J. MICHELLE CHILDS, District Judge.
Plaintiff Greg Bigleman filed this action against his former employer, Defendant Kennametal Inc., alleging that he was subjected to retaliation for engaging in protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, South Carolina Human Affairs Law ("SCHAL"), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-13-10 to -110 (2013), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ("§ 1981"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (ECF No. 8 at 5 ¶ 26-8 ¶ 45.) Plaintiff also alleges a state law claim for breach of contract. (ECF No. 8 at 4 ¶¶ 18-25.)
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 33.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) D.S.C., the matter was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial handling. On April 12, 2019, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation in which she recommended that the court grants Defendant's Motion in its entirety. (ECF No. 46 at 20.) Plaintiff filed Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, which are presently before the court. (ECF No. 49.) For the reasons set forth below, the court
The facts of this matter are discussed in the Report and Recommendation. (See ECF No. 46 at 2-9.) The court concludes, upon its own careful review of the record, that the Magistrate Judge's factual summation is accurate and incorporates it by reference. The court will only reference herein additional facts viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff that are pertinent to the analysis of his claims.
Defendant "is a global manufacturer of metal removal cutting tools." (ECF No. 33-2 at 18:3-4.) Plaintiff started his employment with Defendant on April 1, 2004, as a production tool operation supervisor at the Akebono site in West Columbia, South Carolina. (ECF No. 38-2 at 9/35:19-21, 36:17-37:11.
In 2015, Plaintiff began to report to Mike Ramsey, the vice president of the machine tool industry ("MTI") group. (Id. at 11/44:19-12/45:14.)
In April of 2016 during a conversation in Latrobe, Pennsylvania with Jason Taft
On June 14, 2016, Plaintiff met with Ramsey, Kelly Lynch, and Renee Mayger in Latrobe regarding expense reports that he had submitted for the period of June to November 2015. (Id. at 28/110:21-111:20.) The general result of this audit meeting was that there was error in some of Plaintiff's expense reports due to conversion rates used for foreign transactions. (Id. at 111:9-112:24.) Ramsey proposed a solution that his assistant would review Plaintiff's expense reports going forward and Plaintiff presumed the issue had been addressed. (Id. at 28/112:14-29/114:11.) However, Lynch, the director of internal audit, "decided that at that point we would expand the scope of the review to understand if these issues were in other periods, if there was a broader concern." (ECF No. 38-7 at 22/83:20-23.)
Sometime between July 11, 2016 and July 16, 2016, Plaintiff was at a joint sales meeting of the MTI group in Concord, North Carolina and Ramsey pointed at Plaintiff "and told him in front of the group of employees you need to tell Jason Taft that I will fire anyone who questions my selection of who goes to IMTS because it's my decision." (Id. at 20/79:16-80:21.)
On July 22, 2016, Candace Graytok called Plaintiff to communicate that he was suspended. (Id. at 29/115:19-116:25.) On July 26, 2016, Graytok and Ramsey called Plaintiff to tell him that he was being terminated for an unspecified cause. (Id. at 30/117:3-25.) A disciplinary review committee-comprised of Judith Bacchus, Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer; Michelle Keating, General Counsel, and Jan Kees van Gaalen, Chief Financial Officer-had made the decision to terminate Plaintiff after receiving internal audit's summary of its audit of Plaintiff's expense reports. (ECF No. 38-1 at 3/8:10-16, 5/15:15-6/20:1.) Ramsey was not involved in the disciplinary review committee's decision-making meeting. (Id. at 6/20:2-3.) Defendant officially terminated Plaintiff's employment on July 27, 2016. (ECF No. 38-2 at 12/48:5-8.)
After his termination, Plaintiff alleges that he filed a Charge of Discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on April 27, 2017. (ECF Nos. 8 at 5 ¶ 27, 38-2 at 45/177:15-23.) In the Charge, Plaintiff alleged that he suffered retaliation "involving an overtly hostile and racially discriminatory environment of which Bigleman had complained." (ECF No. 8 at 5 ¶ 27.) Plaintiff further contends that on October 3, 2017, he received a "right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC in connection with his Charge. (ECF No. 8 at 5 ¶ 27 (referencing ECF No. 33-5 at 89).)
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an action on December 27, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas for Lexington County (South Carolina) alleging claims for breach of employment contract, violation of Title VII, race discrimination in violation of § 1981, retaliation, and violation of the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act ("SCPWA"), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 41-10-10 to -110 (Supp. 2011). (ECF No. 1-1 at 5 ¶ 16-10 ¶ 47.) After removing the matter to this court on February 1, 2018 (ECF No. 1), Defendant answered the Complaint on February 1, 2018, denying its allegations. (ECF No. 5.) On February 14, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8) asserting claims against Defendant for Title VII retaliation, SCHAL retaliation, § 1981 retaliation, and breach of an employment contract. (ECF No. 8 at 4 ¶ 18-8 ¶ 45.) Defendant answered the Amended Complaint on February 23, 2018, denying its allegations. (ECF No. 8.)
On January 11, 2019, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 33.) Plaintiff filed opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on January 25, 2019, to which Defendant filed a Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on February 8, 2019. (ECF Nos. 38, 45.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 D.S.C., the Magistrate Judge issued her Report and Recommendation on April 12, 2019, recommending that "the district judge grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment." (ECF No. 46 at 19.) On April 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 49.) On May 9, 2019, Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff's Objections to the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 50).
The court considers the merits of Plaintiff's Objections to the Report and Recommendation below.
This court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims via 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as they arise under laws of the United States, and also via 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which empowers district courts to hear claims "brought under" Title VII. The court also has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 1331 based on Plaintiff's retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which guarantees the rights of a protected class of individuals "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,...." Id. The court may properly hear Plaintiff's state law claims for SCHAL retaliation and breach of employment contract based on supplemental jurisdiction since these claims "are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). See also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (finding supplemental jurisdiction allows parties to append state law claims over which federal courts would otherwise lack jurisdiction to federal claims, so long as "[t]he state and federal claims . . . derive from a common nucleus of operative fact"); De La Rosa v. Reliable, Inc., 113 F.Supp.3d 1135, 1152 (D.N.M. 2015) ("The court can then exercise supplemental jurisdiction over other claims and parties that `form part of the same case or controversy under Article III ....'" (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367, United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725)).
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court reviews de novo only those portions of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which specific objections are filed, and reviews those portions which are not objected to — including those portions to which only "general and conclusory" objections have been made — for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983); Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A genuine question of material fact exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court finds that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, 650 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir. 2011). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). The non-moving party may not oppose a motion for summary judgment with mere allegations or denial of the movant's pleading, but instead must "set forth specific facts" demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir. 1991). All that is required is that "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
As to Plaintiff's retaliation claims pursuant to Title VII, the SCHAL, and § 1981, the Magistrate Judge observed that Plaintiff did not submit direct evidence of retaliation because "[t]here is no evidence that Ramsey had any knowledge that Taft believed Ramsey's decision might be racially-discriminatory or that Ramsey knew that Plaintiff had informed George that Taft believed the decision could be racially discriminatory." (ECF No. 46 at 12.) As for indirect evidence of retaliation, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the requisite causal connection because it does not establish that "Ramsey had any knowledge that Plaintiff (or Taft) had suggested that his (Ramsey's) decision might be perceived as racially-discriminatory or (2) that the decision makers had any knowledge of Plaintiff's protected activity." (Id. at 13.) Moreover, the Magistrate Judge observes that even if Plaintiff could demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation, summary judgment should still be granted to Defendant because (1) it "proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for termination Plaintiff: Internal Audit uncovered many irregularities, misrepresentations, and non-business-related expenses in Plaintiff's submitted expense reports and concluded that he had engaged in intentional financial fraud (i.e., theft from Defendant)"; and (2) Plaintiff has not shown pretext because the evidence of record fails to create "an inference that Ramsey was a decision maker as to Plaintiff's termination."
Upon her consideration of Plaintiff's breach of employment contract claim, the Magistrate Judge observed that "Plaintiff [] failed to present evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Defendant terminated Plaintiff [in violation of the Code of Conduct] in retaliation for making a report regarding Ramsey." (Id. at 17.) She observed that "[a]ll relevant witnesses testified Ramsey was not a decision maker as to Plaintiff's termination, and no witness disputed this testimony." (Id.) She further observed that "there is no evidence that anyone on the Internal Audit or the DRC knew that Plaintiff had made a report about Ramsey." (Id. at 17-18.)
In objecting to the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff generally asserts that the court should reject the Report and Recommendation and deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment for the following reasons:
(ECF No. 49 at 25-26.) The court considers Plaintiff's specific objections relevant to each of his claims below.
Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity in violation of Title VII, SCHAL, and § 1981. (ECF No. 8 at 5 ¶ 26-8 ¶ 45.)
Title VII protects individuals from retaliation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). More specifically, "Title VII proscribes discrimination against an employee because, in relevant part, []he `has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, ....'" Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). In order to prevail on a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must either offer sufficient direct and indirect evidence of retaliation, or proceed under a burden-shifting method.
Under the burden-shifting method, to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in protected activity
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the defendant can rebut the presumption of retaliation by articulating a non-discriminatory reason for its action. Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 271 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). At that point, the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove that the employer's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. Id.
Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation arguing that "[t]he Magistrate [Judge] does not follow binding precedent on how to analyze direct evidence, does not view the whole record, does not view the facts in the nonmovant's light, and errantly weighs the movant's evidence over that of the nonmovant." (ECF No. 49 at 9.) In support of this argument, Plaintiff asserts that he submitted direct evidence of Ramsey's discriminatory animus based on (1) his statement that "I will fire anyone who questions my selection of who goes to IMTS" and (2) his knowledge of Taft's concerns conveyed by both Plaintiff and Jefferies. (Id. at 10, 13.) Plaintiff further asserts that the Magistrate Judge discounted this evidence by impermissibly violating the jury's province in "finding that this outburst was directed to Taft and not to Plaintiff" and concluding that Ramsey did not have "knowledge of the racially discriminatory nature of Plaintiff's complaint prior to terminating him." (Id. at 10, 13.)
Plaintiff also argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in her application of the burdenshifting method in that she "again does not view the whole record, does not consider Plaintiff's copious citations thereto, and instead views facts in the movant's favor, again in violation of Tolan, Jacobs, and Roche Carolina, Inc." He asserts that the Magistrate Judge completely ignores the following evidence that clearly demonstrates Ramsey's role in his termination:
(ECF No. 49 at 14-15 (emphasis in the original).) Moreover, he asserts that the Magistrate Judge failed to consider his evidence of pretext:
(Id. at 19.)
Upon its review, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation because there is a lack of a causal link between Plaintiff's protected activity of complaining and the alleged retaliatory termination he suffered. "[A] causal connection for purposes of demonstrating a prima facie case [of retaliation] exists where the employer takes adverse employment action against an employee shortly after
Although Plaintiff adamantly contends that Ramsey terminated his employment, the court finds that the uncontroverted evidence of record establishes that the members of Defendant's disciplinary review committee ultimately decided to terminate Plaintiff. The court is further unable to impute either direct or circumstantial knowledge of Plaintiff's complaint to George to the disciplinary review committee at the time the decision was made to terminate Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff cannot allege facts sufficient to create an inference that the individuals responsible for his termination had knowledge of his protected activity, he is unable to satisfy the causality element of a prima facie retaliation claim. See Wright, 319 F. App'x at 234 ("Although it appears accurate that certain airline officials were aware of [Plaintiff-Appellant] Wright's FMLA request, she utterly fails to demonstrate that the particular supervisors involved in her termination possessed such knowledge .... As Wright failed to allege facts sufficient to prove that the supervisors responsible for her termination had knowledge of her FMLA request, she was unable to establish a prima facie retaliation claim, ....").
As a result of the foregoing, the court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims for retaliation. Accordingly, the court overrules Plaintiff's objections.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's actions toward him breached both binding contractual provisions of its employment manual and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (ECF No. 8 at 4 ¶ 18-5 ¶ 25.)
With respect to employment, there is a presumption in South Carolina that employees are at-will. Prescott v. Farmer's Tel. Co-Op., Inc., 516 S.E.2d 923, 927 n.8 (S.C. 1999) (In South Carolina, "there is a presumption of at-will employment"). In order to prevail on a breach of contract claim under South Carolina law, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence and terms of the contract, defendant's breach of one or more of the contractual terms, and damages resulting from the breach. Taylor v. Cummins Atl., Inc., 852 F.Supp. 1279, 1286 (D.S.C. 1994) (citing Fuller v. E. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 124 S.E.2d 602, 610 (S.C. 1962)). In an action asserting breach of contract based on a handbook or other statement of company policy, once an employer voluntarily publishes the handbook or policy to its employees, the employer may be held liable for breach of contract if the employee can establish that the handbook, policy, or other similar material applies to the employee, sets out procedures binding on the employer, and does not contain a conspicuous and appropriate disclaimer. Grant v. Mount Vernon Mills, Inc., 634 S.E.2d 15, 20 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, for Plaintiff to survive Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the evidence before the court must be sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact that a contract for employment was created in this case.
In his Objections, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by analyzing his claim for breach of contract using "Title VII's framework rather than [the framework for] South Carolina's common law for breach-of-contract claims." (ECF No. 49 at 24.) In this regard, Plaintiff asserts that "[u]nder this common-law standard for breaches, Plaintiff's copious recordcitations allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the preponderance of the evidence shows that Defendant breached the contract by retaliating against Plaintiff for his complaints of nepotism." (Id.) Additionally, in response to the Magistrate Judge's statute of limitations observation, Plaintiff responds that "the doctrine of preemption should apply to bar the interpretation of the SCHAL Defendant espouses, and preemption analysis greatly differs from that of equitable tolling such that the latter is no substitute for the former." (Id. at 25.)
In the Report, the Magistrate Judge observed that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim failed because "[a]ssuming arguendo that the Code of Conduct were to constitute a contract under South Carolina law, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Defendant terminated Plaintiff in retaliation for making a report regarding Ramsey." (ECF No. 46 at 17.) Upon its consideration of this observation, the court finds that the statement evidences the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Defendant did not breach the Code of Conduct as alleged by Plaintiff. Because the breach of a contractual term is an element of a claim for breach of contract, the court finds that it is unable to agree with Plaintiff that the Magistrate Judge used a Title VII framework to analyze the breach of contract claim.
Upon careful consideration of the entire record, the court hereby
