REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge.
This social security matter is before the court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.VII.02 (D.S.C.). The plaintiff, Keith Williams, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the defendant, Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the court concludes that the Commissioner's decision should be reversed and the case remanded.
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY GENERALLY
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) and (d)(5), as well as pursuant to the regulations formulated by the Commissioner, the plaintiff has the burden of proving disability, which is defined as an "inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); see also Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1973). The regulations require the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to consider, in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity;
(2) whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment;
(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("the Listings"), and is thus presumptively disabled;
(4) whether the claimant can perform his past relevant work; and
(5) whether the claimant's impairments prevent him from doing any other kind of work.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).1 If the ALJ can make a determination that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in this process, review does not proceed to the next step. Id.
Under this analysis, a claimant has the initial burden of showing that he is unable to return to his past relevant work because of his impairments. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. To satisfy this burden, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant has the residual functional capacity, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and impairments, to perform alternative jobs that exist in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); see also McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). The Commissioner may carry this burden by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1983).
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
In April 2013, Williams applied for DIB, alleging disability beginning December 15, 2012. Williams later amended his alleged onset date to August 23, 2013. Williams's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and he requested a hearing before an ALJ. A video hearing was held on July 11, 2016, at which Williams, who was represented by Brett Owens, Esquire, appeared and testified. After hearing testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ issued a decision on July 26, 2016, finding that Williams was not disabled from August 23, 2013 through the date of the decision. (Tr. 11-21.)
Williams was born in 1967 and was forty-six years old on his alleged disability onset date. He has a college education and has past relevant work experience as an electrician in the U.S. Navy, a security guard, and a mail carrier with the U.S. Postal Service. (Tr. 156.) Williams alleged disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). (Tr. 155.)
In applying the five-step sequential process, the ALJ found that Williams had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his amended alleged onset date of August 23, 2013. The ALJ determined that Williams's status post remote bilateral rotator cuff surgeries and asthma were severe impairments. However, the ALJ found that Williams did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("the "Listings"). The ALJ found, after consideration of the entire record, that Williams retained the residual functional capacity to
to lift/carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, stand/walk for six hours and sit for six hours during an eight hour workday; can frequently stoop, climb, kneel, crouch, and crawl; unlimited balancing; should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, dust, gases, and poor ventilation; and avoid concentrated exposure to work hazards such as working on vibratory machinery and at dangerous heights. The claimant can only occasionally do overhead reaching with either upper extremity and he can frequently reach laterally and forward. Thus, he can perform a reduced range of medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c).
(Tr. 17.) The ALJ found that Williams was capable of performing past relevant work as a security guard and a postal carrier, and that this work did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by Williams's residual functional capacity. Therefore, the ALJ found that Williams had not been disabled from August 23, 2013 through the date of the decision.
The Appeals Council denied Williams's request for review on August 5, 2017, making the decision of the ALJ the final action of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-5.) This action followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court may review the Commissioner's denial of benefits. However, this review is limited to considering whether the Commissioner's findings "are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, the court may review only whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied. See Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 267 (4th Cir. 2017); Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980). "Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015). In reviewing the evidence, the court may not "undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, even if the court disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence. Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775.
ISSUES
Williams raises the following issues for this judicial review:
I. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in determining that Plaintiff's mental impairments fail to meet SSA Listing 12.04, contrary to the overwhelming medical evidence?
II. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in failing to properly review Plaintiff's claims in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523?
III. Did the Administrative Law Judge improperly receive the opinions and testimony of the proposed vocational expert contrary to the requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566?
(Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 10.)
DISCUSSION2
Underlying Williams's first two arguments in part is the evaluation of the disability rating of the Department of Veterans Affairs. Specifically, it appears that Williams relies heavily on this rating to support his argument that the ALJ erred in failing to find that he met Listing 12.04. Williams also appears to rely on this rating in part to argue that the ALJ erred in failing to evaluate his impairments in combination. Pertinent here, the VA disability rating of 100% included a determination of 70% disability as a result of Williams's PTSD. The ALJ clearly acknowledged this disability rating within the decision; however, notwithstanding this rating, the ALJ found Williams's PTSD was nonsevere. See Evans v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[A]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rendering review of these issues difficult is the ALJ's actual evaluation of this disability rating. Importantly, in Bird v. Astrue, 699 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2012), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed for the first time the weight that the Social Security Administration must afford to a Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") disability rating. Specifically, the Bird Court held that
in making a disability determination, the SSA must give substantial weight to a VA disability rating. However, because the SSA employs its own standards for evaluating a claimant's alleged disability, and because the effective date of coverage for a claimant's disability under the two programs likely will vary, an ALJ may give less weight to a VA disability rating when the record before the ALJ clearly demonstrates that such a deviation is appropriate.
Bird, 699 F.3d at 343. The Fourth Circuit recently extended the rationale in Bird to state agency determinations. See Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 692 (4th Cir. 2018). Importantly, the Woods Court further elaborated on Bird's requirement that the record "clearly demonstrate" that a deviation from another agency's disability determination is appropriate by explaining that "an ALJ must give `persuasive, specific, valid reasons for doing so that are supported by the record.'" Id. (quoting McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Woods Court offered examples of these reasons, stating that "an ALJ could explain which aspects of the prior agency decision he finds not credible and why, describe why he finds other evidence more credible, and discuss the effect of any new evidence made available after [the agency] issued its decision." Id. Acknowledging that the list is not exclusive, the Woods Court explained that "the point of this requirement—and of these examples—is that the ALJ must adequately explain his reasoning; otherwise, we cannot engage in a meaningful review." Id. at 692-93.
Here, the ALJ mentioned the disability rating several times within the decision and acknowledged that Williams was awarded a 70% disability rating due to PTSD symptoms. However, the ALJ also found that Williams's PTSD "does not cause more than minimal limitation in the claimant's ability to perform basic mental work activities and is therefore nonsevere." (Tr. 15.) After discussing Williams's treatment records, the ALJ later accorded great weight to the state agency reviewer's opinion that Williams's mental impairment was non-severe "based on VA records showing PTSD symptoms have been managed with psychotropic medications and outpatient therapy." (Tr. 19.) Although the ALJ does not expressly state the weight given to a subsequent June 2015 opinion by Monica Wright, Psy. D., stating that Williams's "PTSD symptoms negatively impact the claimant's ability to manage his emotional control at work and thus impact his ability to work in either sedentary or physical environment," it appears the ALJ rejected this opinion. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ stated that
[i]t appears this opinion was based primarily on the claimant's subjective statements and allegations reported at the time of the compensation and pension exam. Dr. Wright's opinion is not well supported and is inconsistent with prior compensation and pension exams in November 2013 and March 2015 that state the diagnosis of PTSD `does not render the claimant unable to secure and maintain substantially gainful employment or render him unable to engage is sedentary activities.' (Exhibits 3F and 7F) Outpatient mental health records fail to show any significant decline in the claimant's functioning or increase in psychologically based symptoms to support Dr. Wright's opinion. (Exhibits 3F, 7F, and 9F)
(Tr. 19-20.)
However, when the ALJ evaluated the actual VA disability rating, the ALJ stated only the following:
The undersigned is aware, and has considered, that the claimant is in receipt of VA benefits. The claimant has a 100 percent service connected disability rating for his combined mental (PTSD) and physical impairments (Exhibit 9F). However, a decision by any nongovernmental agency or any other governmental agency about whether a claimant is disabled is based upon its rules and is not a decision by the Social Security Administration about whether a claimant is disabled. Moreover, the Social Security Administration must make a disability determination based upon social security law. Therefore, the fact that the claimant receives VA benefits is not binding on the Administration. (20 CFR 404.1504 and SSR 06-03p) The Administrative Law Judge has taken this evidence into consideration but an independent decision regarding disability benefits must be based [on] the Social Security Act.
(Tr. 20.)
Upon thorough review of the briefs and record in this matter, the court is constrained to recommend that this matter be remanded for further consideration of Williams's VA disability rating. In accordance with requirements outlined in Bird and Woods, the court is unable to engage in a meaningful review of the ALJ's evaluation of the VA disability rating. In fact, it is unclear exactly what weight the ALJ gave to this evidence. While presumably it was very little as the ALJ found Williams's PTSD to be a nonsevere impairment, no explanation accompanies the ALJ's conclusion on this point as required by Bird and Woods. Although the Commissioner argues that the ALJ's decision is supported, the court in this case is simply unable to divine why the VA's decision was not given substantial weight. See, e.g., Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636-37 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding remand may be appropriate when the courts are left to guess at how the ALJ arrived at the conclusions and meaningful review is frustrated); see also Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016) (remanding where the ALJ failed to "build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion") (citation omitted). Further, the court observes that the ALJ does not acknowledge the applicable presumption of substantial weight. Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the discussion by the ALJ in this matter is insufficient for the court to determine whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied. Thus, the court is constrained to recommend that this matter be remanded for further consideration and evaluation of Williams's VA disability rating.
In light of the court's recommendation that this matter be remanded for further consideration, the court need not address Williams's remaining arguments, as they may be rendered moot on remand. See Boone v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 211 n.19 (3d Cir. 2003) (remanding on other grounds and declining to address claimant's additional arguments). Moreover, if necessary, Williams may present his remaining arguments on remand.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that the Commissioner's decision be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must `only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).
