Filed: May 11, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 13-3841 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WARREN STOKES, a/k/a GEEZ Warren Stokes, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 10-cr-00620-08) District Judge: Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) April 24, 2015 Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges. (Filed: May 11, 2015) _ OPINION _ This disposition is not a
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 13-3841 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WARREN STOKES, a/k/a GEEZ Warren Stokes, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 10-cr-00620-08) District Judge: Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) April 24, 2015 Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges. (Filed: May 11, 2015) _ OPINION _ This disposition is not an..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 13-3841
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WARREN STOKES,
a/k/a GEEZ
Warren Stokes,
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 10-cr-00620-08)
District Judge: Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 24, 2015
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 11, 2015)
_______________
OPINION
_______________
This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Warren Stokes appeals his conviction and sentence in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on his participation in a large-scale
drug-trafficking enterprise known as the “Harlem Boys” that operated in the Bartram
Village Housing Development in Philadelphia. On appeal, he challenges only the District
Court’s denial of his motion to suppress a handgun seized during a warrantless search of
co-Defendant Kareem Pittman’s residence. We will affirm.
I. Background
The pertinent factual background surrounding the Harlem Boys drug-trafficking
operation is set forth more fully in the opinion addressing the appeal of co-conspirator
Ramel Moten. See United States v. Moten, No. 13-3801, Slip Op. at 2-5 (3d Cir. May 11,
2015). We provide here only the facts relevant to Stokes’s appeal.
On October 7, 2009, police responded to a radio call of a “male with a gun” who
entered an apartment building on Harley Terrace in the Bartram Village Housing
Development. (App. at 3260.) While searching for the gunman, police detected the odor
of marijuana emanating from Apartment 3A. The police knocked on the door and were
eventually granted entry by a resident of the apartment. Stokes was sitting in the living
room at the time the police entered the apartment. Tyreek Artis, who matched the
description of the gunman, emerged from a back room and was immediately arrested. As
Artis was being arrested, a police officer conducted a protective sweep and noticed a .38
caliber Colt revolver in a shoe box in plain view. After obtaining consent to search the
apartment, the police also found marijuana and crack cocaine in a closet in the living
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room. Later, the government recorded a telephone conversation between co-defendant
Ramel Moten and a confidential informant, in which Moten identified the revolver and
the drugs as “ours.” United States v. Moten, No. CRIM.A. 10-620-01,
2012 WL
2873368, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2012).
Stokes was later named along with nineteen other members of the Harlem Boys in
an eighty-nine count superseding indictment. More specifically, he was charged with
conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise (count 1), in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d); conspiracy to distribute 280 grams of cocaine base (crack) and marijuana
(count 2), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(D) and 846;
possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base (crack), and aiding and abetting
(counts 41, 46, and 60), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); possession
of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (count 42), in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(I); attempted murder in aid of racketeering (count 53), in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5); and carrying and using a firearm during a violent crime (count
54), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Stokes unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence stemming from the
October 7, 2009 search and the case proceeded to trial. He was acquitted of attempted
murder and an accompanying firearm charge (counts 53 and 54), but was convicted on all
other charges and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, 5 years’ supervised release and
ordered to pay various fines and special assessments. He now appeals the District
Court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
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II. Discussion1
Stokes challenges the District Court’s refusal to suppress the handgun, arguing
that the warrantless search of the apartment was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because there was no need for the search after Artis was arrested, as any
exigency had dissipated.
As is explained more fully in the opinion issued in the related case of United
States v. Moten, No. 13-3801, Slip Op. at 14-15, we conclude, as did the District Court,
that the officers’ search was a reasonable protective sweep in light of the gunman’s arrest
in the residence moments earlier. See Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325, 335-37 (1990)
(holding that arresting officers may briefly search a residence after an arrest is effectuated
where “the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and
articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those
on the arrest scene”). Accordingly, the District Court did not err in refusing to suppress
the evidence, and we need not address whether Stokes had standing to challenge the
search. United States v. Kennedy,
638 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[S]tanding to
challenge a search is not a threshold issue that must be decided before reaching the
question of whether a search was or was not constitutional.”).
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s denial of a
motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and exercise
plenary review of its application of the law to those facts. United States v. Perez,
280
F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).
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III. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the ruling of the District Court.
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