REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CYNTHIA REED EDDY, Magistrate Judge.

RECOMMENDATION

Presently pending before the court are the following:

For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that each motion be granted. Specifically, it is respectfully recommended as follows:

It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice against the following individuals:

It is further respectfully recommended that the following claims be dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction:

It is further respectfully recommended that the following claims be dismissed against all Defendants as frivolous:

It is further respectfully recommended that the remainder of Plaintiff's claims against Hampton Township, Sgt. Kirsopp, Allegheny County, the City of Pittsburgh, Leslie Lewis, Paul Last Name Unknown, Ed Last Name Unknown, and Bob Last Name Unknown be dismissed.

It is further respectfully recommended that the court enter a show cause order as to why the court should not abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) as to Plaintiff's remaining claims against the remaining Defendants.

REPORT

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, proceeding pro se, against a myriad of Defendants in connection with his eviction from Devlin's Pointe Apartments in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. All of the well-supported factual allegations set forth in Plaintiff's complaint are taken as true and given all reasonable inferences. Additionally, judicial notice is taken of certain facts of public record concerning Plaintiff's eviction from Devlin's Pointe Apartments.

Plaintiff is black and is originally from Panama. Compl. [ECF No. 1] at ¶ 1. Plaintiff began renting from Defendant Devlin Apartments in 2000 and had a year-to-year lease that ran from February to February. Id. at ¶¶ 2-3. In 2015, Plaintiff wanted to renew his lease, but did not return a signed copy of the lease. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff continued to pay his rent as usual despite his failure to return a copy of the signed lease. Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff does not include in the complaint what amount of rent he paid in the interim. When Plaintiff reviewed his new lease, he noticed that his rent was increased to $1,060.00 and his name was misspelled on the lease documents. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 11. Plaintiff did not sign the lease due to the misspelling of his name and told the management company that he would not sign the lease until his name was corrected. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12. The management company eventually drafted a new lease with the correct spelling of Plaintiff's name, which Plaintiff executed. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiff alleges that after he signed his lease, certain "things" began to happen, including his assertion that his hot water was intentionally turned off for an unidentified period of time, and that his apartment was "flooded" with gas. Plaintiff contacted emergency services when his apartment was allegedly being flooded with gas, however, air quality testing completed by the responding firefighters did not detect "anything of concern." Id. at ¶ 29.

On September 18, 2015, Devlin's Pointe commenced eviction proceedings against Plaintiff in Pennsylvania's magisterial district court. See Magisterial District Judge Docket No. MJ-05304-LT-0000034-2015 [ECF No. 15-2]. On September 21, 2015, the eviction complaint was issued via hand delivery. Id. The eviction complaint was marked successfully served on Plaintiff on September 29, 2015.1 Id. According to Plaintiff, Devlin's Pointe initiated the eviction proceedings for a "breach in the condition of the lease." Compl. [ECF No. 1] at ¶ 41. The state court docket reflects that the eviction proceedings were commenced because of "rent in arrears." See Magisterial District Judge Docket No. MJ-05304-LT-0000034-2015 [ECF No. 15-2]. Plaintiff alleges that his name was "intentionally" misspelled in initiating the eviction proceedings in order to deceive him. Compl. [ECF No. 1] at ¶ 43. The name on the docket read "Ambrosia Rouse" instead of Plaintiff's name, "Ambrosio Rouse." See Magisterial District Judge Docket No. MJ-05304-LT-0000034-2015 [ECF No. 15-2]. Plaintiff further alleges that Devlin's Pointe waived any right to argue that Plaintiff had breached the lease by not timely executing a lease extension, because they continued to accept his rent payments. Compl. [ECF No. 1] at ¶ 41.

On November 7, 2015, Plaintiff was "surprised" by a loud knock at his door and upon opening the door, a total of four individuals and Sergeant Kirsopp were present at his door. Id. at ¶¶ 48-50. Plaintiff believes that a Devlin's Pointe Apartment employee was one of the people present, but does not provide any further identification as to that individual. Id. at ¶ 54. A person who identified himself as a "constable," presumably Donald Glock, informed Plaintiff that he was being evicted and that he had five minutes to gather his belongings and leave the premises. Id. at ¶ 51. Plaintiff stated to the individuals that he did not owe rent, and when given a copy of the court documents presumably detailing the eviction judgment, it contained the misspelling of his name. Id. at ¶¶ 54-56. When Plaintiff brought this to Sgt. Kirsopp's attention, he responded to Plaintiff that he could not resolve the misspelling discrepancy and that he was only there to assist with the eviction. Id. at ¶ 58. The Constable Glock asked Plaintiff for identification, which Plaintiff handed over and according to Plaintiff, Constable Glock "acknowledged" a discrepancy between Plaintiff's identification and the name on the eviction judgment. Id. at 57. Plaintiff proceeded to call 911 and alleged that these individuals were trespassing. Id. at ¶ 59. The 911 operator told Plaintiff that they could not do anything because there was already an officer present and that the officer was the person who would have to resolve any issues. Id at ¶ 63.

Sgt. Kirsopp then entered Plaintiff's apartment and told Plaintiff that he did not have time to waste and that he could not solve anything and that Plaintiff had to leave and comply with his orders. Id. at ¶ 66. Constable Glock reminded Plaintiff that he had five minutes to gather his belongings and leave. Id. at ¶ 67. Plaintiff then gathered a few belongings and was escorted off of the premises by Sgt. Kirsopp. Id. While Plaintiff was being escorted off of the premises, he realized that he had left his cell phone behind in the apartment and asked Sgt. Kirsopp for permission to retrieve it. Id. at ¶ 69. Sgt. Kirsopp told Plaintiff that he could not do so and it was too late because the constable had already proceeded to lock the door and had taken possession of the apartment. Id. at ¶ 70. Plaintiff then requested to speak with the management of Devlin's Pointe but was told that they were not there. Id. at ¶ 71.

Because Plaintiff did not have anywhere to stay, Sgt. Kirsopp offered to drive Plaintiff to a hotel, and proceeded to pat down Plaintiff before he entered the police vehicle. Id. at ¶¶ 72-76. Sgt. Kirsopp then drove Plaintiff to the township police building, and another unidentified officer drove Plaintiff to a local hotel. Id. at ¶¶ 73-76.

Since his eviction, Plaintiff has been without his belongings which he claims are in Devlin's Pointe Apartment's control. Plaintiff claims that Devlin's Point Apartment employees "Ed" and "Bob" and "others supervised by them," moved Plaintiff's belongings. Id. at ¶ 78.

A few days after Plaintiff was evicted, he contacted the magisterial district court and asked for information regarding his eviction. Id. at ¶ 79. Plaintiff alleges that he then obtained a copy of the notice of judgment of his eviction. Id. at ¶ 81. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Judge Blaschak, who presided over the eviction proceedings, did not have jurisdiction when she entered the eviction judgment in favor of Devlin's Pointe. Id. at ¶ 83. Plaintiff then filed a motion for leave to file a late appeal of the eviction judgment in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania on November 16, 2015. Id. at ¶ 85.

On November 24, 2015, a hearing was held on Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a late appeal before Judge Colville in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas and was attended by Plaintiff, Devlin's Pointe manager and Devlin's Pointe lawyers. Id. at ¶¶ 86, 95. Plaintiff argued in this hearing that, inter alia, his name did not appear on any judgment, that Devlin's Pointe actions were retaliatory in nature, that he was not served any notice of the action against him, even if service of the eviction complaint was accurate, that it would not have been sufficient to provide adequate compliance under Pennsylvania law, that Devlin's Pointe purposefully misrepresented Plaintiff's name in the eviction action to deceive him, and that he had been denied due process. Id. at ¶ 97. Plaintiff also argued that while Devlin's Pointe initiated eviction proceedings in September 2015, it had accepted rent from Plaintiff in October and November 2015. Id. at ¶¶ 98-99. According to Plaintiff, Devlin's Pointe's lawyer returned Plaintiff's check for the November 2015 rent at the hearing, but did not return the October 2015 check. Id. Judge Colville ultimately denied Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a late appeal. Id. at ¶ 101. Plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration and appealed Judge Colville's decision on December 22. 2015 to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which according to Plaintiff, remains pending. Id at ¶¶ 103-105.

Plaintiff levies a multitude of claims against a multitude of individuals. He names the following individuals and entities as defendants in this case:

Plaintiff enumerates the following claims3 in his complaint:

II. Standard of Review

a. Pro se litigants

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and is accorded substantial deference and liberality in pleadings in federal court. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). While Plaintiff is given this liberality, he is not free to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and must contain a modicum of factual specificity, identifying the particular conduct of the defendant that is alleged to have harmed Plaintiff, so that the court can determine whether the complaint is frivolous and whether a defendant has adequate notice to frame an answer. Frazier v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1986). A civil rights complaint, such as the one here, complies with this standard if it alleges the conduct violating the plaintiff's rights, the time and place of that conduct, and the identity of responsible officials. It must include factual allegations to support the constitutional claims raised in the complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

b. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

A federal court may dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when the allegations within the complaint are immaterial and made solely for purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, or are wholly insubstantial and frivolous. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.2008) (a plaintiff's federal claim may be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the claim clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, or when it is wholly insubstantial and frivolous). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact, and is subject to dismissal where it presents a cause of action that relies on "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). When determining whether a complaint is frivolous, the Court need not accept the factual allegations as true, but must "pierce the veil of the complaint," to determine if the allegations are "fanciful," "fantastic," or "delusional." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-329).

c. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well-settled. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This "`does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead `simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Nevertheless, the court need not accept as true "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences," Doug Grant, Inc. v. Great Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).

Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. . . . Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of `entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal citations omitted).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).

III. Discussion

While the factual allegations of Plaintiff's complaint are generally easy to follow, his enumerated causes of action are rambling, include unrecognized causes of action and do not explicitly state against which Defendant Plaintiff seeks to assert each claim. To save scare judicial resources, the undersigned will first discuss unrecognized and meritless causes of action that should be dismissed with prejudice and then will discuss the pending motions to dismiss.

a. Claims against "Devlin's Pointe Apartments' Management"

Plaintiff names both "Devlin's Pointe Apartments" and "Devlin's Pointe Apartments' Management" as parties to this action. He provides no factual basis, such as alleging that these are two separate legal entities, for initiating the action against both of these Defendants, and therefore, "Devlin's Pointe Apartments' Management" should be dismissed with prejudice as a duplicative party, and the court will interpret all of Plaintiff's claims against "Devlin's Pointe Apartments' Management" as being properly asserted as against "Devlin's Pointe Apartments."

b. Unrecognized and meritless causes of action that should be dismissed

Plaintiff's complaint includes numerous causes of action that are clearly meritless against all of the Defendants. A district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under 12(b)(6) after service of process if the plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to respond. See Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 430 n. 5 (3d Cir.1990). Hampton Township and Sgt. Kirsopp raised these grounds for dismissal in their motion to dismiss and Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to respond, and did so respond to the motion to dismiss. Further, a court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint even if a court does not give notice and an opportunity to respond where it is "clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that any amendment would be futile." Bethea v. Nation of Islam, 248 Fed. Appx. 331, 333 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citing Chute v. Walker, 281 F.3d 314, 319 (1st Cir.2002)). The claims recommended for dismissal here, even when construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are "patently meritless and beyond all hope of redemption" and are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice as to all of the Defendants, and not merely those who specifically moved to dismiss those claims. See Bethea, 248 Fed. Appx. at 333 (citing Chute, 281 F.3d at 319).

i. Rooker-Feldman doctrine7 and the doctrine of res judicata

Plaintiff asserts numerous claims that this court lacks jurisdiction over pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the following claims, unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment claims (Counts V-A and V-B), Fourteenth Amendment "unlawful takings" claim (Count VII), civil trespass under Pennsylvania law claim (Count VII-C), state law tortious interference with contract claim (Count XVI), "failure to train" claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI-B), and breach of contract claim (Count XV), and respectfully recommends that these claims be dismissed with prejudice.

In connection with his Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful search and seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges that:

Compl. [ECF No. 1] at ¶ 106 (emphasis added). Likewise, Plaintiff alleges that:

Id. at ¶ 108 (emphasis added). In connection with his Fourteenth Amendment "unlawful takings" claim made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges:

Id. at ¶ 119. In connection with Plaintiff's state law civil trespass claim, Plaintiff alleges:

Id. at ¶ 125 (emphasis added). In connection with his state law tortious interference with contract claim, Plaintiff alleges:

Id. at ¶ 171. In connection with his "failure to train" claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges:

Id. at ¶ 115. In connection with his breach of contract claim, Plaintiff alleges:

Id. at ¶ 169.

This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims for unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Counts V-A and V-B), his Fourteenth Amendment "unlawful takings" claim (Count VII), his claim for civil trespass under Pennsylvania law (Count VII-C), his claim for state law tortious interference with contract (Count XVI), his claim for "failure to train" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI-B), and his claim for breach of contract (Count XV) under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.8

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally stands for the proposition that a federal district court has no subject matter jurisdiction to review the propriety of state court decisions and judgments where the party who lost in state court complains about injuries from the state court ruling in federal court. Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2008). A federal district court lacks jurisdiction over any challenges to a state court decision that are essentially the functional equivalent of an appeal of the state court decision. Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 2004). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine not only applies to claims actually raised in the state court, but also those claims not actually raised but "inextricably intertwined" with the state court decision. Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 Fed. Appx. 149, 152 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (quoting Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 885 n. 11 (3d Cir.1994)). A federal district court may not provide relief that would effectively reverse a state court decision, directly or indirectly, prevent the enforcement of state court orders, or void the rulings issued by the state court in an eviction action. See Mestman v. Jones, 670 Fed. Appx. 752, 753 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of tenant's civil rights claims against landlord under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as ejectment order has been issued by the state court against the tenant).

Here, Plaintiff's claims for unlawful search and seizure, "failure to train," "unlawful takings," civil trespass, breach of contract and tortious interference with contract are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as granting Plaintiff his requested relief for these claims would necessarily invalidate the state court eviction order. It is clear that Plaintiff's basis for these claims stems from his allegation that the eviction order was improper because it was never served upon Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because it is patently clear that these claims are barred, it is respectfully recommended that these claims be dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants. See Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestic Relations Sections, 390 Fed. App'x 201, 203 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming district court's sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine) him and the order did not correctly spell his first name. However, any claim that the eviction order is invalid is necessarily barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as it requires the court to reject Judge Blaschak's order of eviction and Judge Colville's order denying Plaintiff's motion to file a late appeal. In other words, to grant Plaintiff his requested relief, i.e., finding that the purported lack of notice of eviction violated his legal rights, would require this court to find that the state court erred in entering the orders at issue and would effectively reverse the state court decisions. As such, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims for unlawful search and seizure, "failure to train," "unlawful takings," civil trespass, breach of contract and tortious interference with contract under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and it is respectfully recommended that these claims be dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants, as amendment would be futile.

In addition, it appears that this court is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel from adjudicating Plaintiff's claim that he received improper notice of his eviction or that his name was misspelled on the eviction proceedings, as any such argument is merely an attempt "to re-litigate issues that were already decided in state court." Okpala v. Lucian, 645 Fed. Appx. 138, 140 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished); see also Pondexter v. Allegheny County Hous. Auth., 329 Fed. Appx. 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (tenants barred by res judicata from asserting claims in federal court because the tenants could have raised the claims during the state court eviction proceedings).

In fact, Plaintiff alleges that at the hearing on his motion to file a late appeal, he argued to Judge Colville that his name did not appear on any judgment, that Devlin's Pointe was acting in retaliation against him, that he was never served notice of the eviction proceeding or order, that the eviction was improper under Pennsylvania law, that Devlin's Pointe intentionally misspelled his first name on eviction proceedings and he was denied due process. Compl. [ECF No. 1] at ¶¶ 96-101. As gleaned from the record, Judge Colville rejected Plaintiff's arguments when he denied Plaintiff's motion to file a late appeal. Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to base any of his claims on his allegations that he was improperly served with the eviction proceedings and judgment order, that his name was misspelled on the judgment rendering it "invalid," or that the eviction was improper under Pennsylvania law, such claims are barred by res judicata and should be dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.9 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 2002).

ii. Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim for "false arrest" (Count V-C)

Next, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim for "false arrest" (Count V-C) should be dismissed with prejudice, as Plaintiff does not allege that he was arrested at any time. See James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 2012) ("To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.").10

iii. Plaintiff's "abuse of process" claim (Count VI-A)

Next, Plaintiff's "abuse of process" claim (Count VI-A) should be dismissed with prejudice against all Defendants with the exception of Devlin's Pointe Apartments and James A. West, Jr., as Plaintiff has not alleged that any other Defendant has initiated any civil litigation against Plaintiff. See Gen. Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297, 304 (3d Cir. 2003) (Under Pennsylvania law, "[g]enerally speaking, to recover under a theory of abuse of process, a plaintiff must show that the defendant used legal process against the plaintiff in a way that constituted a perversion of that process and caused harm to the plaintiff.").11

iv. Plaintiff's federal criminal trespass claim (Count VII-A), criminal burglary claim (Count VII-B), state law criminal trespass claim (Count VII-C), and state law criminal theft claim (Count VII-D)

Next, Plaintiff's federal criminal trespass claim (Count VII-A), criminal burglary claim (Count VII-B), state law criminal trespass claim (Count VII-C), and state law criminal theft claim (Count VII-D) should be dismissed with prejudice, as Plaintiff has no authority to bring criminal charges against the Defendants, as that authority rests solely with the Commonwealth. Pa. R. Crim. P. 506 (a private criminal complaint may be submitted to an attorney for the Commonwealth who will approve or disapprove of the complaint).12

v. Plaintiff's "unlawful eviction" claim (Count VII-E)

Next, Plaintiff's claim for "unlawful eviction" (Count VII-E) should be dismissed with prejudice as duplicative of his section 1983 claims, and because there is no recognized cause of action under federal or Pennsylvania law for "unlawful eviction."

vi. Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claims (Counts X-A and X-B)

Next, Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Sixth Amendment (Counts X-A and X-B) should be dismissed with prejudice, as the Sixth Amendment "right to counsel" and "confrontation clause" elements attach only in relation to criminal proceedings. See U.S. Const. Amend. 6; Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 166 (2001). Plaintiff does not allege that he was charged with a crime or that any criminal proceedings were initiated; rather, he is complaining about his eviction proceedings. Accordingly, Counts X-A and X-B should be dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.13

vii. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment "excessive penalties/fines" claim (Count XI-A)

Next, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment "excessive penalties/fines" claim (Count XI-A) should also be dismissed with prejudice, as the Eighth Amendment proscribes cruel and unusual punishment in the form of excessive bail or excessive fines in criminal proceedings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Plaintiff does not allege that he was subject to any punishment by any of the Defendants, nor was he involved in any criminal proceedings, therefore this Count should be dismissed with prejudice.14

viii. Plaintiff's "42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)" claim (Count XVII)

Lastly, Plaintiff's "42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)" claim (Count XVII) should be dismissed with prejudice as duplicative of his claims at Count XIV.15

c. Judge Blaschak and Judge Colville are entitled to judicial immunity

While Judges Blaschak and Colville provide many cogent reasons for dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint, because the court recommends that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice against Judges Blaschak and Colville, as they are entitled to absolute immunity, only that will be discussed here. It is clear that the judicial defendants are absolutely immune from liability for all of the claims brought by Plaintiff against them, as Plaintiff solely complains about acts taken by the judicial defendants in their judicial capacities. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir.2006). Judicial immunity is not only immunity from damages, but immunity from the lawsuit itself. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Further, immunity applies even if the action the judge took was "in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. A judge will not be entitled to judicial immunity only when the judge "has acted in the `clear absence of all jurisdiction.'" Id. at 357 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351, 20 S.Ct. 646 (1872)). Here, both Judge Blaschak and Judge Colville had jurisdiction in connection with Plaintiff's eviction proceedings. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 151(a)(2) and 68 Pa.C.S. § 250.503 (giving jurisdiction of matters arising under the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 to Magisterial District Judges); 68 Pa.C.S. § 250.513 (appeals of Magisterial District Judges decisions are appealed to the common pleas court). Therefore, both Judge Blaschak and Judge Colville acted within their jurisdiction in connection with Plaintiff's eviction proceedings and should be afforded absolute immunity in connection with this lawsuit.

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the judicial defendants' motion to dismiss be granted, and all claims against them be dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 109.

d. Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp's Motion to Dismiss ECF No. 9 should be granted

Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp address the merits of each claim asserted against them by Plaintiff. Accordingly, each argument (with the exception of those already recommended to be dismissed) will be addressed seriatim.

i. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff asserts a myriad of constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides:

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff is required to show that an individual acting under color of state law violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights or statutory rights. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 749 n. 9 (1999) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)).

In order for a plaintiff to adequately state a claim under section 1983, he must establish that the defendant deprived him of a right secured by the United States Constitution acting under color of state law. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). A plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation "must portray specific conduct by [] officials which violates some constitutional right." Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015). By doing so, a plaintiff must demonstrate a defendant's "personal involvement" in the alleged constitutional violation by adequately alleging either (1) the defendant's personal involvement in the alleged violation; or (2) his actual knowledge and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct. Id. (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). "Although a court can infer that a defendant had contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a case, the knowledge must be actual, not constructive." Id. (citations omitted).

Municipalities, such as Hampton Township, are only liable under section 1983 where factual allegations show that a municipal custom or policy caused the constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. In doing so, the plaintiff must "identify a custom or policy, and specify what that custom or policy was." McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any municipal custom or policy that caused his purported constitutional violations. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that all of Plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Hampton Township, i.e., Counts V-A, V-B, VI-B, VI-C, VII, IX-A, IX-B be dismissed.

ii. Plaintiff's First Amendment "right of expression" claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IX-A) should be dismissed as to Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp

In connection with his First Amendment "right of expression" claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges:

Compl. [ECF No. 1] at ¶ 131.

The First Amendment protects "[a]n individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances" and federal courts "have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in the activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).

Plaintiff has not alleged any set of facts that would tend to show that any of the Defendants attempted to prevent Plaintiff from exercising his First Amendment rights in any way. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Count IX-A be dismissed as to Hampton Township and Sgt. Kirsopp.

iii. Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IX-B) should be dismissed as to Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp

In connection with his First Amendment retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges:

Compl. [ECF No. 1] at ¶ 133.

The First Amendment guarantees "the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I. A government may not retaliate against a citizen for exercising his rights guaranteed under the First Amendment. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). The right to petition protected by the First Amendment "extends to all departments of the Government, including administrative agencies . . . and encompasses formal and informal complaints . . . about matters of public and private concern." Arneault v. O'Toole, 513 Fed. Appx. 195, 198 (3d Cir. 2013) (unpublished). To state a valid First Amendment Retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show the following: (1) "that he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity"; (2) "that the government responded with retaliation"; and (3) "that the protected activity caused the retaliation." Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The "key question" in making the determination of whether an individual has been retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment rights is whether the government conduct "was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights." Thomas v. Indep. Tp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006).

Here, Plaintiff has not identified any constitutionally-protected activity that he engaged in, how the government responded with retaliation or how any constitutionally protected activity he engaged in caused the retaliation. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's claim for First Amendment retaliation (Count IX-B) be dismissed as against Hampton Township and Sgt. Kirsopp.

iv. Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981(c), 1983, 1985(3) and "state law" (Count XIV) and claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count XVIII) should be dismissed with prejudice as to Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp

Plaintiff includes two Counts which purport to state claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981(c), 1983, 1985(3) and "state law" (Count XIV) and under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count XVIII). While the court does not interpret Plaintiff's complaint at Count XIV as being asserted against Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp, and only interprets Plaintiff's complaint as asserting Count XVIII against these Defendants, Plaintiff nonetheless fails to state a claim against Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp for all of his purported claims under Counts XIV and XVIII.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1981(c) against Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp, these claims fail as a matter of law. Primarily, a claim made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is not a "conspiracy claim" as Plaintiff asserts, but rather prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts and property transactions and provides:

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). To state a claim under section 1981, "a plaintiff `must allege facts in support of the following elements: (1) [that plaintiff] is a member of a racial minority; (2) intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute[,] which includes the right to make and enforce contracts. . . .'" Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). To state a 1981 cause of action against a municipality, the plaintiff must "allege that the discrimination he suffered was pursuant to an official policy or custom of the City." McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the cause of action for damages created by section 1983 "constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in [section] 1981 by state governmental units.").

While Plaintiff alleges that he is a member of a racial minority, he alleges no set of facts that show how any Hampton Township policy or custom was used to discriminate against him on the basis of race in making and enforcing contracts. Likewise, he has not alleged any set of facts tending to show that Sergeant Kirsopp discriminated against him on the basis of race in making and/or enforcing contracts. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1981(c) against Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp, these claims be dismissed.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil conspiracy claim against Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp, Plaintiff has not identified any predicate denial of his civil rights by Hampton Township or Sergeant Kirsopp, which is "necessary before a cause of action" for civil conspiracy under section 1983 arises. Goldschmidt v. Patchett, 686 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Holt Cargo Sys., Inc. v. Delaware River Port Auth., 20 F.Supp.2d 803, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1998) aff'd, 165 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1999) (to state a claim for conspiracy under section 1983, there must be a predicate section 1983 violation).

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert conspiracy claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp, that those claims be dismissed.

Next, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp, such a claim fails. A complaint asserting a claim under section 1985 must allege "class-based, invidious discriminatory animus." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (§ 1985(3)); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir.1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)). No set of facts in Plaintiff's complaint tend to show that Hampton Township or Sergeant Kirsopp engaged in "class-based invidious discriminatory animus" and accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp, such a claim be dismissed.

Lastly, "viable claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 takes as its predicate the allegation of facts sufficient to support a claim under [section] 1985. Section 1986 creates a right of action for failure to prevent a wrong proscribed by [section] 1985." Messa v. Foley, CIV. 92-1887, 1993 WL 106519, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1993), aff'd, 17 F.3d 1430 (3d Cir. 1994). Because Plaintiff has failed to allege an adequate section 1985 claim against Hampton Township and Sergeant Kirsopp, he cannot state a claim under section 1986, and it is respectfully recommended that Count XVIII be dismissed against those Defendants.

e. Allegheny County's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 22] should be granted

i. Plaintiff has failed to identify any Allegheny County policy or custom in connection with his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims

Allegheny County argues that Plaintiff's section 1983 claims against it should be dismissed for failure to identify a policy or custom that caused his injuries.

Municipalities and other local governmental units "can be sued directly under [section] 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. "But, under [section] 1983, local governments are responsible only for `their own illegal acts,'" and "are not vicariously liable under [section] 1983 for their employees' actions." Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citations omitted). To state a plausible section 1983 claim against a municipality, the complaint must contain factual allegations showing that a municipal custom or policy caused the constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (the plaintiff must "identify a custom or policy, and specify what that custom or policy was").

Allegheny County is correct that Plaintiff has failed to identify any policy or custom of Allegheny County that would tend to show that it caused him any constitutional deprivation. Ostensibly, Plaintiff's claim for municipal liability rests upon his allegation that the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act is unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act is not a custom or policy of the municipal Defendants, but rather codified by the Pennsylvania legislature. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice as to his municipal liability claims against Allegheny County, as amendment would be futile.

ii. Plaintiff has failed to identify any Allegheny County agent or employee in connection with this lawsuit

Allegheny County argues that the complaint should be dismissed as it pertains to Allegheny County because Plaintiff has failed to identify that any Allegheny County agent or employee was materially involved in any of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's lawsuit.

Under Twombly and Iqbal, the complaint must contain enough factual content that accepted as true raises a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements of the cause of action asserted. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (citations omitted). A generous reading of Plaintiff's complaint illustrates that no employee or agent of Allegheny County was involved in any of the events giving rise to his numerous causes of action. Instead, the public servants he identifies in his complaint are the judges involved in his eviction proceedings, Sergeant Kirsopp who is employed by the Hampton Township Police Department, and two "Pennsylvania" constables, Donald Glock and an unidentified individual. Without more, Plaintiff's complaint cannot survive dismissal. It is therefore respectfully recommended that the remaining claims in Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed as to Allegheny County.

f. The City of Pittsburgh's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 48] should be granted

i. Plaintiff has failed to identify any City of Pittsburgh agent or employee in connection with this lawsuit

As explained supra, a Plaintiff must include enough factual content that raises a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the elements of the cause(s) of action asserted. Plaintiff has failed to include any facts explaining how the City of Pittsburgh was involved in any of the events giving rise to his numerous causes of action and has not identified any City of Pittsburgh agent or employee who has allegedly acted unlawfully, nor has he identified any city custom or policy that has allegedly violated his constitutional rights. Ostensibly, Plaintiff's claim for municipal liability rests upon his allegation that the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act is unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act is not a custom or policy of the municipal Defendants, but rather codified by the Pennsylvania legislature. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed against the City of Pittsburgh.

g. Unserved Defendants

There are six unserved Defendants in this matter: Constable Donald Glock, Constable John Doe, Leslie Lewis, Devlin's Pointe Apartments manager, Paul Last Name Unknown, Ed Last Name Unknown and Bob Last Name Unknown.

Donald Glock and John Doe are the two constables that were present at the eviction. Compl. [ECF No. 1] at ¶¶ 11-12. Plaintiff alleges that one of the constables informed Plaintiff he was being evicted for not paying rent, checked his identification and told him he had five minutes to leave and locked the apartment door. Id. at ¶¶ 51-70. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against the John Doe constable by alleging that this constable was present during the eviction. Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff does not explain how either constable violated Plaintiff's civil rights or state law in connection with the eviction process, other than complaining that they were operating under the purportedly invalid eviction order. As mentioned supra, because it is recommended that any of Plaintiff's claims related to Plaintiff's allegation that he was operating under a purportedly invalid eviction order be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman and res judicata doctrines, it is respectfully recommended that all of the claims against Constable Glock and Constable John Doe be dismissed with prejudice.16 See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 109.

Turning to the remaining unserved Defendants, Leslie Lewis, Paul, Ed and Bob are all Devlin's Pointe employees. See Compl. [ECF No. 1] at ¶¶ 13-15. Plaintiff alleges no set of facts regarding how Leslie Lewis was involved in any of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's action. Plaintiff alleges that Paul was present during the eviction, but alleges no other set of facts as it pertains to Paul. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that Ed and Bob moved Plaintiff's belongings after he was evicted. Id. at ¶ 78. Plaintiff does not explain how Leslie Lewis, Paul, Ed or Bob are liable to him for any of his asserted claims and the court will not attempt glean Plaintiff's claims against these individuals from Plaintiff's rambling complaint. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint as asserted against Leslie Lewis, Paul Last Name Unknown, Ed Last Name Unknown, and Bob Last Name Unknown be dismissed.

h. Younger Abstention Doctrine

Plaintiff indicates that he has appealed Judge Colville's decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which according to Plaintiff, remains pending. As such, Plaintiff should be ordered to show cause as to why this court should not abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the remaining claims in this action, because Plaintiff's appeal of his eviction may be ongoing, important state interests are implicated in the appeals process of eviction actions and Plaintiff may raise his federal claims in state court, as they all hinge on whether the eviction order was valid. See Abreu v. Ochoa-Salazar, CV 17-3109 (JLL), 2017 WL 1900729, at *2 (D.N.J. May 8, 2017) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971)).17

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, it is respectfully recommended that each motion be granted. Specifically, it is respectfully recommended as follows:

It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice against the following individuals:

It is further respectfully recommended that the following claims be dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction:

It is further respectfully recommended that the following claims be dismissed against all Defendants as frivolous:

It is further respectfully recommended that the remainder of Plaintiff's claims against Hampton Township, Sgt. Kirsopp, Allegheny County, the City of Pittsburgh, Leslie Lewis, Paul Last Name Unknown, Ed Last Name Unknown, and Bob Last Name Unknown be dismissed.

It is further respectfully recommended that the court enter a show cause order as to why the court should not abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) as to Plaintiff's remaining claims against the remaining Defendants.

In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and the Local Rules for Magistrates Judges, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service to file objections to this report and recommendation, or by May 16, 2018. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).