Filed: Mar. 07, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: BLD-187 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 13-3783 _ JOSEPH WATSON, Appellant v. PAUL FISHER, Former Kitchen Food Service Manager; REAM, Kitchen Supervisor; THOMAS PAPUGA, Captain; GLASS, Major; SNYDER, Security Lieutenant; JECHONECH, Kitchen Cook; VERNEAU, Kitchen Cook; TROY, Correction Security Officer; CO RANDY PRATTS _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 3-09-cv-00087) Magistrate Jud
Summary: BLD-187 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 13-3783 _ JOSEPH WATSON, Appellant v. PAUL FISHER, Former Kitchen Food Service Manager; REAM, Kitchen Supervisor; THOMAS PAPUGA, Captain; GLASS, Major; SNYDER, Security Lieutenant; JECHONECH, Kitchen Cook; VERNEAU, Kitchen Cook; TROY, Correction Security Officer; CO RANDY PRATTS _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 3-09-cv-00087) Magistrate Judg..
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BLD-187 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-3783
___________
JOSEPH WATSON,
Appellant
v.
PAUL FISHER, Former Kitchen Food Service Manager;
REAM, Kitchen Supervisor;
THOMAS PAPUGA, Captain;
GLASS, Major;
SNYDER, Security Lieutenant;
JECHONECH, Kitchen Cook;
VERNEAU, Kitchen Cook;
TROY, Correction Security Officer;
CO RANDY PRATTS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-09-cv-00087)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Lisa Pupo Lenihan
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
and for Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 27, 2014
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed March 7, 2014)
_________________
OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM
Joseph Watson, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order granting summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and
procedural history, we recount only the essential facts. Watson is a prisoner currently in
the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) in the State
Correctional Institution at Somerset (“SCI-Somerset”). On April 3, 2009, he initiated the
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several DOC employees at SCI-Somerset.
Watson contended that the Defendants violated his rights as protected under the First,
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in various ways from 2006 to 2009, while
he worked in the kitchen at SCI-Somerset. Specifically, Watson alleged that he and
several other inmates were targeted for invasive strip searches when they worked in the
prison kitchen, and that after he filed formal grievances he became the target of ongoing
harassment.
The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Watson’s complaint in the District
Court, which granted the motion. Watson appealed. Upon review, we affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. See Watson v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr., 436 F.
App’x 131 (3d Cir. 2011). We agreed with the District Court that Watson had failed to
state claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, but determined that his First
Amendment retaliation and access to courts claims, as well as his Fourth Amendment
claim pertaining to the strip searches, should have survived the motion to dismiss.
2
On remand, the District Court entered an order providing Watson with a period of
time to file an amended complaint consistent with our opinion. Watson ultimately filed a
second amended complaint on February 22, 2012. The Defendants filed motions to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this time seeking dismissal
of Watson’s access to courts claims. The District Court granted their motions on August
21, 2012. Thereafter, the District Court granted the Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment on Watson’s remaining claims. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District
Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, as well as its grant of summary judgment, is
plenary. Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).
The District Court properly dismissed Watson’s access to courts claims. The
second amended complaint alleged that the Defendants denied him access to the courts
on two occasions. First, Watson alleged that he was unable to bring criminal charges
against various DOC employees, including the kitchen staff, for their alleged actions
because the Defendants confiscated evidence supporting his case during a cell search.
Second, he claimed that he was unable to adequately file a federal habeas petition
challenging his criminal conviction because some the documents that he needed to
support the petition were left in “disarray” and “trashed” when he was moved to a
different housing unit in the prison.
To establish a cognizable access-to-the-courts claim, a prisoner must demonstrate
that he has suffered an actual injury to his ability to present a claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518
3
U.S. 343, 352-54 (1996). Moreover, the claim must relate to either a direct or collateral
challenge to the prisoner’s sentence or conditions of confinement.
Id. at 355
(“Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental . . .
consequences of conviction and incarceration.”). Watson alleged that the combined
actions of all of the named Defendants prevented him from pursuing a criminal
prosecution against the DOC employees who participated in the strip searches. We agree
with the District Court that Watson did not state an actual injury. Watson’s claim that the
Defendants’ alleged actions affected his ability to pursue a criminal prosecution does not
implicate one of the two types of cases enumerated in Lewis.
Watson also claimed that, during a move to a different housing unit at the prison,
unspecified guards essentially rearranged documents that he kept in a footlocker, causing
him to submit a 2008 habeas petition without all of the necessary supporting documents.1
The District Court determined that Watson failed to state a viable access-to-the-courts
claim under Lewis because he did not suffer any injury. However, even if he had, the
claim was subject to dismissal because the second amended complaint failed to
adequately allege and demonstrate personal involvement on the part of any of the named
Defendants.
As we noted in our decision addressing Watson’s earlier appeal, to be liable under
§ 1983, each individual defendant “must have personal involvement in the alleged
1
Although Watson claimed that the documents were “trashed,” based on his explanation
in the complaint the documents were left in disarray but were not destroyed.
4
wrongdoing.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v.
Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). “Personal involvement can be shown
through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. These allegations must be made with appropriate particularity.
Id. We agree with the District Court that no facts were alleged in the second amended
complaint suggesting which Defendants, if any, were personally involved, or had actual
knowledge and acquiesced, in the commission of this alleged wrong.2 Dismissal was
therefore appropriate.
We further conclude that the District Court properly granted the Defendants’
motions for summary judgment on Watson’s retaliation claim, as well as on his Fourth
Amendment claim pertaining to the strip searches.
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), “[n]o action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Properly perfected exhaustion of
administrative remedies is mandatory. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). To
properly exhaust, a prisoner must bring his complaint to every level of the state’s prison
grievance system and follow all of its procedures.
Id. at 85. An untimely or otherwise
2
Because we affirm on this ground, we need not discuss whether Watson also failed to
state a claim under Lewis.
5
procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal results in a procedural default
and does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement, thereby precluding an action in federal
court. See Id., at 90-91 (proper exhaustion of administrative remedies means using all
steps that the agency requires, and doing so properly so that the agency addresses the
issues on the merits); Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004). Under DC-
ADM 804, exhaustion requires three steps: the filing of an initial grievance; an appeal to
the facility manager or superintendent; and an appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate
Grievances and Appeals.
It is undisputed that Watson failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies
with respect to the two grievances that implicate the remaining claims.3 He argues,
however, that he could not exhaust his administrative remedies because prison officials
failed to provide him with a means of appealing his grievances by depriving him of a
copy of the prison handbook. Although exhaustion is mandatory, a prisoner must only
exhaust remedies that are “available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The availability of an
administrative remedy is a question of law that we review de novo. Ray v. Kertes, 285
F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2002). An administrative remedy is unavailable when a prison
official prevents a prisoner from pursuing the prison grievance process. See Mitchell v.
3
In January 2008, Watson filed grievance number 214850, alleging that the pat searches
constituted harassment and/or sexual harassment. In February 2008, Watson filed
grievance number 217079, alleging that a misconduct report was issued against him in
retaliation for having filed the earlier grievance.
6
Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003); Brown v. Croak,
312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir.
2002).
We agree with the District Court that the alleged failure to provide Watson with a
copy of the grievance procedures did not preclude him from exhausting his administrative
remedies. The record demonstrates that when Watson attempted to file an appeal of
grievance number 214850, he submitted it to the wrong office. Rather than filing it with
the Superintendent, as the procedure requires, he filed it with the Office of Inmate
Grievances and Appeals. The appeal was returned to Watson with specific instructions
that such appeals must be first filed with the Superintendent. Watson did not take any
further action with regard to grievance number 214850, and he failed to appeal grievance
number 217079 altogether.
Therefore, even if Watson did not have a copy of the prison handbook, he was
made aware of the proper grievance process when he filed his first appeal. Watson has
not provided copies of any documents suggesting that he attempted to perfect his appeal
via proper channels, but was denied an opportunity to do so. Rather, the evidence
strongly suggests that Watson abandoned the appeals. Summary judgment was therefore
appropriate.4
4
The District Court held in the alternative that the Defendants were entitled judgment as a
matter of law on the merits of these claims. However, because we affirm on exhaustion
grounds, we need not address this alternative holding.
7
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
8
