REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARY GORDON BAKER, Magistrate Judge.

This action has been filed by Plaintiff, pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 68). Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' motion.

BACKGROUND1

This action arises from the alleged loss of Plaintiff's legal materials and other property by employees of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on or about April 8, 2018, he was transferred from the Restrictive Housing Unit ("RHU") at McCormick Correctional Institution ("MCCI") to Broad River Correctional Institution ("Broad River") for crisis intervention following a suicide attempt. (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 5-7; 68-2 at 1; 99 at 3.) According to Plaintiff, when he was removed from RHU, his "personal property and legal mail/work" were put into a trash bag by Defendants Badger and Saylor. (Dkt. No. 99 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that after his transfer, Defendants failed to send Plaintiff his "property/legal mail/legal work," which was necessary for Plaintiff's work to obtain post-conviction relief ("PCR"). (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff has attached to his response brief inmate requests and grievances related to his complaints about the alleged loss of his property and legal mail/work.2 (Dkt. No. 99-1.)

On April 23, 2018, Plaintiff submitted an inmate request stating that he came to MCCI "with nothing" and asking to be provided "with the other items." (Id. at 21.) The "Request Responses" states "Sir, do you have your inventory sheet form when you arrived to Broad River?. . . I understand that you were placed in lock up but I am showing you[] were issued all of the items you're stating to be missing." (Id.)

On May 25, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the "current mailbox coordinator, requesting the return of his legal papers and listing the specific legal documents at issue, including "alibi written statements from witnesses." (Id. at 13.) In the letter, Plaintiff states that before he left MCCI, he asked Lt. Jones about his "legal mail leaving with [him] that morning [he] left." (Id.) Lt. Jones told Plaintiff she would send the property. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he asked a prison official to talk to Lt. Jones and the official was told by Lt. Jones that she sent Plaintiff's property to the commissary. (Id. at 13-14.)

On May 29, 2019, Plaintiff submitted an inmate request stating that he is "missing [his] legal mail/legal work" that was in RHU. (Id. at 17.) The "Request Responses" states "The personnel from McCormick stated the following: The RHU Lt. stated there was no legal mail in your cell when you left for Broad River CSU, the commissary manager stated he never had any of your possessions, and the property control officer stated [all] they had for you was a pair of pants and a shirt." (Id.)

On June 15, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a Step 1 grievance form stating in part that "Lt. Jones told [certain prison employees that] she sent stuff to property control." (Id. at 9.) In the grievance, Plaintiff asserts that he is still missing his legal papers and that this could hinder his PCR action. (Id.) Under "action taken," the form states that the grievance was returned as a duplicate. (Id.)

In an inmate request form dated July 3, 2018, Plaintiff states in part that there is documentation that he signed for three pieces of legal mail during February of 2018. (Dkt. No. 99-1 at 62.) He states that legal mail he received during that time was: (1) "from [his] PCR lawyer with some legal work pertaining to [his] PCR case"; (2) records from the clerk of court; (3) and Plaintiff's transcript from court reporters." (Id.) He states he "also had other legal mails and legal work." (Id.) Plaintiff states that "between . . . Sgt. Badger, Lt. Saylor, and Lt. Jones . . . [his] property, legal mail and legal work got mishandled and misplaced." (Id.)

In an Inmate Request form dated August 2, 2018, Plaintiff states that he is "without [his] 6 manila envelopes with [his] legal mails and legal work, shoes, and TV." (Id. at 71.) He states he is also missing his "DSS and social security papers." (Id.)

Defendants have provided "Inmate Property Inventory" forms completed by Plaintiff on December 30, 2016, June 4, 2017, and January 7, 2018. (Dkt. No. 68-2.) None of these forms indicate Plaintiff had any legal materials in his inventory on those dates. His form dated December 30, 2016, indicates he has one "clear locker bag," but this item is not recorded on the subsequent forms. (Id. at 5.)

Defendants have also submitted the affidavit of Defendant Clarissa Jones with their Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as the Order of Dismissal issued by the PCR court. (Dkt. Nos. 68-2; 68-3.) In her affidavit, Jones avers that when Plaintiff was transferred to Broad River, his "personal property was removed from his room, placed into bags, and put into a locked storage room pending his return to MCCI" pursuant to procedure. (Dkt. No. 68-2 at 1.) She avers that Plaintiff was transferred back to MMCI on or about May 9, 2018. (Id. at 2.) She avers that, "to [her] knowledge, all of Mr. Hair's personal property was returned to him from storage following his return to MCCI, including a Ziploc bag of legal-type documents." (Id.)

In the Order of Dismissal, the PCR court stated that Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the PCR evidentiary hearing held on October 3, 2018. (Dkt. No. 68-3 at 1.) In its Order issued December 6, 2018, the Court found that Plaintiff had "not established any constitutional violations or deprivations [based on ineffective assistance of counsel] that would require this court to grant his application." (Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff filed this action on June 11, 2018, alleging that he has still not received the "property/legal mail/legal work" that was taken when he initially left MCCI. (Dkt. No. 1.) He further alleges that he has not received responses to most of his grievances related to this issue. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Dkt. No. 57.) More specifically, he alleges denial of access to courts and the violation of his right "to be free from unreasonable seizures without due process of law and the freedom to petition the government for a redress of grievances." (Dkt. Nos. 1; 57.) According to Plaintiff, he suffers from anxiety, depression, and restless sleep as a result of Defendants' actions. (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.) He further claims that Defendants' actions have resulted in the "loss of legal work, causing problems with [Plaintiff's] PCR." (Id. at 11.)

STANDARDS

A. Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint

Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Facts are `material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a `genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "`the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'" Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).

DISCUSSION

Defendants assert that this action should be dismissed because, inter alia, Plaintiff cannot establish that he suffered a constitutional deprivation. (Dkt. No. 68-1.) The undersigned considers Plaintiff's claims below.

A. Denial of Access to the Courts

Plaintiff alleges that the loss of his legal materials resulted in the dismissal of his PCR action, thereby denying him access to the courts. The Fourth Circuit has held that "destruction or unreasonable seizure or tampering with important legal materials is an unconstitutional interference with a prisoner's right of access to the courts." Bryant v. Muth, 994 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1993). An inmate must allege a specific injury resulting from the alleged denial of court access to state a cognizable constitutional claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (holding that an inmate alleging denial of access to the courts must be able to demonstrate "actual injury" caused by the policy or procedure in effect at the place of incarceration in that his nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded).

Here, Plaintiff argues that his PCR action was dismissed because he could not "present his PCR application, alibi witness statements, and his amending letter in reference to his PCR application." (Dkt. No. 99 at 24.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants lost these items, among others. (Id.) Importantly, Plaintiff was represented by counsel in the PCR action at issue. "It is well-established that representation by counsel negates a prisoner's claim of lack of access to the courts." Hundley v. Thomas, No. 5:17-CT-3110-BO, 2017 WL 6759609, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2017), aff'd, 719 F. App'x 250 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1084 (4th Cir. 1993) (prisoner's right to meaningful court access may be satisfied by providing prisoner with "adequate assistance from persons trained in the law"); Samples v. Greer, No. 1:12-2472, 2013 WL 3289105, at *4 (D.S.C. June 28, 2013); Drake v. Laurence, No. 6:09-cv-3105-RMG-KFM, 2010 WL 4156461, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2010) ("As discussed in Cyrus [v. U.S. Marshals of Columbia, SC, No. 8:05-cv-1384,-OFF-BHH, 2007 WL 601610 (D.S.C. Feb. 21, 2007)], representation by counsel negates a prisoner's claim of inadequate access to the courts.") (internal citation and quotations omitted)).

Because Plaintiff was represented by counsel in the legal proceedings at issue, Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim for denial of access to the courts.

B. Remaining Claims

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right "to be free from unreasonable seizures without due process of law and the freedom to petition the government for a redress of grievances."3 (Dkt. No. 57.)

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However, while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process Clause, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984), "[a]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a [government] employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause . . . if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." Id. at 533.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff appears to allege Defendants acted with negligence in the loss of his property. (Dkt. No. 99-1 at 62 (stating Defendants "mishandled and misplaced" his "legal mails and legal work").) "[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (emphasis removed); see McIntyre v. Portee, 784 F.2d 566, 567 (4th Cir. 1986). Further, Plaintiff has not alleged or shown that the failure to return his legal materials was authorized by either prison policy or any higher ranking supervisory officials. "[I]n South Carolina, prisoners may bring a civil action in state court for recovery of personal property against prison officials who deprived them of property without state authorization." Drake v. Brown, No. 6:09cv-1449-JFA-WMC, 2009 WL 1749375, *2 (D.S.C. 2009) (citing McIntyre, 784 F.2d at 567). Because Plaintiff has a meaningful post-deprivation remedy available in state court, his due process claim also fails.

Further, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation of his right to be free from unreasonable seizures, the Supreme Court has held that prisoners may not challenge seizures of items from their prison cells under the Fourth Amendment. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526. Plaintiff therefore also fails to state a claim of violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures. Finally, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "prisoners do not have a constitutional right of access to the grievance process." Daye v. Rubenstein, 417 Fed. App'x. 317 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 161 (2011). Thus, Plaintiff's vague reference to "the freedom to petition the government for a redress of grievances" does not establish a constitutional violation.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the Court GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 68.)

AND IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must `only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).