SARA LIOI, District Judge.
Before the Court is the motion of pro se petitioner Isaac Green, Jr. ("Green") to reopen 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1), asking the Court to revisit its order denying his motion to vacate his sentence. (Doc. No. 160 ["Rule 60(d) Mot."].) In support of his Rule 60(d) motion, Green requests leave to expand the record. (Doc. No. 161 ["Mot. Expand"].) As the Court does not require any response from respondent United States of America (the "government"), these matters are ripe for review. For the reasons to follow, both motions are DENIED.
In January 2013, a federal jury convicted Green of possession of counterfeit obligations, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472, but was unable to reach a verdict as to two other charges contained in the federal indictment issued August 1, 2012. (Doc. No. 67 (Verdict); see Doc. No. 1 (Federal Indictment).) The government elected to proceed with a retrial of the remaining two counts, and upon retrial to a federal jury in March 2013, Green was convicted of possession of an unregistered firearm, a violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), and 5871, and being a felon in possession of firearms, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). (Doc. No. 89 (Verdicts).) On June 28, 2013, this Court sentenced Green to a term of imprisonment of 120 months. (Doc. No. 109 (Judgment).) Green took a direct appeal and, on July 16, 2014, the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court's judgment. United States v. Green, 572 F. App'x 438 (6th Cir. 2014).
On August 3, 2015, Green filed a motion to vacate the Court's judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffectiveness of counsel, police misconduct by state police officers who executed the search warrant at Green's residence, this Court's limitation of cross-examination of a police officer at the suppression hearing, and prosecutorial misconduct and/or malicious prosecution. (Doc. No. 146 ["2255 Mot."].)
Citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), Green argues that this Court was without jurisdiction to issue its pre-trial ruling on his motion to suppress because:
(Rule 60(d) Mot. at 2016) (citations and numerals omitted).) In support of Rule 60(d) relief, he requests leave to expand the record to include a letter, dated October 2, 2012, from the Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney advising that the state charges against Green were "dismissed due to current pending federal charges[,]" referring to the charges contained in the indictment in this federal action. (Doc. No. 161-1 (Letter) at 2027.)
Rule 60(d)(1) provides that a court may "entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1). The Sixth Circuit has identified the "indisputable elements" of an independent action as:
Mitchell v. Rees, 651 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Barrett v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 840 F.2d 1259, 1263 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). This relief is only available "to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L. Ed. 2d 32 (1988). A "grave miscarriage of justice" is a "stringent and demanding standard" and, in a habeas context, a claimant must "make a strong showing of actual innocence." Mitchell, 651 F.3d at 595-96.
Green has failed to satisfy the elements for an independent action, and has further failed to make a showing of actual innocence. He has neglected to put forward any facts suggesting that he did not commit the federal crimes for which he was convicted. Moreover, there has been no miscarriage of justice or fraud regarding his federal convictions. Instead, misapplying several legal concepts relating to jurisdiction and abstention, Green erroneously suggests that this Court was without jurisdiction either to preside over the prosecution of the federal charges for which he was convicted or to consider the constitutionality of the evidence offered in support of those charges. Of course, it is well-established that "a federal prosecution does not bar a subsequent state prosecution of the same person for the same acts, and a state prosecution does not bar a federal one." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L. Ed. 2d 303 (1978) (citing Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L. Ed. 2d 729 (1959)).
Green's jurisdictional argument is baseless and, accordingly, he has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(d).
For the foregoing reasons, Green's Rule 60(d) motion (Doc. No. 160) and his motion to expand the record (Doc. No. 161) are DENIED. Further, the Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith, and that there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).