; John Doe 1, an employee of the Pennsylvania Lottery Commission; John Doe 2, an employee of Peachtree Settlement Funding Corporation t/d/b/a/ Settlement Funding, L.L.C.
Before: McKEE, FUENTES and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
In accordance with the standard of review for a motion to dismiss, we "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir.2002)).
In 1991, Beckerman won a prize of $3,234,000 in the Pennsylvania State Lottery and began receiving annual installments of $154,000. On February 25, 1998, Beckerman entered into a Lottery Prize Assignment Agreement with Woodbridge Sterling Capital, LLC, through which he received a lump-sum payment of $400,000 in exchange for an assignment of his right to receive three future annual prize installments. Woodbridge later assigned its rights under the Agreement to Aurora Financial Corporation.
Beckerman discussed the Agreement with defendant attorney Thomas Weber of the firm of Goldberg, Katzman & Shipman and was advised that the Agreement was not in his best interests. After Beckerman
At a hearing on the petition, an attorney from the Goldberg firm other than Weber represented Beckerman and failed to disclose the medical conditions. The court approved the petition.
On multiple occasions prior to 2006, Beckerman requested his file from Weber and his firm, but was unsuccessful.
Beckerman's complaint in the District Court asserts claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and adds purported violations of state law. The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Beckerman disputes the dismissal of his First Amendment denial-of-access-to-courts claim. We agree with the District Court that Beckerman has not stated a viable claim. The backward-looking First Amendment denial-of-access-to-court claims identified by the Supreme Court involved situations in which "official acts" caused the denial of access to the courts. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-14, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002). The complaint here does not aver that an official act caused Beckerman to lose access to the courts. At bottom, the plaintiff's claim is for legal malpractice, rather than a constitutional violation.
Beckerman also challenges the District Court's order dismissing his state-law claims because the applicable two-year statute of limitations, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5524, had expired. The state-law claims that Beckerman asserts arise from injuries he allegedly suffered as a result of executing the Peachtree assignment. The state court approved the Peachtree assignment on April 5, 2000, yet Beckerman did not file his complaint in this case until July 7, 2006. It is apparent from the face of the complaint that Beckerman brought his statelaw claims at least four years after the statute of limitations expired.
The District Court therefore correctly dismissed Beckerman's state-law claims.
Beckerman's final challenge is to the District Court's decision to deny him leave to file a sur-reply to Weber and Goldberg, Katzman & Shipman's motion to dismiss. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Beckerman's motion, which in effect was an untimely attempt to amend his complaint rather than supplement his brief after the pleadings were closed.
Finally, we note that the District Court found that defendants John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 were not served with a summons within the 120-day period provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), but did not dismiss the complaint against those defendants without prejudice as Rule 4(m) requires. Beckerman admits that John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 were never served with a summons. Consequently, we will direct that the complaint as to defendants John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).
Clay Caldwell, Greene SCI, Waynesburg, PA, pro se.
Kemal A. Mericli, Esq., Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellees.
Before: BARRY, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Caldwell then filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim: his allegation that prison employees impermissibly opened his legal mail. The employees filed a motion to dismiss, a response to Caldwell's summary judgment motion, a counter statement of facts, and an appendix of evidentiary materials. The Magistrate Judge concluded that summary judgment should be entered in favor of the
Our standard of review is plenary. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.1999) (stating standard of review over § 1915(e)(2) dismissal); McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir.2005) (stating standard of review over an order granting summary judgment). When reviewing a complaint dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B), we apply the same standard provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher, 184 F.3d at 240; see also Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir.2007). In determining whether a district court properly dismissed a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we are required to "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir.2002)). This standard requires that a plaintiff allege in his complaint "`enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element[s]" of a cause of action. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). "[A] formulaic recitation of the elements . . . will not do." Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65. With respect to a grant of summary judgment, we must affirm where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir.2006); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Caldwell further alleged that his incarceration at SCI-Greene, a "Western State Prison[,][was] against Judge[`]s Court Orders." But an inmate does not have a constitutionally protected interest in being incarcerated in a particular penal institution. See Asquith v. Dept of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir.1999), citing Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976). Moreover, respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. SeeRizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). Thus, Governor Rendell was properly dismissed from the action because he was not personally involved in the misconduct alleged in the complaint.
Caldwell also alleged that prison employees inspected mail he sent to his family and opened his incoming legal mail outside his presence. The Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners have protected First Amendment interests in both sending and receiving mail. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). The Court has also recognized, however, that the rights of prisoners "must be exercised with due regard for the `inordinately difficult undertaking' that is modern prison administration." Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 85, 107 S.Ct. 2254). The opening and inspecting of Caldwell's outgoing mail is reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of institutional security. See, e.g., Altizer v. Deeds, 191 F.3d 540, 547-48 (4th Cir.1999) (stating that if inmates' outgoing mail could not be opened and inspected "a prison official would never know that a letter contained the very type of material that, according to the Supreme Court, could rightfully be censored, i.e., correspondence sent by an inmate that would be detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution; necessary for the protection of the public; or used to facilitate criminal activity"); Smith v. Delo, 995 F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that "[a]lthough there is less of a security risk with outgoing mail precisely because the mail is going out of the prison, Abbott, 490 U.S. at 413, 109 S.Ct. 1874, . . . there is also no doubt that prison officials are justified in discovering and refusing to process mail that contains" "escape plans, contraband, threats, or evidence of illegal activity"). Consequently, we agree that prison employees did not violate Caldwell's constitutional rights by inspecting his outgoing nonprivileged mail.
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, see I.O.P. 10.6., we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.
David Solan, Fort Dix, NJ, pro se.
Paul J. Fishman, United States Attorney, by: Mark Christopher Orlowski, Assistant United States Attorney, Newark, NJ, for Defendant United States of America.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff David Solan ("Plaintiff) is a prisoner currently confined at FCI-Fort Dix. The Complaint alleges that from June 23, 2010 to the present, Plaintiff has been permitted access to the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System ("TRULINCS"),
Defendant cited Plaintiff's computer expertise and his misuse of another Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") computer system in 2006 as her reason for denying Plaintiff e-mail access. The prior misuse of a computer specifically refers to an incident that occurred in USP Canaan, where Plaintiff's infraction was described as "[r]efusing an Order, Code 307, for misuse of the electronic law library." Id. at ¶ 16. However, the infraction actually issued was Code 319, use of equipment contrary to instructions. Id. The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff's infraction while incarcerated at USP Canaan was wrongfully described and a "crude setup bearing no relation to any wrongful activities." Id. at ¶ 18.
Plaintiff alleges that the restriction of his e-mail privileges violates his due process rights, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. He seeks monetary damages and an order requiring Defendant to grant him access to TRULINCS electronic messaging system.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no "genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that "the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In establishing whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. "The nonmoving party's evidence `is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor.' " Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." See Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable rule of law. Id. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Id.
Summary judgment will not be denied based on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings; instead, some evidence must be produced to support a material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); United States v. Premises Known as 717 S. Woodward Street, Allentown, Pa., 2 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir.1993). The nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Local Civil Rule 56.1 imposes additional requirements on parties in summary judgment motions, mandating they "set[ ] forth material facts as to which there does not exist a genuine issue," L. Civ. R. 56.1(a), which the parties have accomplished.
A defendant is protected by qualified immunity if he or she is a public officer or employee who "made a reasonable mistake about the legal constraints" on their actions. Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206-07 (3d Cir.2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A mistake is not reasonable when it amounts to the violation of a "clearly established" right, such that "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Curley, 499 F.3d at 207 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court described the two-step inquiry courts undertake in determining whether a governmental officer is entitled to qualified immunity. First, the Court must address whether "the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Id. at 201. As the Court of Appeals noted in Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir.2007), this is "not a question of immunity at all, but is instead the underlying question of whether there is even a wrong to be addressed in an analysis of immunity." Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. If the Court determines that there was no constitutional violation, "there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
The question here is whether access to TRULINCS e-mail system was a clearly established right of constitutional dimension. The policy relating to the TRULINCS electronic messaging was installed in February 2009. There are no cases from the District of New Jersey that reference TRULINCS. However, a few other district courts have dealt with similar issues. In Sofsky v. Lappin, 2010 WL 3789322 (D.Mass. September 27, 2010), the court held that since plaintiff did not allege that he could not communicate to the public through other means, he did not establish denial of a fundamental constitutional right. In addition, one court held that a change in procedure for addressing outgoing mail did not present a significant hardship on a prisoner and did not constrain plaintiff's ability to communicate. Russell v. Whitehead, 2010 WL 2367370 (D.Md. June 09, 2010). These cases include a comparison of the issue of inmate e-mail access to other communication methods.
The Plaintiff has provided no case law or statutory authority to the contrary. Accordingly, as discussed in more detail below, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff has not established a violation of a constitutional right.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges three different constitutional violations arising from Defendant's rescission of Plaintiff's TRULINCS electronic messaging access; specifically, Plaintiff maintains his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated. The Court will discuss each alleged constitutional violation separately.
Plaintiff claims that a "total email ban on a prisoner also represents a severe physical limitation placed on his freedom of speech" and that his First Amendment rights as a prisoner are guaranteed by Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). (Am. Compl. at 16-17.) Further, Plaintiff argues that the restriction of his e-mail "serve[s] no legitimate correctional system purpose." (Am. Compl. at ¶ 43.)
The Defendant argues the policy promulgated by the BOP states that e-mail access is a privilege, not a right, and the Warden may restrict the access of any inmate to the TRULINCS system. Moreover, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's computer knowledge and prior violation of BOP code regarding computer use were justification for imposing the ban. Finally, Defendant argues that "Plaintiff still has access to send and receive correspondence through regular mail, and is able to communicate on the telephone," and therefore his ability to communicate is minimally effected. (Mot. Summ. J. at 12.)
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, inter alia, that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . ." U.S. Const. amend. I. "Convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison," Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). However, the Supreme Court has also required that prison officials "be accorded wideranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Id. at 547.
Since Plaintiff has not challenged the BOP Program Statement 5265.13, entitled "Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer Systems (TRULINCS)—Electronic Messaging" which provides in part, "an inmate with a personal history or special skills of knowledge of using computers/email/Internet or other communication methods as a conduit for committing illegal activities will be excluded," the Court will not conduct the analysis from Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), which analyzes the policy itself. Here, the Defendant has provided her reasons for restricting Plaintiff's access to TRULINCS electronic messaging, which comply with the aforementioned policy statement. Plaintiff's familiarity with computers preceding his incarceration and his prior abuse of the prison system's computers, namely his tampering with other inmates' legal information, are more than sufficient reasons for Defendant to revoke Plaintiff's privileges. Moreover, the Defendant's restriction removed only a small fraction of Plaintiff's communication with the external world, and served a safety interest for the institution in protecting the privacy of other prisoners and reducing conflict among prisoners. Consequently, Defendant's actions did not violate a clearly established right and Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiff's First Amendment Claims.
In response, Defendant argues that no liberty interest exists in electronic messaging and that no significant hardship is presented in relation to ordinary prison life. Moreover, Defendant posits that she personally considered Plaintiff's circumstances before imposing any restriction. (Mot. Summ. J. at 13.)
A liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources: the Due Process Clause or state law. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Asquith v. Department of Corrections, 186 F.3d 407, 409 (3d Cir.1999). In order to establish a Due Process claim, an individual must show that he or she was deprived of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986). A liberty interest is an essential prerequisite to a Due Process claim. An additional requirement is imposed on prisoners to show "an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life." See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is a protected liberty interest and is not entitled to due process. There is no atypical and significant hardship as required by Sandin. E-mail messaging does not become a protected liberty interest when other communication methods remain available. As stated immediately below subsection III.B., there is no clear case law providing an entitlement to electronic messaging for inmates. In fact, the case law from various districts, including Rueb, 2011 WL 839320 at 6 (stating there is no first amendment right to e-mail) and Sofsky, 2010 WL 3789322 at 1 (holding that because Plaintiff did not allege he could not communicate with the public through other methods, there was no denial of a constitutional right), indicates the opposite is more likely to be true.
Though Plaintiff alleges that the uniqueness of electronic messaging makes it the most effective method of communication, he does not allege he is otherwise constrained from communicating externally. With other means of communication available, including the telephone, mail, and visitation rights, there is no significant hardship placed on Plaintiff.
Since the policy itself is not at issue, the Defendant gave Plaintiff due process by following the correct procedure as outlined in Program Statement 5265.13. Plaintiff's due process claim is therefore denied.
Plaintiff brings a "class of one" claim in accordance with Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, which provides for "a class of one claim where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in the treatment." 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Likewise, Plaintiff feels that the Defendant's reasoning for excluding him from TRULINCS e-mail system is irrational and not "rationally related to a government interest." (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 38, 39.)
Defendant argues that this claim is without merit, as Plaintiff failed to aver he has been treated differently than similarly situated inmates. (Mot. Summ. J. at 16.) Specifically, Defendant states that Plaintiff has not alleged that any other similarly situated inmates have been treated differently. Finally, Defendant states that her rationale was provided to Plaintiff and is consistent with the BOP Policy Statement covering TRULINCS electronic messaging.
To prove a lack of rational basis, a plaintiff must negate every conceivable rational basis for his differential treatment. See Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) ("[T]he burden is upon the challenging party to negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."); Ramsgate Court Townhome Ass'n v. West Chester Borough, 313 F.3d 157, 160 (3d Cir.2002). Even with class of one claims, like all Equal Protection claims, the burden falls on a plaintiff to negate all other rational explanations for the state actor's action.
Plaintiff has failed to negate all conceivable reasons why Defendant restricted his e-mail access for the purpose of institutional safety. One conceivable reason was that Defendant was concerned Plaintiff would invade fellow inmates' privacy and create animosity and unrest in the prison population. The Plaintiff has put forth no evidence to negate this.
In addition, Plaintiff has not established that similarly situated inmates were treated differently. In fact, Plaintiff compares his situation to that of only one other inmate, Jeffrey Payne. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Payne was incarcerated for distribution of child pornography and used computers to facilitate these acts. However, the case of Mr. Payne is distinguishable because he, even if convicted as alleged by Plaintiff, has not been punished by the BOP for acting in violation of the computer policy.
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of Defendant's decision to rescind Plaintiff's access to TRULINCS electronic messaging, arguing that the decision is an abuse of discretion and a "clear error of judgment." (Am. Compl. at ¶ 43.) Additionally, Plaintiff states that the decision was not based on "a consideration of relevant factors." (Am. Compl. at ¶ 42 citing Bowman Trans., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974) (internal citations omitted).) On a separate note, Plaintiff claims that since BOP Policy Statement 5265.13 is the only PS that deals with e-mail access, a notice and comment period should be provided. Ultimately, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's decisions should be overruled pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 ("APA").
Defendant asserts that her decision "was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." (Mot. Summ. J. at 19.) In addition, Defendant states that Congress has not directly spoken to this issue and therefore this court should defer to the BOP's, interpretation and the Defendant's judgment, since they have more expertise. Id. at 21. Finally, Defendant contends that her decision "was in conformity with guidance provided by the Program Statement." Id. at 22.
"Abuse of discretion" is the standard of review under the APA, which requires a reviewing court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). A reviewing court must find that the actual choice made by the agency was neither arbitrary nor capricious. See C.K. v. N.J. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 92 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir.1996); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414, (1971) ("agency action must be set aside if the action was `arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' . . . ."), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 (1977) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). "[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974).
The Court must first determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If Congress has expressed a clear intent, that matter is concluded. Id. However, if Congress has not directly spoken to the issue, a reviewing court must defer to a "permissible construction of the statute" by the agency, rather than substituting its own judgment. Id. at 483.
Here, BOP authority to implement communications systems arises from 18 U.S.C. § 4042, which states the BOP is to provide for the "safekeeping, care, and subsistence" of all federal inmates. 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2). The Program Statement that directs TRULINCS was created by the BOP pursuant to their authority under § 4042. Further, this Program Statement includes interpretations of what the BOP deems as conduct that jeopardizes communication privileges. Since the statute delegating the BOP their authority makes no mention of prison communication systems, Congress has not directly spoken to the issue. Next, the Court must determine whether the BOP's decision was arbitrary or capricious.
Defendant's decision to rescind Plaintiff's access to TRULINCS electronic messaging was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Two reasons are cited by Defendant for banning Plaintiff from TRULINCS electronic messaging: (1) Plaintiffs expertise with computers and (2) Plaintiff's prior disciplinary action concerning misuse of a BOP computer. (Moran Declaration at 6-7.) Since Defendant based her decision on criterion contained within the Program Statement, her decision was not an abuse of discretion. Moreover, because the restriction placed on Plaintiff was in the interest of prisoner safety, it is accordance with the goals of § 4042. In this instance, the Court will defer to the BOP's interpretation. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim under the APA is dismissed.
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
