REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).1 Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for administrative action consistent with this recommendation, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, alleging an onset of disability date of February 1, 2010. [R. 170-71.] The claim was denied initially and on reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). [R. 91-99; 101-08.] Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), and, on July 28, 2017, ALJ Benjamin R. McMillion conducted a de novo hearing to review Plaintiff's claim. [R. 36-54.]

The ALJ issued a decision on December 14, 2017, finding Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act ("the Act"), from February 1, 2010, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2015, the date last insured. [R. 17-30.] At Step 1,2 the ALJ found Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Act on December 31, 2015, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of February 1, 2010, through his date last insured of December 31, 2015. [R. 19-20, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments of human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV"), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), right shoulder/wrist bursitis, degenerative disc disease, obesity, and depression. [R. 20, Finding 3.] The ALJ also found Plaintiff had the medically determinable impairment of choroidal neruovascularization due to polypoidal choroidal vasculopathy of the left eye, which was not severe. [R. 20.] At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 20, Finding 4.]

Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform his past relevant work, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):

[R. 21, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC finding, the ALJ determined at Step 4 that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work as a bus driver. [R. 28, Finding 6.] However, the ALJ found that, through the date last insured, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the vocational expert ("VE"), jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. [R. 29, Finding 10.] Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined in the Act, at any time from February 1, 2010, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2015, the date last insured. [R. 30, Finding 11.]

Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, but the Council declined review. [R. 3-8.] Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on March 27, 2019. [Doc. 1.]

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

Plaintiff contends the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and contains errors of law requiring remand for further proceedings before the Commissioner. [Doc. 12.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to conduct a proper analysis under Listing 1.04, as each of the required findings under Listing 1.04 are documented in the record. [Id. at 26-30.] Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred by failing to account for "unexplored manipulative limitations" in his upper extremities in the RFC and improperly relying on the VE's testimony without resolving conflicts between the VE's testimony and the DOT. [Id. at 30-36.]

The Commissioner, on the other hand, contends that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. [Doc. 13.] The Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's Step 3 findings [id. at 7-9], RFC findings [id. at 9-10], and Step 5 findings [id. at 10-14].

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F.Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963)) ("Substantial evidence, it has been held, is evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is `substantial evidence.'").

Where conflicting evidence "allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)," not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Bird v. Comm'r, 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962).

The reviewing court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review, however, if the decision applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Where the Commissioner's decision "is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the [Commissioner's] decision `with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.'" Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Remand is unnecessary where "the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose." Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974).

The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sargent v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). To remand under sentence four, the reviewing court must find either that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding remand was appropriate where the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair record of the claimant's residual functional capacity); Brenem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding remand was appropriate where record was insufficient to affirm but was also insufficient for court to find the claimant disabled). Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a remand under sentence four is usually the proper course to allow the Commissioner to explain the basis for the decision or for additional investigation. See Radford v. Comm'r, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985); see also Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (4th Cir. 1986) (remanding case where decision of ALJ contained "a gap in its reasoning" because ALJ did not say he was discounting testimony or why); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (remanding case where neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council indicated the weight given to relevant evidence). On remand under sentence four, the ALJ should review the case on a complete record, including any new material evidence. See Smith, 782 F.2d at 1182 ("The [Commissioner] and the claimant may produce further evidence on remand."). After a remand under sentence four, the court enters a final and immediately appealable judgment and then loses jurisdiction. Sargent, 941 F.2d 1207 (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991)).

In contrast, sentence six provides:

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court may remand a case to the Commissioner on the basis of new evidence only if four prerequisites are met: (1) the evidence is relevant to the determination of disability at the time the application was first filed; (2) the evidence is material to the extent that the Commissioner's decision might reasonably have been different had the new evidence been before him; (3) there is good cause for the claimant's failure to submit the evidence when the claim was before the Commissioner; and (4) the claimant made at least a general showing of the nature of the new evidence to the reviewing court. Borders v. Heckler, 777 F.2d 954, 955 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1983); Sims v. Harris, 631 F.2d 26, 28 (4th Cir. 1980); King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979)), superseded by amendment to statute, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as recognized in Wilkins v. Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 925 F.2d 769, 774 (4th Cir. 1991).3 With remand under sentence six, the parties must return to the court after remand to file modified findings of fact. Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98. The reviewing court retains jurisdiction pending remand and does not enter a final judgment until after the completion of remand proceedings. See Allen v. Chater, 67 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (holding that an order remanding a claim for Social Security benefits pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is not a final order).

APPLICABLE LAW

The Act provides that disability benefits shall be available to those persons insured for benefits, who are not of retirement age, who properly apply, and who are under a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). "Disability" is defined as:

Id. § 423(d)(1)(A).

I. The Five Step Evaluation

To facilitate uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, federal regulations have reduced the statutory definition of disability to a series of five sequential questions. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 n.2 (1983) (noting a "need for efficiency" in considering disability claims). The ALJ must consider whether (1) the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals an impairment included in the Administration's Official Listings of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; (4) the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) the impairment prevents the claimant from having substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the claimant. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983). The claimant must prove disability on or before the last day of her insured status to receive disability benefits. Everett v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 412 F.2d 842, 843 (4th Cir. 1969). If the inquiry reaches step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to produce evidence that other jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Grant, 699 F.2d at 191. If at any step of the evaluation the ALJ can find an individual is disabled or not disabled, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981).

A. Substantial Gainful Activity

"Substantial gainful activity" must be both substantial—involves doing significant physical or mental activities, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a)—and gainful—done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized, id. § 404.1572(b). If an individual has earnings from employment or self-employment above a specific level set out in the regulations, he is generally presumed to be able to engage in substantial gainful activity. Id. §§ 404.1574-.1575.

B. Severe Impairment

An impairment is "severe" if it significantly limits an individual's ability to perform basic work activities. See id. § 404.1521. When determining whether a claimant's physical and mental impairments are sufficiently severe, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's impairments. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B). The ALJ must evaluate a disability claimant as a whole person and not in the abstract, having several hypothetical and isolated illnesses. Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that, when evaluating the effect of a number of impairments on a disability claimant, "the [Commissioner] must consider the combined effect of a claimant's impairments and not fragmentize them"). Accordingly, the ALJ must make specific and well-articulated findings as to the effect of a combination of impairments when determining whether an individual is disabled. Id. at 50 ("As a corollary to this rule, the ALJ must adequately explain his or her evaluation of the combined effects of the impairments."). If the ALJ finds a combination of impairments to be severe, "the combined impact of the impairments shall be considered throughout the disability determination process." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B).

C. Meets or Equals an Impairment Listed in the Listings of Impairments

If a claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals the criteria of a listing found at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1 and meets the duration requirement found at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509, the ALJ will find the claimant disabled without considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

D. Past Relevant Work

The assessment of a claimant's ability to perform past relevant work "reflect[s] the statute's focus on the functional capacity retained by the claimant." Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1204 (4th Cir. 1995). At this step of the evaluation, the ALJ compares the claimant's residual functional capacity4 with the physical and mental demands of the kind of work he has done in the past to determine whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to do his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b).

E. Other Work

As previously stated, once the ALJ finds that a claimant cannot return to her prior work, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant could perform other work that exists in the national economy. See Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)-(g). To meet this burden, the Commissioner may sometimes rely exclusively on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "grids"). Exclusive reliance on the "grids" is appropriate where the claimant suffers primarily from an exertional impairment, without significant nonexertional factors.5 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(e); see also Gory v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 929, 930-31 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that exclusive reliance on the grids is appropriate in cases involving exertional limitations). When a claimant suffers from both exertional and nonexertional limitations, the grids may serve only as guidelines. Gory, 712 F.2d at 931. In such a case, the Commissioner must use a vocational expert to establish the claimant's ability to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a; see Walker, 889 F.2d at 49-50 ("Because we have found that the grids cannot be relied upon to show conclusively that claimant is not disabled, when the case is remanded it will be incumbent upon the [Commissioner] to prove by expert vocational testimony that despite the combination of exertional and nonexertional impairments, the claimant retains the ability to perform specific jobs which exist in the national economy."). The purpose of using a vocational expert is "to assist the ALJ in determining whether there is work available in the national economy which this particular claimant can perform." Walker, 889 F.2d at 50. For the vocational expert's testimony to be relevant, "it must be based upon a consideration of all other evidence in the record, . . . and it must be in response to proper hypothetical questions which fairly set out all of claimant's impairments." Id. (citations omitted).

II. Developing the Record

The ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly develop the record. See Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1173 (4th Cir. 1986). The ALJ is required to inquire fully into each relevant issue. Snyder, 307 F.2d at 520. The performance of this duty is particularly important when a claimant appears without counsel. Marsh v. Harris, 632 F.2d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 1980). In such circumstances, "the ALJ should scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts, . . . being especially diligent in ensuring that favorable as well as unfavorable facts and circumstances are elicited." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

III. Treating Physicians

If a treating physician's opinion on the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence" in the record, the ALJ must give it controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The ALJ may discount a treating physician's opinion if it is unsupported or inconsistent with other evidence, i.e., when the treating physician's opinion does not warrant controlling weight, Craig, 76 F.3d at 590, but the ALJ must nevertheless assign a weight to the medical opinion based on the 1) length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; 2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship; 3) supportability of the opinion; 4) consistency of the opinion with the record a whole; 5) specialization of the physician; and 6) other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Similarly, where a treating physician has merely made conclusory statements, the ALJ may afford the opinion such weight as is supported by clinical or laboratory findings and other consistent evidence of a claimant's impairments. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 590 (holding there was sufficient evidence for the ALJ to reject the treating physician's conclusory opinion where the record contained contradictory evidence).

In any instance, a treating physician's opinion is generally entitled to more weight than a consulting physician's opinion. See Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that treating physician's opinion must be accorded great weight because "it reflects an expert judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient's condition for a prolonged period of time"); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). An ALJ determination coming down on the side of a non-examining, non-treating physician's opinion can stand only if the medical testimony of examining and treating physicians goes both ways. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 346 (4th Cir. 1986). Further, the ALJ is required to review all of the medical findings and other evidence that support a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). However, the ALJ is responsible for making the ultimate determination about whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability. Id.

IV. Medical Tests and Examinations

The ALJ is required to order additional medical tests and exams only when a claimant's medical sources do not give sufficient medical evidence about an impairment to determine whether the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517; see also Conley v. Bowen, 781 F.2d 143, 146 (8th Cir. 1986). The regulations are clear: a consultative examination is not required when there is sufficient medical evidence to make a determination on a claimant's disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517. Under the regulations, however, the ALJ may determine that a consultative examination or other medical tests are necessary. Id.

V. Pain

Congress has determined that a claimant will not be considered disabled unless he furnishes medical and other evidence (e.g., medical signs and laboratory findings) showing the existence of a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 16-3p provides, "[i]n considering the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an individual's symptoms, we examine the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence; an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms; statements and other information provided by medical sources and other persons; and any other relevant evidence in the individual's case record." Social Security Ruling 16-3p Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms In Disability Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. 49,462, 49,464 (Oct. 25, 2017); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1)-(c)(2) (outlining evaluation of pain).

In evaluating claims of disabling pain, the ALJ must proceed in a two-part analysis. Morgan v. Barnhart, 142 F. App'x 716, 723 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion); see also SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. at 49,463. First, "the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has produced medical evidence of a `medically determinable impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce" the alleged symptoms. Id. (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 594); see SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. at 49,463. Second, the ALJ must evaluate "the intensity and persistence of an individual's symptoms such as pain and determine the extent to which an individual's symptoms limit his or her ability to perform work-related activities . . . or to function independently." SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. at 49,464; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528 (noting that the ALJ must consider all of a claimant's statements about his symptoms, including pain, and determine the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence).

APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS

Listing Analysis

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to find him disabled under Listing 1.04 because each of the four findings required by Listing 1.04 are documented in the medical evidence. [Doc. 12 at 29-30.] The Commissioner contends the ALJ properly considered and found Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. [Doc. 13 at 8-9.]

Listing 1.04.

When a claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the claimant is deemed disabled and no further analysis is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). To determine whether a claimant's impairments meet or equal a listed impairment at Step 3 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ must identify the relevant listed impairments and compare the listing criteria with the evidence of the claimant's symptoms. See Peck v. Colvin, No. 8:12-cv-02594-DCN, 2014 WL 994925, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2014) (noting that, without identifying the relevant listings and comparing the claimant's symptoms to the listing criteria, it is simply impossible to tell whether there was substantial evidence to support the determination) (citing Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1172 (4th Cir. 1986)). "In cases where there is `ample factual support in the record' for a particular listing, the ALJ must provide a full analysis to determine whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals the listing." Id. (citations omitted). While the ALJ may rely on the opinion of a State agency medical consultant in conducting a listing analysis, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(iii), the ALJ ultimately bears the responsibility for deciding whether a claimant's impairments meet or equal a listing, see id. § 404.1527(e)(2).

Listing 1.04 of the Administration's Listing of Impairments addresses specific disorders of the spine, resulting in compromise of a nerve root or the spinal cord. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x. 1, § 1.04. A claimant with a spinal impairment may qualify as "disabled" under Listing 1.04 if there is:

See Peck, 2014 WL 994925, at *3 (quoting 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x 1, § 104).

At the outset, the ALJ's decision here does not expressly compare the specific criteria under each paragraph of Listing 1.04 to the record evidence of Plaintiff's impairments. It is the duty of the ALJ to resolve conflicts in the evidence of record. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). However, without a discussion of the conflicting evidence, it is difficult for a reviewing court to (1) track the ALJ's reasoning and be assured that all record evidence was considered and (2) understand how the ALJ resolved conflicts in the evidence. See Mellon v. Asture, No. 4:08-cv-2110-MBS, 2009 WL 2777653, at *13 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2009). Here, the decision fails to compare Plaintiff's symptoms to the requirements of the Listing 1.04(A), (B) or (C). See Cook, 783 F.2d at 1173 (remanding in part because it was "simply impossible to tell whether there was substantial evidence to support the determination" when the ALJ's decision failed to identify the relevant listed impairment and failed to compare each of the listed criteria to the evidence of the plaintiff's symptoms). Without such a discussion, the Court is unable to determine whether the ALJ's finding at Step 3 of the sequential analysis is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ's failure to expressly consider and discuss his findings regarding whether Plaintiff could satisfy Paragraph A, B or C of Listing 1.04 constitutes reversible error and warrants a remand to the ALJ to properly consider the issue.

Additionally, the Court notes that, while it is Plaintiff's burden at Step 3 to prove disability, Plaintiff points to evidence of record which could potentially support a finding under Listing 1.04(A). [Doc. 12 at 29-30 (pointing to radiating pain, decreased range of motion, decreased sensation on light touch in the right lower extremity, and positive straight leg raises with pain radiating to the buttocks and down the posterior aspect of the leg).] The Court notes that the ALJ referenced conflicting evidence in the record (such as finding no evidence of significantly reduced range of motion, reduced sensation or strength [R. 26], and negative straight leg raises [R. 27]), but the ALJ failed to address his consideration of the same or explain how he resolved the conflicting evidence in favor of a finding that the listing was not met. To the contrary, the ALJ failed to even mention that Listing 1.04 was being considered.

The ALJ failed to address and/or explain his assignment of weight as to numerous findings in the record concerning evidence that supported a showing of severity under Listing 1.04. While the ALJ acknowledged some of the above-referenced evidence in his RFC assessment, the ALJ failed to offer any explanation as to how that evidence informed any portion of his Listing analysis. Moreover, although the ALJ discussed evidence that conflicted with the evidence suggesting Plaintiff's impairment met Listing 1.04, the ALJ's decision contains no discussion as to how he resolved such conflicts in the evidence. Thus, with respect to the evidence supporting Plaintiff's claim that his impairment met Listing 1.04A, without a discussion of how the ALJ weighed and resolved conflicts in the evidence, the Court is unable to find that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Remaining Allegations of Error

On remand, the ALJ will be able to explain his consideration of the evidence in light of Listing 1.04. See Harris v. Asture, No. 9:09-cv-0028-HFF, 2009 WL 5125215, *4 (D.S.C. 2009); Hancock v. Barnhart, 206 F.Supp.2d 757, 763-64 (W.D. Va. 2002) (explaining that, on remand, the ALJ's prior decision has no preclusive effect, as it is vacated and the new hearing is conducted de novo). Additionally, the ALJ should consider Plaintiff's allegations of error with respect to the RFC and the ALJ's consideration of Plaintiff's upper extremity limitations.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and the case be REMANDED to the Commissioner for further administrative action consistent with this Report and Recommendation.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.