OPINION AND ORDER

CLAIRE V. EAGAN, District Judge.

Now before the Court are Fred Randolph Lynn's Motion to Withdraw (Dkt. #146) and defendant's Motion to Continue Jury Trial (Dkt. #147). Defendant Calvin Shobe has retained a new attorney, Neal Kirkpatrick, and Kirkpatrick has filed a motion to continue the jury trial set for Monday, March 26, 2012. Dkt. #147. Shobe's appointed attorney, Fred Randolph Lynn, has filed a motion to withdraw as defense counsel. Dkt. #146. These motions were set for hearing on March 22, 2012, and counsel for the government, Lynn, Kirkpatrick, and defendant were present at the hearing. Below is a timeline of the events leading up to the current trial setting:

The government opposes defendant's request for a continuance and Lynn's motion to withdraw as defense counsel. The government asks the Court to consider to consider the procedural history of this case, and states that it is prepared to go to trial on March 26, 2012. Lynn is familiar with this case, has engaged in plea negotiations on defendant's behalf, and has filed numerous motions, and the government argues that he should not be permitted to withdraw at this stage of the case.

Defendant has retained Kirkpatrick and, under the Sixth Amendment, he has the right to retain counsel of his choice. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006). However, a defendant's decision to retain new counsel does not automatically require the Court to grant a continuance to allow a newly retained attorney additional time to prepare for trial. United States v. Flanders, 491 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2007). The Tenth Circuit has provided eight factors for district courts to consider in exercising their discretion to grant or deny a continuance under these circumstances:

Id. at 1216. The Court should also consider whether a defendant diligently sought out new counsel. United States v. Trestyn, 646 F.3d 732, 740 (10th Cir. 2011).

The Court will consider defendant's request for a continuance under the Flanders factors. Trial is less than a week away and it would inconvenience the government and the witnesses if the case were rescheduled. The trial has already been continued three times and, aside from the late entry of Kirkpatrick into the case, there would be no reason to grant a fourth continuance. To be clear, the Court is not considering any delay caused by defendant's competency evaluation as evidence that defendant intentionally delayed these proceedings. Kirkpatrick could legitimately need additional time to prepare if he were to represent defendant by himself, but the Court is not required to allow Lynn to withdraw and the Court may authorize hybrid representation to alleviate any risk of prejudice to defendant. Trestyn, 646 F.3d at 740; Flanders, 491 F.3d at 1215-16. Lynn is prepared to represent defendant at trial and he has competently represented defendant up to this point, and defendant would be represented by competent counsel even if he had not retained Kirkpatrick. This case is not particularly complex and Kirkpatrick can get up to speed relatively quickly, especially if he is not the only attorney representing defendant. Defendant's conduct at the pretrial conference suggests that he is intentionally attempting to delay the trial, and he did not diligently seek out a new attorney. The criminal complaint was filed in August 2011, and defendant has had more than seven months to retain an attorney if he so wished. Defendant waited until the eleventh hour to retain Kirkpatrick, and this is a strong factor weighing against granting defendant's request for a continuance. Trestyn, 646 F.3d at 740.

Kirkpatrick states that he intends to offer a diminished capacity defense and he needs additional time to gather evidence in support of this defense. He argues that he will be unable to present the defense he "envisioned" unless the trial is continued,1 and he states that he was not aware of the procedural posture of the case when he accepted the representation of defendant. During a sealed portion of the hearing, Lynn made a record as to his awareness of the issues raised by Kirkpatrick and the Court takes into account Lynn's statements concerning his knowledge of the evidence and any advice he may have given to defendant. The Court has reviewed the docket sheet and the evidence presented at the hearing, and makes the following findings:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Fred Randolph Lynn's Motion to Withdraw (Dkt. #146) and defendant's Motion to Continue Jury Trial (Dkt. #147) are denied.