KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Magistrate Judge.
On February 1, 2017, the Court received and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus submitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, originally signed and dated by the Petitioner, Isaiah S. Valenti (hereinafter referred to as "Valenti"), on January 24, 2017. (Doc. 1). At all times relevant to this action, Valenti has been incarcerated at SCI-Somerset, located in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, at 1). For the following reasons, it is recommended that Valenti's Petition be
In his petition, Valenti challenges his December 3, 2008 sentence in the Court of Common Pleas of York County of 11-27 years in prison. (Doc. 1, at 1); Commonwealth v. Valenti, Docket No. CP-67-CR-0001075-2008 (York Cnty. C.C.P.).
Upon the conclusion of direct review, Valenti filed a pro se petition for collateral relief under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") in the York County Court of Common Pleas (the "PCRA Court") on April 20, 2010, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. (Doc. 1, at 4); Commonwealth v. Valenti, Docket No. CP-67-CR-0001075-2008 (York Cnty. C.C.P.). On July 19, 2010, the PCRA Court denied Valenti's PCRA petition. (Doc. 1, at 5); Commonwealth v. Valenti, Docket No. CP-67-CR-0001075-2008 (York Cnty. C.C.P.). Valenti appealed the denial of his PCRA petition on August 11, 2010, however withdrew the appeal on September 30, 2010. Commonwealth v. Valenti, Docket No. CP-67-CR-0001075-2008 (York Cnty. C.C.P.); Commonwealth v. Valenti, Docket No. 1316 MDA 2010 (Pa. Super. Ct.). On October 18, 2011, Valenti filed a second PCRA petition,
Valenti, proceeding pro se, signed and dated the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on January 29, 2017, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 1, at 21, 22-25). The Eastern District of Pennsylvania filed the petition on February 1, 2017, however denied Valenti's application to proceed in forma pauperis on February 15, 2017. (Doc. 2). On April 28, 2017, the action was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). (Doc. 4; Doc. 6; Doc. 7). After reviewing the petition, this Court directed Respondents to file an answer, motion, or other response pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. (Doc. 10). On October 12, 2017, Respondents filed an answer to Valenti's petition, asserting that all of Valenti's claims were procedurally defaulted, and that Valenti failed to establish any cause and prejudice resulting from the default. (Doc. 17). As Valenti declined to file a response brief, this petition is now ripe for disposition.
Valenti presents the following two grounds for relief in his federal habeas petition:
Respondents submit that Valenti's grounds for relief are not properly before this Court because the claims were not fairly presented to the Pennsylvania State Courts. (Doc. 17, at 10). Generally, a federal district court may not address the merits of a habeas petition unless all of the claims contained in the petition have been exhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). "The exhaustion requirement is satisfied only if the petitioner can show that he fairly presented the federal claim at each level of the established state-court system for review." Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 714 (3d Cir. 2004); see also O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 ("[T]he exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts . . . by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process."). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit notes that "`[f]air presentation' of a claim means that the petitioner `must present a federal claim's factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.'" Holloway, 355 F.3d at 714 (quoting McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999)). A federal claim may be exhausted by presenting it either on direct appeal or in post-conviction PCRA proceedings. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844 (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953)). Exhaustion also "turns on an inquiry into what procedures are `available' under state law." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847.
In Pennsylvania, a federal claim is deemed exhausted once it is presented to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania—either on direct appeal from a state criminal conviction or on appeal from a PCRA court's denial of post-conviction relief—because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not considered an "available" state court remedy. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (declaring review from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to be "unavailable" for purposes of exhausting state court remedies); see also In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, Order No. 218, (Pa. May 9, 2000); Pa. R. App. P. 1114 historical notes (Order of May 9, 2000). Here, Respondents contend that Valenti's claims are procedurally defaulted, as he never presented the instant due process challenges to the Pennsylvania state courts. (Doc. 17, at 9). In his federal habeas petition, Valenti concedes that his trial and appellate counsel did not raise these claims on direct appeal from his state criminal conviction. (Doc. 1, at 9, 13). However, Valenti asserts that he presented these claims to both the PCRA Court and the Superior Court on PCRA review.
Valenti cannot now go back and "fairly present" his federal grounds for relief in a third PCRA petition because the time for him to bring a new PCRA petition has expired. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b)(1) (requiring a PCRA petition to be filed "within one year of the date the judgment becomes final").
While a federal court generally will not review a claim that is procedurally defaulted, iit may review the merits of procedurally defaulted claims if the petitioner demonstrates either cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the claim is not considered. Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 2013); Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000); McCandless v. Vaugh, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999). It is the petitioner's burden to demonstrate circumstances excusing procedural default. See Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 772, 750 (1991). To show "cause," a petitioner must establish "that some objective factor external to the defense impeded [the petitioner's] efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). A petitioner satisfies the "prejudice" prong by showing that the trial was "unreliable or . . . fundamentally unfair" because of a violation of federal law. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). Alternatively, in order to demonstrate a "fundamental miscarriage of justice," a petitioner must present new evidence to show "that constitutional error has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the crime." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995).
Valenti's habeas petition indicates that his trial counsel and direct appellate counsel failed to raise the instant due process claims in state court. (Doc. 1, at 9, 11). However, Valenti's habeas petition otherwise fails to demonstrate, let alone specifically allege, how the concept of "cause and prejudice," or a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" applies to the facts surrounding his case. Instead, Valenti solely challenges the prosecution's conduct and submits that improper prosecutorial comments and vouching violated his right to due process. (Doc. 1, at 6-13). Simply stated, this argument does not allege "that some objective factor external to the defense impeded [Valenti's] efforts to comply with the [Pennsylvania]'s procedural rule," or "that constitutional error has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the crime." Murray, 477 U.S. at 488; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Accordingly, the Court is precluded from reviewing the merits of Valenti's due process claims, as he has failed to identify justifiable cause to excuse his procedural default, or allege a fundamental miscarriage of justice, as a basis for relief.
As such, the Court respectfully recommends that the first and second grounds for habeas relief be
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Valenti's petition (Doc. 1) be
In analyzing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Superior Court found that Valenti's underlying prosecutorial misconduct claim lacked arguable merit. (Doc. 17-4, at 236). Specifically, the Court cited to Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282 (2010) for the proposition that prosecutors are allowed to "fairly respond to the position of opposing counsel." (Doc. 17-4, at 234). Further relying on Commonwealth v. Mollett, 5 A.3d 291, 31 (Pa. Super. 2010), the Superior Court noted that statements made by a prosecutor constitute reversible error only when they are made in a deliberate attempt to "destroy the objectivity of the jury . . . [and] to create such a bias and hostility toward the defendant that the jury would be unable to render a true verdict." (Doc. 17-4, at 234). Based on these standards, the Superior Court found that "the prosecutor's closing statement was [a] fair response to [Valenti's] own testimony, which the jury could have interpreted as implying that another person planted the evidence." (Doc. 17-4, at 234-35). Upon review of Valenti's testimony highlighted by the Superior Court, the finding that Valenti's trial counsel was not ineffective, as the underlying claim lacked merit, can be reasonably justified under the standard in Strickland Kightlinger, 2013 WL 4504382, at *6; See also Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 200 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Having reviewed the prosecutor's comments in view of the entire closing arguments made by both counsel and the evidence adduced at trial, we find that the prosecutor's comments were invited [by the defendant] and, for the most part, went no further than required to `right the scale.'") (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985)). Accordingly, even if Valenti's habeas petition did seek to reassert his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding prosecutorial misconduct, it would not succeed on the merits.
