CHRISTOPHER H. STEGER, Magistrate Judge.
On January 16, 2019, Defendant Rhonda Kay Davis, through counsel, filed a motion for a psychiatric and/or psychological evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 [Doc. 11]. Following a hearing, the undersigned found that there was reasonable cause to believe that Defendant may be "suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering [her] mentally incompetent to the extent that [she] is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against [her] or to assist properly in [her] defense." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). [Doc. 29]. As a result, the Court granted Defendant's motion and ordered that she undergo a mental evaluation to determine whether she is competent to stand trial. See id.
Defendant's evaluation occurred at FMC Carswell. Following the evaluation, forensic psychologist, Matthew Opesso, Psy.D., submitted a forensic report (the "Report") to the Court and counsel for the parties [Docs. 34, 35]. In the Report, Dr. Opesso describes Defendant's various cognitive deficits and renders the opinion that Defendant "is not presently competent to stand trial." [Doc. 34 at PageID #: 569]. Following receipt of the Report, Defendant's attorney filed a motion for a competency hearing under 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 and 4247(d) to determine whether Defendant is competent to stand trial. [Doc. 36]. In response, the Government filed a Motion for Psychiatric Treatment [Doc. 38], stating that the Government does not contest that Defendant is currently incompetent to stand trial, but requesting that Defendant be treated for up to four months to determine whether Defendant can be restored to competency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).
On April 25, 2019, the Court held a hearing on both motions. [Doc. 40]. At that hearing, defense counsel was prepared to present the testimony of Dr. Opesso who, along with Defendant, participated via video conference. Counsel for Defendant and the Government agreed that Dr. Opesso would confirm the information presented in his report, to wit, that Defendant has a mental defect that impairs her ability to assist properly in her own defense; that Defendant has minimal ability to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against her; and that while Defendant may possess foundational aspects of competency, she appears to lack the rational and decisional capacity often required of defendants in a trial setting. [See Doc. 34]. The Government's counsel confirmed that it has no objection to Dr. Opesso's findings and opinions that Defendant was presently incompetent to stand trial, but requests that Defendant be required to undergo treatment designed to restore her to competency.
Section 4241 codifies the competency principles set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). To be competent, a defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult with [their] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against [them]." Id. at 402; see 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (phrasing test as whether defendant is "unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense"); United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying the "two-prong" competency test from Dusky).
Section 4247(d) governs the hearing and assures certain trial-type rights. These include rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and participation. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d); 18 U.S.C. § 4241(c) (referencing § 4247(d) for hearing procedure). Overall, per § 4241(d), a defendant is not competent if, "after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant" meets the incompetency definition of § 4241(a). This framework suggests that the defense bears the burden, although the cases are in disagreement on burden allocation. Compare United States v. Chapple, 47 F.3d 1170, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 1995) (table) (burden on United States, though without statutory analysis) and United States v. Salley, 246 F.Supp.2d 970, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (burden on United States) with United States v. Simmons, 993 F.Supp. 168, 170 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The burden to prove a lack of competence is on the defendant."). Here, the Court need not resolve the burden-allocation question because the findings are not in dispute. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992) (indicating that argument over burden, in competency context, only matters in "narrow class" of cases where proof is "in equipoise").
The Court has carefully reviewed and considered the Report as well as the proffer of evidence at the April 25, 2019, hearing. Based upon that record, the Court
Having found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant is not competent to proceed, § 4241(d) provides
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1).
Based on the Court's findings, commitment is mandatory under § 4241(d). See, e.g., United States v. Millard-Grasshorn, 603 F.3d 492, 494 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Filippi, 211 F.3d 649, 651 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Shawar, 865 F.2d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 1989).
The undersigned therefore
It is, therefore,