OPINION AND ORDER

CLAIRE V. EAGAN, District Judge.

Now before the Court is defendant Andrew Scott Pierson's motion to quash search warrant,1 and motion to suppress. Dkt. ## 19, 20.2 Defendant is charged by indictment with one count of being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Dkt. # 4. Defendant seeks to suppress a search warrant and all tangible and intangible evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant and derived directly and/or indirectly therefrom, arguing that the evidence relied on in the search warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. Plaintiff filed a response (Dkt. # 22) to defendant's motion.

I.

On September 23, 2014, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Officer Holley J. Campbell applied to a United States magistrate judge for a search warrant for the residence located at "54990 E 340rd, Jay, Oklahoma."3 Dkt. # 19-1. Officer Campbell's affidavit in support of the search warrant provides the following information:

Dkt. # 19-1, at 4-11.

Based on the information contained in Officer Campbell's affidavit, Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary issued the search warrant on September 23, 2014 for the residence located at "54990 E 340rd, Jay, Oklahoma." Id. at 12. The search warrant allowed officers to seize: firearms; ammunition; records, notes, and receipts showing the acquisition and disposition of firearms, ammunition, or firearm parts and accessories; financial documents utilized in the purchase of firearms, ammunition, or firearm parts and accessories; desktops, laptops, tablet computers, and cell phones that could be used to access the interest and process transactions related to the purchasing of firearms, ammunition, or firearm parts and accessories; and items to establish the persons who have control, possession, custody or dominion over property searched and from which evidence is seized. Id. at 3, 12.

Agents executed the search warrant on September 30, 2014, and recovered three rifles; three pistols; several thousand rounds of ammunition; a sealed box addressed to 1208 Paseo de Danubio Rd., Laredo, Texas, containing another box addressed to Pierson, 54990 E 340 Rd., Jay, Oklahoma, containing a jig used to drill a hole in an AR type firearm to install an auto sear; a bank statement for Pierson Farms, 54990 E 340 Rd., Jay, OK, documenting several thousand dollars of deposits made in Laredo, Texas, and documenting several purchases from companies that sell firearms, firearm parts, and ammunition; and Ozark Cartridge and Die Supply checks. Dkt. # 2, at 4-5.

Betty Kendall, defendant's mother, was present on the premises at the time of the search. Kendall stated that Pierson was in Texas at the time. Id. at 4, 6. Kendall stated that the three rifles belong to Pierson, and that the three pistols were acquired by Pierson, but she did not know from where he acquired them. Id. at 6. Kendall stated that she routinely receives packages for Pierson at the residence, and she mails them to an address in Laredo, Texas at Pierson's request. Id. That same day, ATF Agents executed a search warrant at 1208 Paseo de Danubio Road, Laredo, Texas,7 and recovered machine gun parts, firearms kits, trigger kits, magazines, firearm stocks, and tools during the search. Id.

The parties called no witnesses at the hearing on the motion to suppress held February 6, 2019, but each side made legal arguments.

II.

Defendant challenges the facial validity of the search warrant and argues that the evidence relied on in the affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause. Specifically, he argues that the affidavit: (1) lacks support for the proposition that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place; (2) relies on the purchase of items by Ozarkcart from three months to almost one year before the date of the search warrant; (3) does not explain how the affiant reached the conclusion that Ozarkcart was/is defendant; and (4) does not provide any information about any attempt to determine whether defendant resided at the place to be searched.

The Supreme Court has stated that probable cause is a "fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In the context of search warrants, the Tenth Circuit requires that a magistrate issuing a search warrant find that "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." United States v. Tisdale, 248 F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). "Probable cause undoubtedly requires a nexus between suspected criminal activity and the place to be searched." United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 937 (10th Cir. 1990). A magistrate may consider the affiant's experience as part of his probable cause determination. United States v. Soussi, 29 F.3d 565, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). In reviewing the search warrant affidavit, this Court must "interpret [the affidavit] in a common sense and realistic fashion." United States v. Grimmett, 493 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006). A reviewing court must show great deference to the magistrate's finding of probable cause, and the magistrate's finding should be upheld if the magistrate had a "`substantial basis' for determining that probable cause existed." United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2004)).

A. Fair Probability that Evidence of a Crime Will Be Found in a Particular Place

Defendant's primary argument is that the affidavit provides no information as to whether the "parts kits" or demilled receivers allegedly purchased by defendant were, in fact, illegal for an individual to purchase and possess. Defendant argues that, therefore, the affidavit provides no basis for determining that evidence of illegal firearms would be found inside the residence.

As summarized in detail above, the affidavit clearly states that ATF agents had determined that the "Uzi parts kit" purchased from Kyle Wick via Gunbroker.com was not properly destructed and was readily restorable. ATF determined that, because a readily restorable receiver is considered a "machinegun" under § 5845(b), the "parts kit" sold to them by Wick via Gunbroker.com was, in fact, a "machinegun." Based on this information, ATF agents executed a search warrant on Wick's residence and found that Wick had sold 94 of "the same parts kits" to individuals throughout the United States. Dkt. # 19-1, at 5 (emphasis added). ATF agents discovered that one of those parts kits had been sold to Ozarkcart, who ATF identified as being Pierson. As the affidavit states, Pierson had, in fact, purchased a Uzi demilled receiver in 2013. Agents also discovered that Pierson had purchased a M53/MG42 demilled receiver in 2013.

Although the affidavit does not allege that the ATF officers examined the specific parts kits purchased by defendant, ATF determined that defendant had purchased the "same" parts kit (the Uzi parts kit) as the one purchased and examined by ATF, in addition to a similar parts kit (the M53/MG42 parts kit). Moreover, defendant purchased the parts kit from the same person who had sold the parts kit to ATF. Finally, defendant purchased the parts kit just a few months after ATF had purchased its parts kit. Because the Uzi parts kit examined by ATF was not properly demilled and was easily restorable to a functioning machinegun, ATF officers reasonably believed that the parts kits purchased by defendant were "not properly demilled and [were] readily restorable to a functioning machinegun." Accordingly, the Court finds that the affidavit provides sufficient information to establish probable cause to believe that the parts kits purchased by defendant were not properly demilled and were readily restorable machineguns. Therefore, defendant purchased "machineguns," as that term is defined in § 5845(b).8

Section 922(o) of Title 18 of the United States Code makes it a crime for any person to possess a machinegun.9 In addition, § 922(g)(1) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person "who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." § 922(g)(1). The affidavit clearly establishes that in 2006, defendant pleaded guilty to three felonies and was sentenced to 41 months of imprisonment; therefore, at the time defendant purchased the parts kits in 2013, he was a convicted felon. Accordingly, the affidavit provides sufficient information to establish probable cause to believe that it was illegal for defendant to purchase and possess the demilled receivers.

In any event, the affidavit makes clear that defendant purchased 2000 rounds of ammunition on June 28, 2014. Dkt. # 19-1, at 7. As the affidavit states, it is illegal for Pierson, being a convicted felon, to possess ammunition. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On that basis alone, the magistrate judge had sufficient information to find that there was probable cause to believe that defendant had engaged in illegal conduct.

Moreover, the affidavit provides sufficient information to establish a fair probability that the evidence of the crime would be found in defendant's residence. An affidavit must show a "nexus between . . . suspected criminal activity and the place to be searched, and a court may not arrive at probable cause simply by piling hunch upon hunch." United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). However, the Tenth Circuit has found that courts have "never required, for example, that hard evidence or `personal knowledge of illegal activity' link a Defendant's suspected unlawful activity to his home." Id. (quoting United States v. One Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Two and 43/100 Dollars ($149,422.43) in U.S. Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 874 (10th Cir. 1992)) (citations omitted). "Instead, [the circuit court] [has] indicated that a sufficient nexus is established once `an affidavit describes circumstances which would warrant a person of reasonable caution' in the belief that `the articles sought' are at a particular place." Id. (quoting $149,422.43, 965 F.2d at 874) (citation omitted).

Moreover, the Tenth Circuit has "long recognized that magistrate judges may `rely on the opinion' of law enforcement officers `as to where contraband' or other evidence `may be kept.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 1997)). Therefore, in some cases, an affidavit containing an officer's statement that "certain evidence-in his or her professional experience-is more likely to be found in a defendant's residence" has been sufficient to show a nexus; however, "an affiant officer need not draw an explicit connection between a suspect's activities and his residence for a Fourth Amendment nexus to exist." Id. (citations omitted).

Officer Campbell's affidavit explains that she has training and experience in the investigation of individuals who illegally possess firearms, and she has investigated violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) since 2005. Based on her training and experience, she knows that most people store their firearms and firearm-related documents in their homes, businesses, and vehicles, and that they usually possess other items related to firearms, such as ammunition. Officer Campbell also averred that, based on her training and experience, she knows that firearms are tangible objects of habitual retention; therefore, once a person acquires a firearm, he or she usually keeps said weapon for a long period of time. The affidavit explains that an ATF investigation determined that an individual with the username Ozarkcart purchased "parts kits" on Gunbroker.com, that Andrew Pierson is the registered agent for a limited liability company named Ozark Cartridge and Die Supply, and that the address listed for the registered agent is 54990 E 340 Road, Jay, Oklahoma. In addition, records from the Delaware County Treasurer's Office, the Delaware County Assessor's Office, and the Oklahoma Drivers License database indicated that Pierson's residence is located at 54990 E 340 Road, Jay, Oklahoma. Because the magistrate judge was permitted to rely on Officer Campbell's opinion that firearms, ammunition, and firearm-related documents are often kept in the individual's residence, and because the affidavit provides information sufficient to show that Pierson's residence is located at 54990 E 340 Road, Jay, Oklahoma, the Court finds that the affidavit provides sufficient support for the proposition that there was a fair probability that evidence would be found in the residence located at 54990 E 340 Road, Jay, Oklahoma.

B. Purchases Occurring Three Months to One Year Before Search Warrant

Defendant argues that the evidence contained in the affidavit was stale, because the purchases of the items by Ozarkcart occurred three months to one year before the search warrant. "Probable cause to search cannot be based on stale information that no longer suggests that the items sought will be found in the place to be searched." United States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458, 1459 (10th Cir. 1990). "[W]hether information is too stale to establish probable cause depends on the nature of the criminal activity, the length of the activity, and the nature of the property to be seized." Id. at 1460. Moreover, "`ongoing and continuous activity makes the passage of time less critical' when judging the staleness of information upon which a search warrant is based. United States v. Mathis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Snow, 919 F.2d at 1460).

Here, the property to be seized was firearms and ammunition, and the nature of the criminal activity was the possession of such firearms and ammunition. As noted, Officer Campbell averred that, based on her experience and training, she knows that firearms are tangible objects of habitual retention, and once a person acquires a firearm, he or she usually keeps said weapon for a long period of time. Moreover, she explained that individuals often store such items in their homes. Therefore, it was reasonable for a magistrate judge to determine that, based on the evidence showing that defendant had purchased firearms three months prior, there was probable cause to believe that defendant continued to possess those items. Moreover, the affidavit states that defendant had purchased at least 221 items from Gunbroker.com over a period of two years. Accordingly, the affidavit suggests that defendant was engaged in the ongoing and continuing possession of firearms and/or ammunition. Therefore, the Court finds that the magistrate judge had a substantial basis for determining that firearms and/or ammunition would be found inside defendant's residence at the time of the search warrant, and the information relied upon was not stale.

C. Explanation of How Affiant Concluded that Ozarkcart Was/Is Defendant

The affidavit explains that an ATF investigation determined that an individual with the username Ozarkcart purchased "parts kits" on Gunbroker.com, that Andrew Pierson is the registered agent for a limited liability company named Ozark Cartridge and Die Supply, and that the address listed for the registered agent is 54990 E 340 Road, Jay, Oklahoma. The affidavit does not explain how the ATF agents discovered Ozark Cartridge and Die Supply or why they believed that it was connected to the username Ozarkcart, but the reasonable inference is that the username Ozarkcart derived from the company name Ozark Cartridge and Die Supply. As the affidavit indicates, the registered agent of Ozark Cartridge and Die Supply is Andrew Pierson.

The Court finds that the magistrate judge had a substantial basis to determine there was probable cause to find that Ozarkcart is short for Ozark Cartridge and Die Supply, that defendant is the registered agent of Ozark Cartridge and Die Supply, and that, therefore, Ozarkcart is defendant.

D. Determination That Pierson Actually Resided In Place to be Searched

Although Pierson was no longer residing at 54990 E 340 Road, Jay, Oklahoma at the time the warrant was executed, the affidavit provides substantial information in support of the determination that Pierson was living at that residence. Specifically, the affidavit states that the 2013 tax rolls provided by the Delaware County Treasurer's Office list Andrew Pierson as owning 10 acres of land at that address. Moreover, as of July 24, 2014, the Oklahoma Secretary of State website stated that Pierson is the registered agent for Ozark Cartridge and Die Supply, with his address listed as 54990 E 340 Road, Jay, Oklahoma. Further, the affidavit states that the Delaware County Assessor's Office verified that as of August 14, 2014, Pierson owned the property located at 54990 E 340 Road, Jay, Oklahoma. Finally, the affidavit states that the Oklahoma Drivers License database records for Oklahoma drivers license number G083011284 pertaining to Andrew Scott Pierson lists a home address of 54990 E 340 Road, Jay, Oklahoma. Moreover the license was renewed in May 2012. Accordingly, the affidavit provides substantial information to support a probable cause determination that Pierson resided at 54990 E 340 Road, Jay, Oklahoma, at the time the search warrant was issued.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the magistrate judge had probable cause to issue a search warrant for the residence located at 54990 E 340 Road, Jay, Oklahoma.

III.

In its response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues that, even if the Court concludes probable cause did not exist, the good faith exception precludes the application of the exclusionary rule.

The Supreme Court has held that, when police officers act in good faith and in reasonable reliance on a search warrant, the evidence obtained during the search should not be suppressed even if the warrant was lacking in probable cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984); United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1993). There is a presumption that, when an officer relies on a warrant, the officer is acting in good faith. McKneely, 6 F.3d at 1454. This presumption is "not absolute," but it "must carry some weight." Id. (quoting United States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1985)).

However, the good faith exception does not apply in four situations:

United States v. Augustine, 742 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1007 (10th Cir. 2000); and Leon, 468 U.S. at 923) (alteration in original). Further, the Tenth Circuit has held that the good faith exception "will not save an improperly executed warrant." United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1208 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Moland, 996 F.2d 259, 261 (10th Cir. 1993)).

Here, the ATF agents relied on a search warrant and the Court must presume that the agents were acting in good faith unless one of the four situations identified above applies. Defendant does not argue that the affidavit contains information that the affiant would have known was false if not for a reckless disregard of the truth; nor does defendant argue that the magistrate judge abandoned his judicial role. As discussed above, the Court finds that the magistrate judge had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed. Finally, the warrant clearly identifies the place to be searched and the items to be seized; therefore, the warrant is not facially deficient. Accordingly, the Court finds that, even if the Court were to conclude that probable cause did not exist, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's motions to quash search warrant and to suppress evidence (Dkt. ## 19, 20) are denied.