JOSEPH F. ANDERSON, JR., District Judge.
Wayne Wells ("Petitioner"), a pro se state prisoner, filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). On July 18, 2019, Warden Terrie Wallace ("Respondent") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along with a return to the petition and memorandum of law in support. (ECF Nos. 13 & 14). The court advised Petitioner of the summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond via an order issued pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) on the following day. (ECF No. 15). Petitioner filed a response on August 13, 2019, to which Respondent filed a reply on August 20, 2019. (ECF Nos. 17 & 18). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge.
The Magistrate Judge assigned to this action
The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court is only required to conduct a de novo review of the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report to which an objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections to portions of the Report of the Magistrate Judge, this court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the court must only review those portions of the Report to which Petitioner has made a specific written objection. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005).
"An objection is specific if it `enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.'" Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No. 0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A specific objection to the Magistrate's Report thus requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL 4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). A specific objection must "direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
"Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object." Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The court reviews portions "not objected to—including those portions to which only `general and conclusory' objections have been made—for clear error." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby, 718 F.2d at 200; Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47).
Petitioner was advised of his right to object to the Report, which was entered on the docket on August 29, 2019. (ECF No. 19). Petitioner filed objections to the Report on September 16, 2019
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). All inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but he "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985).
Although this court incorporates the factual background discussed in the Report, a brief recitation of the relevant facts is necessary to properly address Petitioner's Objections. Petitioner was indicted for second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and he went to trial in November 2010. The victim testified that when she first met Petitioner, she told him she was eighteen. The next time they met, however, he asked her if she was fifteen, as one of her friends had told him that. She admitted that was her real age; a couple of hours later, they had sex. Over the summer, they had sex several more times. Each time, he came over to her house after midnight, climbing through her bedroom window.
Petitioner testified in his defense. He told the jury the victim said she was eighteen and never told him anything different. He did not know she actually was fifteen until her stepfather found him in the house and confronted him. Had Petitioner known her true age, he would not have had a sexual relationship with her. As he had done in his opening statement, Petitioner's trial counsel argued in closing that the victim lied to Petitioner about her age, causing him to mistakenly think she was eighteen.
After the jury began deliberations in Petitioner's criminal trial, they sent out the following questions: "If the defendant truly believed the victim was eighteen, does that matter and/or is ignorance of her age no excuse?" The trial court answered, "No, and ignorance is no excuse." Trial counsel did not object to the court's answer. It is this judge's response to the jury's questions along his counsel's failure to object that form the basis of the two grounds for relief asserted in Petitioner's habeas petition.
Petitioner's habeas petition raises the following two issues:
(ECF No. 1 p. 5,6-7).
As to Ground One, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff's trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to object to the trial judge's response to the questions from the jury during deliberations. In response, Petitioner claims that "trial counsel's understanding of the law was wrong if he thought that the trial judge's answers to the jury's questions were correct statements of law." (ECF No. 22 p. 2).
Despite Petitioner's objections, the Model Penal Code has no bearing on this matter. The South Carolina statute at issue, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655(B)(2), does not include mistake-of-age as a defense. Moreover, the version of the statute in effect at the time of the incident in question is a version wherein the General Assembly removed a previously included mistake-of-age defense. (ECF No. 19 p. 9-10). Therefore, the Magistrate Judge correctly opined that Petitioner has failed to show his trial counsel's understanding of the law was not reasonable. Petitioner's objections fail to identify any specific legal authority supporting his contention that a mistake-of-age was a viable defense to the South Carolina criminal statute under which he was convicted in 2009. Accordingly, this claim must be denied.
As to Ground Two, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the trial judge's response to the jury's questions were correct because the South Carolina statute at issue has no explicit intent element. The statue, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655(B)(2), states in relevant part:
Petitioner argues that the Report "clearly indicated that the State did not read the statute as a whole, or give full effect to each section, nor did the State read the Petitioner as `ejusdem generis' or treated him similar to the three groups that the statute specifically enumerated." (ECF No. 22 p. 12-13). This is the same argument previously asserted by Petitioner and specifically addressed in the Report. In response to this argument, the Magistrate Judge correctly opined that
(ECF No. 19 p. 13).
Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to provide any proof that intent is an element of his offense of conviction. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show any error in the trial court judge's answers to the contrary, let alone that his Constitutional rights were violated as a result.
Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner asserts any new claims for relief not included in his original petition, including the argument the Petitioner faults trial counsel for not objecting to a portion of the trial court's jury charge, those arguments were not addressed by the Magistrate Judge and are likewise not addressed here. Habeas petitioners cannot assert new claims for the first time in response to summary judgment motions. Neumon v. Cartledge, No. 8:14-cv-2556-RMG, 2015 WL 4607732, at *9 (D.S.C. July 31, 2015).
None of Petitioner's attempted objections point to any errors in the Report. Petitioner continuously reasserts the same arguments from his initial petition and opposition to the summary judgment motion. Thus, Petitioner has not asserted any specific objections. "Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object." Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). To the extent that any of Petitioner's arguments could constitute specific objections, they fail to indicate any errors within the Report as discussed above.
After carefully reviewing the applicable laws, the record in this case, the Report and Recommendation, and the objections thereto, this Court finds the Magistrate Judge's recommendation fairly and accurately summarizes the facts and applies the correct principles of law. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 19). Thus, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) is granted and Petitioner's habeas petition (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with prejudice.
It is further ordered that a certificate of appealability is denied because Petitioner has failed to make "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
