Filed: Jun. 10, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 13-4763 _ SALAM ALJAWAD v. SALAM MAJEED; DEBORAH MAJEED, a/k/a Deborah Covey; BEDHR MAJEED; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10 Salam Majeed, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-04321) District Judge: Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig _ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 8, 2015 Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circu
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 13-4763 _ SALAM ALJAWAD v. SALAM MAJEED; DEBORAH MAJEED, a/k/a Deborah Covey; BEDHR MAJEED; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10 Salam Majeed, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-04321) District Judge: Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig _ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 8, 2015 Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circui..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-4763
___________
SALAM ALJAWAD
v.
SALAM MAJEED; DEBORAH MAJEED, a/k/a Deborah Covey;
BEDHR MAJEED; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10
Salam Majeed,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-04321)
District Judge: Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 8, 2015
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 10, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se appellant Salam Majeed appeals from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s December 4, 2013 order confirming the judgment
entered against him earlier in this breach of contract action. We will affirm.
I.
Majeed was one of several defendants in a breach of contract complaint filed in
the District Court by plaintiff/appellee Salam Aljawad in 2011. The complaint concerned
the breakdown of Aljawad and Majeed’s joint venture, which involved installing energy-
saving devices (motion sensors) in hotel rooms. Aljawad alleged that Majeed had
received in excess of $72,000 and “other checks” for work performed by the joint
venture, but refused to share those proceeds with Aljawad. The complaint also alleged,
inter alia, that Majeed had made false and disparaging remarks about Aljawad to a
supplier, in an attempt to persuade that supplier to deal only with Majeed. In light of
these allegations, Aljawad sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as various
other relief.
Soon after the litigation began, Aljawad and Majeed entered into a settlement
agreement, providing—among other things—that, within 90 days of receiving 1,263
motion sensors, Majeed was to pay Aljawad $24,225. The settlement was not finalized,
however, as each party claimed that the other had failed to comply with its terms.
Aljawad claimed that Majeed had not paid as required by the settlement agreement.
Majeed, on the other hand, claimed that he was not required to pay because Aljawad had
sent only 1,248 motion sensors. Upon the District Court’s order, Aljawad and Majeed
submitted evidence concerning implementation of the settlement agreement, which the
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District Court treated as cross-motions for summary judgment on the issues of whether “a
settlement agreement of the original dispute was reached and whether it ha[d] been
violated.” (Dist. Ct. Mem. entered Jan. 31, 2013, at 2.)
On January 31, 2013, the District Court entered judgment in favor of Aljawad in
the amount of $24,093.75. The judgment reflected the amount due for the 1,248 sensors
that Majeed had received. The District Court determined that the settlement agreement
was unambiguous, and applied Pennsylvania law to conclude that Aljawad’s breach
(failing to provide 15 sensors) was not material. In considering this issue, the District
Court noted that Aljawad offered to deduct the price of the missing sensors, and
determined that his explanation for the shortfall was reasonable.1 The District Court
further concluded that Majeed had received the benefit of his bargain, and to the extent he
had not, he could be compensated for his loss by Aljawad’s offered reduction in the
amount due. As a result, the District Court concluded that Aljawad had substantially
performed under the settlement agreement, and that Majeed was not excused from
complying with the terms of the agreement.
Majeed’s initial appeal to this Court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because
the District Court had not disposed of the claims against the remaining defendants. On
December 4, 2013, the District Court dismissed the claims against the remaining
defendants, and confirmed the judgment against Majeed for the reasons set forth in its
January 31, 2013 memorandum. Majeed once again appeals.
1
Aljawad asserted that “some motion sensors were missing from completed jobs and [he]
was required to provide and/or install the missing sensors before receiving payment on
account of those jobs.” (Dist. Ct. Mem. entered Jan. 31, 2013, at 3-4.)
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II.
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over this lawsuit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332,2 and we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s December 4, 2013
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In that order, the District Court confirmed its January 31,
2013 order, which granted judgment in favor of Aljawad. It is this determination that
Majeed challenges. Our review of a district court’s summary judgment decision is
plenary. See Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 2010). Summary
judgment is appropriate if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
As the parties did not dispute the validity of the settlement agreement, the issue
before the District Court was whether, under Pennsylvania law, the settlement agreement
was materially breached. See Int’l Diamond Imps., Ltd. v. Singularity Clark, L.P., 40
A.3d 1261, 1271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“[T]he non-breaching party does not have a right
to suspend performance if the breach is not material.”) (quotation marks omitted). To
2
Early in the case, Majeed argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under § 1332
because the amount in controversy did not exceed $75,000. “‘The sum claimed by the
plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal
certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify
dismissal.’” Dardovitch v. Haltzman,
190 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938)). Here, Aljawad’s
claim that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 appears to have been made in
good faith, and it is far from a “legal certainty” that the amount in controversy was
actually less than the jurisdictional threshold. Accordingly, dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction was not warranted.
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determine whether a breach is material, Pennsylvania courts consider the following five
factors:
a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the
benefit which he reasonably expected;
b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately
compensated for that part of the benefit of which he will be
deprived;
c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer
to perform will suffer forfeiture;
d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or offer to
perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the
circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to
perform or offer to perform comports with standards of good
faith and fair dealing.
Widmer Eng’g, Inc. v. Dufalla, 837 A.2d 459, 467 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981)).
In this case, the District Court correctly identified and applied the Restatement
factors to determine that a reasonable jury could not conclude that Aljawad’s delivery of
1,248 (rather than 1,263) motion sensors was a material breach. Majeed received the
benefit of his bargain and was adequately compensated for any loss, as Aljawad offered
to lower the payment based on the delivery shortage. Accordingly, the District Court
properly entered judgment against Majeed in the amount due under the settlement
agreement (minus $131.25 for the 15 sensors that were not delivered), and his arguments
to the contrary are unpersuasive.
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm.
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