JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants. [Doc. 20.] Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff filed this action on January 11, 2017.
According to Plaintiff, he received a thirty-year sentence in the state of Maryland in 1988 for burglary and attempted robbery. [Doc. 1 ¶ 2.] Plaintiff was granted parole in 2000. [Id.] In 2014, Plaintiff contacted his parole agent regarding transferring his parole from Maryland to South Carolina. [Id. ¶ 5; Doc. 1-1 at 3.] In 2015, an application was placed to transfer Plaintiff's parole from Maryland to South Carolina through the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision ("Interstate Compact").
Plaintiff was granted a temporary travel permit to visit his mother from December 3, 2016, through December 18, 2016. [Doc. 33-2.] Subsequently, Plaintiff's Interstate Compact transfer request was approved on February 23, 2017. [Doc. 20-1.] Plaintiff is currently residing in Spartanburg, South Carolina, at his mother's residence and is being supervised by Defendant Erin Johnson ("Johnson"), with the Spartanburg Office of the Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services. [Doc. 20 at 2; see also Doc. 33-1 at 1.]
Plaintiff, who filed the instant action prior to the transfer being approved, seeks a declaration that Defendants were wrong; immediate transfer to South Carolina; training for Defendants' staff on Interstate Compact rules; costs, including legal fees; and any additional relief the Court deems just and proper. [Doc. 1 ¶ 17.]
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him. See Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
This action is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 "`is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides `a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant "deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States" and (2) that the defendant "deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the "state action" requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, "the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual" may at times be treated "as if a State has caused it to be performed." Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, "state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a `close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior `may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'" Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation "caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible" and that "the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to "begin[] by identifying `the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'" Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
As an initial matter, as discussed above, Plaintiff's request for transfer of his parole from Maryland to South Carolina through the Interstate Compact has been approved. [Doc. 20-1.] Plaintiff is currently residing with his mother in Spartanburg, South Carolina, and is being supervised by Johnson. [Doc. 20 at 2.] A case becomes moot "when the issues presented are no longer `live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). A claim may be mooted "when the claimant receives the relief he or she sought to obtain through the claim," because the court no longer "has [] effective relief to offer." Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2007). Because Plaintiff has been approved through the Interstate Compact for transfer to South Carolina and Plaintiff is currently residing with his mother, as requested, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief be found as moot.
Further, the Interstate Compact does not create a private right of action for parolees. The Interstate Compact "is a formal agreement between member states that seeks to promote public safety by systematically controlling the interstate movement of certain adult offenders." Introduction, Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision Rules (March 1, 2016) ["ICAOS Rules"], available at http://www.interstatecompact.org (last visited May 18, 2017). Under the Interstate Compact, states may transfer offenders to other states, providing offenders the opportunity to transfer their parole supervision to the community where they have family, confirmed employment, specialized treatment programs, and/or educational or vocational opportunities. Id. at 24. However, there exists no right to have parole transferred to another state. See Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 104 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the language of the Interstate Compact itself creates rights for the various states who are signatories to it, but it does not create rights for probationers or parolees.); see also Castaneira v. Potteiger, 621 Fed.Appx. 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding parolees do not have a private right of action under § 1983 to enforce the provisions of the Interstate Compact). Because Plaintiff has not alleged a private right of action under § 1983, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Doc. 20] be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must `only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
