KAREN L. LITKOVITZ, Magistrate Judge.
This habeas corpus action brought pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is before the Court on respondents' motion to dismiss (Doc. 4), to which petitioner has not responded. For the reasons stated below, it is recommended that the motion be granted.
On February 13, 2018, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus challenging his continued detention by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) pursuant to a final order of removal. (See Doc. 1 at PageID 4). Petitioner was taken into ICE custody on or about August 3, 2017. Petitioner argues that his continued detention is unlawful because he has been detained for more than six months with no significant likelihood of his actual removal, in violation of Zadvydas v. Davis, 553 U.S. 678 (2001).
On April 3, 2018, respondents filed a motion to dismiss this action. (Doc. 4). According to respondents, petitioner has been released from ICE custody pursuant to an Order of Supervision. In support of the motion, respondents include the Declaration of Oscar E. Blair, a Deportation Officer for the Enforcement and Removal Office of ICE. Blair attests that, on April 1, 2018, petitioner was released from ICE custody pending his removal. (Doc. 4, Ex. 1, Blair Decl. at PageID 18). The Release Notification is attached to the Declaration. (See id. at PageID 20-21). In light of petitioner's release from custody, respondents contend that the petition should be dismissed as moot.
Respondents' motion should be granted. Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution limits the federal judicial power to the adjudication of cases and controversies. In the context of a habeas corpus petition, a district court generally lacks jurisdiction over the petition if the petitioner is not in government custody. Therefore, except in limited circumstances not applicable to the case-at-hand,
Petitioner does not challenge his removal order in this case. He instead contests his indefinite detention pending removal. (See Doc. 1). In these circumstances, petitioner's April 1, 2018 release pending removal renders this action moot and deprives the Court of jurisdiction. See Felix v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 3:05-cv-2211, 2007 WL 951452, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2007) ("When an alien subject to removal challenges only his detention pending removal, his release pending removal, whether or not conditional, entails no collateral consequences. It renders the petition moot because he has received all the relief he sought and would have been entitled to."); see also Kahn v. Attorney General, Case Nos. 1:15-cv-2014, 1:16-cv-85, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 17, 2016) ("As Petitioner has received his requested relief by being released from custody on an order of supervision, there is no longer an active case or controversy.") (Report and Recommendation), adopted, 2016 WL 4009885 (N.D. Ohio June 25, 2016); Willix v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-894, 2012 WL 463830, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Jan 24, 2012) (finding habeas petition moot where petitioner seeking release pending removal is released pursuant to an order of supervision) (Report and Recommendation), adopted, 2012 WL 463825 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2012). Therefore, because petitioner has been released and has obtained the relief requested in the petition, the undersigned recommends that respondents' motion to dismiss (Doc. 4) be
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b),