Filed: Jul. 08, 1994
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 1994 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7-8-1994 United States of America v. A.D. Precedential or Non-Precedential: Docket 93-3197 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 Recommended Citation "United States of America v. A.D." (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 79. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/79 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the
Summary: Opinions of the United 1994 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7-8-1994 United States of America v. A.D. Precedential or Non-Precedential: Docket 93-3197 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 Recommended Citation "United States of America v. A.D." (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 79. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/79 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the ..
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Opinions of the United
1994 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-8-1994
United States of America v. A.D.
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 93-3197
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994
Recommended Citation
"United States of America v. A.D." (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 79.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/79
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
N0S. 93-3197, 93-3205, 93-3209, 93-3225
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
A.D.
PG PUBLISHING COMPANY,
PUBLISHER OF THE PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE*
Appellant in No. 93-3197
(*Pursuant to Rule 12(a), F.R.A.P.)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
T.Y.
PG PUBLISHING COMPANY,
PUBLISHER OF THE PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE*
Appellant in No. 93-3205
(*Pursuant to Rule 12(a), F.R.A.P.)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
T.Y.
THE TRIBUNE-REVIEW PUBLISHING COMPANY*
Appellant in No. 93-3209
(*Pursuant to Rule 12(a), F.R.A.P.)
1
2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
A.D.
TRIBUNE-REVIEW PUBLISHING COMPANY*
Appellant in No. 93-3225
(*Pursuant to Rule 12(a), F.R.A.P.)
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. Action Nos. 93-00053-01, 93-00054-01)
Argued November 4, 1993
BEFORE: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, and STAPLETON,
Circuit Judge, and RESTANI,** Judge,
United States Court of International
Trade
(Opinion Filed: July 8, 1994)
W. Thomas McGough, Jr. (Argued)
Marketa Sims
Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay
435 Sixth Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Attorneys for Appellant
PG Publishing Company
Susan A. Yohe (Argued)
Ronald D. Barber
Strassburger, McKenna, Gutnick & Potter
322 Boulevard of the Allies
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Attorneys for Appellant
Tribune-Review Publishing Company
3
** Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
4
Thomas W. Corbett, Jr.
United States Attorney
Paul J. Brysh (Argued)
Assistant United States Attorney
633 U.S. Post Office and Courthouse
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Attorneys for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires us to apply the confidentiality
provisions of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42
("the Act"). We hold that the Act gives district judges
authority to regulate access to the record of proceedings under
the Act on a case-by-case basis through a balancing of interests.
I.
A.D. and T.Y., juveniles, were arrested in connection
with gang-related armed robberies of Pittsburgh-area convenience,
clothing, and food stores. To initiate federal juvenile
delinquency proceedings against A.D. and T.Y., the United States
filed informations. The government also sought to detain A.D.
and T.Y., so detention hearings were scheduled before a
magistrate. PG Publishing Co., publisher of the Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, learned that the government would seek to close the
detention hearings and appeared before the magistrate to object.
5
After hearing from the Post-Gazette, the government, and the
juveniles, the magistrate closed the detention hearings on the
ground that the Act mandates closure of all federal juvenile
delinquency proceedings.
Following the detention hearings, the Post-Gazette
filed motions to intervene in the two delinquency proceedings, as
well as a motion to open the record of the detention hearings and
to hold all further proceedings in open court. Tribune-Review
Publishing Co., publisher of the Tribune-Review, filed similar
motions.
In support of their motions, the newspapers argued that
the Act does not mandate closed proceedings and records and that,
in any event, the First Amendment requires the district court to
make a discretionary determination on the need for
confidentiality on a case-by-case basis. The government argued
that the Act mandates closed proceedings and records and that the
Constitution permits closure. A.D. and T.Y. also argued in favor
of closure. The district judge granted the motions to intervene
but denied the motions to open the proceedings and to unseal the
records. The newspapers filed this timely appeal.0
0
Before this opinion was published, the proceedings against A.D.
and T.Y. apparently concluded and the outcomes were reported in
the press. See Mike Bucsko, 15 years for armed robber, 18,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Dec. 17, 1993, at B12. We nevertheless
find that this case is not moot. The newspapers sought not only
access to the court proceedings but also to the record of the
proceedings, and such relief could still be granted.
In addition, we are of the opinion that the dispute
between the newspapers and the government over access to juvenile
proceedings is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219
6
II.
Under the Act, persons who violate the laws of the
United States before reaching their eighteenth birthday may be
subject to federal juvenile delinquency proceedings, provided
that proceedings against them begin before their twenty-first
birthday. §§ 5031-32. Provision is made for representation by
counsel, § 5034, custody prior to disposition, §§ 5033 & 5035,
and speedy trials, § 5036. After a juvenile is adjudged
delinquent, a dispositional hearing is held, and the juvenile may
be committed to official detention, placed on probation, or
ordered to make restitution. § 5037(a). Observation and study
of the juvenile can also be ordered. § 5037(d). Juveniles
cannot be jailed with adults, and must be provided adequate
facilities, care, and treatment. § 5039. Juveniles suspected of
engaging in certain conduct may be subject to criminal
prosecution as adults. § 5032.
The Act also contains several confidentiality
provisions, which are at issue in this case. The first of these,
§ 5032, provides in relevant part:
U.S. 498, 515 (1911). "[I]n the absence of a class action, the
'capable of repetition, yet evading review' doctrine [is] limited
to the situation where two elements combined: (1) the challenged
action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior
to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to
the same action again." Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149
(1975). Both elements combined in this case -- the newspapers
promptly sought access to the juvenile court proceedings, but
were unable to complete litigation before the proceedings
terminated, and other proceedings against other juveniles almost
certainly will follow, to which the newspapers are again likely
to seek access.
7
. . . any proceedings against [an alleged
juvenile delinquent] shall be in an
appropriate district court of the United
States. For such purposes, the court may be
convened at any time and place within the
district, in chambers or otherwise. . . .
The second disputed provision, § 5038, provides in relevant part:
(a) Throughout and upon completion of the
juvenile delinquency proceedings, the records
shall be safeguarded from disclosure to
unauthorized persons. The records shall be
released to the extent necessary to meet the
following circumstances:
(1) inquiries received from another
court of law;
(2) inquiries from an agency
preparing a presentence report for
another court;
(3) inquiries from law enforcement
agencies where the request for
information is related to the
investigation of a crime or a
position within that agency;
(4) inquiries, in writing, from the
director of a treatment agency or
the director of a facility to which
the juvenile has been committed by
the court;
(5) inquiries from an agency
considering the person for a
position immediately and directly
affecting the national security;
and
(6) inquiries from any victim of such
juvenile delinquency, or if the victim
is deceased from the immediate family of
such victim, related to the final
disposition of such juvenile by the
court in accordance with section 5037.
Unless otherwise authorized by this section,
information about the juvenile record may not
8
be released when the request for information
is related to an application for employment,
license, bonding, or any civil right or
privilege. Responses to such inquiries shall
not be different from responses made about
persons who have never been involved in a
delinquency proceeding.
* * *
(c) During the course of any juvenile
delinquency proceeding, all information and
records relating to the proceeding, which are
obtained or prepared in the discharge of an
official duty by an employee of the court or
an employee of any other government agency,
shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly
to anyone other than the judge, counsel for
the juvenile and the Government, or others
entitled under this section to receive
juvenile records.
* * *
(e) Unless a juvenile who is taken into
custody is prosecuted as an adult neither the
name nor picture of any juvenile shall be
made public in connection with a juvenile
delinquency proceeding.
III.
The government argues that these confidentiality
provisions mandate the closure of all juvenile proceedings and
the sealing of all records. We decline the newspaper's
invitation to decide whether this construction of the Act is
consistent with the First Amendment. Nevertheless, we start with
the proposition that the task of statutory interpretation we here
face implicates First Amendment values and that the government's
construction of the Act raises a substantial constitutional
question.
9
The First Amendment provides a right of public access
in both civil and criminal cases.0 We have catalogued the
interests protected by that right in the context of criminal
proceedings:
First, public access to criminal proceedings
promotes informed discussion of governmental
affairs by providing the public with a more
complete understanding of the judicial
system. This public access and the knowledge
gained thereby serve an important educative
interest. Second, public access to criminal
proceedings gives the assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all
concerned and promotes the public perception
of fairness. Public confidence in and
respect for the judicial system can be
achieved only by permitting full public view
of the proceedings. Third, public access to
criminal proceedings has a significant
community therapeutic value because it
provides an outlet for community concern,
hostility, and emotion. Fourth, public
0
See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 3
(1986) ("Press-Enterprise II") ("First Amendment right of access
to the transcript of a preliminary hearing growing out of a
criminal prosecution"); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 464 U.S. 501, 508-10 (1984) ("Press-Enterprise I")
(First Amendment values create presumption of openness for voir
dire); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580
(1980) (plurality opinion ) ("the right to attend criminal trials
is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment"); United
States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994) ("the First
Amendment right of access attaches to a post-trial hearing to
investigate jury misconduct"); Republic of Philippines v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 1991) ("the
First Amendment, independent of the common law, protects the
public's right of access to the records of civil proceedings");
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir.
1984) ("the First Amendment embraces a right of access to civil
trials"); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 554 (3d Cir.
1982) ("Criden II") ("the public has a first amendment right of
access to pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment
hearings").
10
access to criminal proceedings serves as a
check on corrupt practices by exposing the
judicial process to public scrutiny, thus
discouraging decisions based on secret bias
or partiality. Fifth, public access to
criminal proceedings enhances the performance
of all involved. Finally, public access to
criminal proceedings discourages perjury.
United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982)
("Criden II") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)).
This "First Amendment right of access is not absolute."
United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994).
Competing values may warrant a denial of access to proceedings
and records in some instances. See Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court,
478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise II").
Where there has been such a denial, whether resulting from
legislative or judicial action, courts confronted with a First
Amendment challenge ask whether the closure is "essential to
preserve higher values" and "narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,
510 (1984) ("Press-Enterprise I"). If an alternative would serve
the interest well and intrude less on First Amendment values, a
denial of public access cannot stand. See United States v.
Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1987). For this reason,
the proponent of a legislatively imposed denial of access in a
stipulated category of cases, where the trial judge is not free
to weigh the competing interests on a case-by-case basis, has a
difficult burden to carry.
11
Juvenile courts have been created in every state during
the last century. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1967).
Recognizing the special sensitivity of information regarding
juveniles and the impact that public dissemination of such
information may have on the youths involved, states have devised
a number of different approaches to accommodate these concerns.
For the most part, these have not involved blanket prohibitions
of access. See Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile
Delinquency Hearings,
81 Mich. L. Rev. 1540, 1540 n.3 (1983). It
remains true, as the Supreme Court observed in 1967, that
"[d]isclosure of court records is discretionary with the judge in
most jurisdictions."
Gault, 387 U.S. at 24.
Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has had
occasion to decide whether an across-the-board ban on access to
juvenile proceedings would accord with the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court did address in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1981), whether the First Amendment permits a
statutory bar to public access to criminal trials during the
testimony of minor victims of sex crimes. The appellee urged
that the statute served two compelling state interests: "the
protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and
embarrassment; and the encouragement of victims to come forward
and testify in a truthful and credible manner."
Id. at 607. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that both of these interests were
compelling. It held, however, that neither would justify an
across-the-board ban on access in every instance involving a
minor sex victim:
12
[A]s compelling as that interest [in
protecting minor victims of sex crimes] is,
it does not justify a mandatory closure rule,
for it is clear that the circumstances of the
particular case may affect the significance
of the interest. A trial court can determine
on a case-by-case basis whether closure is
necessary to protect the welfare of a minor
victim. Among the factors to be weighed are
the minor victim's age, psychological
maturity and understanding, the nature of the
crime, and desires of the victim, and the
interests of parents and relatives. Section
16A, in contrast, requires closure even if
the victim does not seek the exclusion of the
press and general public, and would not
suffer injury by their presence. . . . If
the trial court [in the case before us] had
been permitted to exercise its discretion,
closure might well have been deemed
unnecessary. In short, § 16A cannot be
viewed as a narrowly tailored means of
accommodating the State's asserted interest:
That interest could be served just as well by
requiring the trial court to determine on a
case-by-case basis whether the State's
legitimate concern for the well-being of the
minor victim necessitates closure. Such an
approach ensures that the constitutional
right of the press and the public to gain
access to criminal trials will not be
restricted except where necessary to protect
the State's interest.
Id. at 607-08. The Supreme Court added:
We emphasize that our holding is a
narrow one: that a rule of mandatory closure
respecting the testimony of minor sex victims
is constitutionally infirm. In individual
cases, and under appropriate circumstances,
the First Amendment does not necessarily
stand as a bar to the exclusion from the
courtroom of the press and general public
during the testimony of minor sex-offense
victims. But a mandatory rule, requiring no
particularized determinations in individual
cases, is unconstitutional.
Id. at 611, n.27.
13
Globe is not controlling in this case. It concerned
criminal trials, which historically have been open to the press
and general public. See Globe, 596 U.S. at 605 ("when our
organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open") (quoting Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (plurality
opinion)). No centuries-old tradition of openness exists for
juvenile proceedings, which are a relatively recent creation, and
proceedings to determine whether a juvenile is a delinquent are
not generally regarded as criminal proceedings. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brian N.,
900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990)
("Under [the Juvenile Delinquency Act], prosecution results in an
adjudication of status, not a criminal conviction.").
Nevertheless, the detention and delinquency proceedings called
for in the Act are closely analogous to criminal proceedings, and
all the public interests in criminal proceedings that we
catalogued in Criden II, 675 F.2d at 556, seem present and
equally cogent here. Of equal importance, we cannot say that the
countervailing interests that would be served by denying public
access to proceedings under the Act are any more compelling than
those that the Supreme Court acknowledged were being served by
the challenged statute in Globe.
Thus, while Globe is not on all fours with the
situation before us, it does suggest that an across-the-board ban
on access to juvenile proceedings under the Act would pose a
substantial constitutional issue. Accordingly, we will apply the
well established rule of statutory construction articulated in
14
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988):
[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction
of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will
construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress. Catholic Bishop,
supra, at 499-501, 504. This cardinal
principle has its roots in Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion for the Court in Murray v.
The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804),
and has for so long been applied by this
Court that it is beyond debate. . . . As was
stated in Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648,
657 (1895), "[t]he elementary rule is that
every reasonable construction must be
resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality." This approach not only
reflects the prudential concern that
constitutional issues not be needlessly
confronted, but also recognizes that
Congress, like this Court, is bound by and
swears an oath to uphold the Constitution.
Accordingly, in the absence of an unambiguous directive to the
contrary, we are reluctant to attribute to Congress an intention
to deprive district courts of discretion to strike on a case-by-
case basis the balance between the interests protected by the
First Amendment and competing privacy interests. When we examine
the Act with care, we fail to find such a directive.
IV.
We first focus on § 5032 and its provision that "court
may be convened at any time and place within the district, in
chambers or otherwise." This provision, in our view, evidences a
congressional expectation that district judges will exercise
their discretion when they decide where to hold hearings under
15
the Act. Moreover, the addition of "in chambers or otherwise"
suggests that this discretion is to include a decision regarding
the availability and degree of public access -- we can think of
no other persuasive reason for the inclusion of this clause.
Thus, to our minds, § 5032 provides strong evidence that Congress
did not intend an across-the-board ban on public access to
proceedings under the Act.
When we turn to § 5038(a), we find additional evidence
for this proposition and implicit recognition that the court
retains discretion with respect to access to judicial records. We
read this section as directed to protection of the court's
records "of the juvenile delinquency proceeding," including the
transcript.0 As a result, we understand the term "released" to
refer to action the court authorizes. Section 5038(a) does not
mandate denial of access to the records of a proceeding -- it
provides only that such records be "safeguarded against
disclosure to unauthorized persons." § 5038(a) (emphasis
supplied). The court is barred from authorizing access only in
those situations involving "information about the juvenile record
. . . when the request for information is related to an
application for employment, license, bonding or any civil right
or privilege." Even in these few situations singled out in the
0
The focus on protecting the court's record was clearer under the
version of § 5038(a) which existed prior to its amendment in 1984
and provided that "the district court shall order the entire file
and record of such proceeding sealed." There is no suggestion in
the text or legislative history of the 1984 amendment that the
subject matter of this subsection was being changed. See Sen.
Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 387-93, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3527-33.
16
last paragraph of § 5038(a), the court is required to release the
information sought if the request comes from one of the entities
described in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6).
Section 5038(a) lists in paragraphs (a)(1) through
(a)(6) the entities that have a right to access the records of
the judicial proceeding on request, and, as we have noted, it
specifies in its concluding paragraph a limited number of
situations where disclosure is forbidden. It does not, however,
further define or limit the concepts of authorized and
unauthorized persons. Most importantly, § 5038(a) implicitly
recognizes that there are situations other than those described
in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6) and its concluding paragraph
in which access could be authorized. If Congress intended
paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6) to constitute an exclusive list
of the situations in which access would be authorized, the
concluding paragraph would be superfluous; if access was to be
foreclosed in all but the situations described in
paragraphs(a)(1) through (a)(6), the prohibition against
disclosure in connection with applications for employment,
licenses, bonding and civil rights would not have been necessary.
Section 5038(c), as we read it, has a different and
more specific target than § 5038(a) -- information and documents
"obtained or prepared" by an employee of the court or of another
government agencies in the line of duty. The Act provides ample
evidence of Congress' recognition that the district court would
need information gathered by others in order to perform its
responsibilities successfully. Section 5032, for example, lists
17
a number of factors that the court must consider in determining
whether to transfer a juvenile for criminal prosecution as an
adult: "the age and social background of the juvenile; the
nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the
juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present
intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature
of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such
efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the
juvenile's behavioral problems." Section 5032 goes on to
stipulate that "any proceedings against a juvenile . . . shall
not be commenced until the prior juvenile records of such
juvenile have been received by the court [or their unavailability
explained]." Other provisions of the Act authorize the
commitment of the juvenile "for observation and study by the
appropriate agency," and require an examination of the juvenile's
"personal traits, his capabilities, his background, any previous
delinquency or criminal experience, and mental or physical
defect, and any other relevant factors." § 5038(d).
We read § 5038(c) as directed to the protection of the
fruits of the labors of the government employees who "obtain and
prepare" this information. Some of this information will be
contained in documents maintained in locations other than the
Office of the Court Clerk, such as the files of the United States
Attorney and the United States Probation Office. To this extent,
§ 5038(c) is broader than § 5038(a). We do not suggest that
§5038(c) applies to bar the media from publishing anything they
legally obtain. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S.
18
97 (1979); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court,
430 U.S.
308 (1977). It does, however, bar anyone associated with a
proceeding under the Act, including the United States Attorney
and the employees of any other law enforcement agency, from
disclosing such information to unauthorized persons. Because we
read "others entitled under this section" to include persons
authorized by the court to receive records under the authority
implicitly recognized in § 5038(a), we believe § 5038(c)
preserves the district court's discretion to weigh the juvenile's
interest and the public's interest on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, we turn to § 5038(e). The government argues,
with some persuasive force, that the prohibition against making
public the picture of any juvenile is inconsistent with a
congressional intent to have public hearings in cases brought
under the Act. Those attending a public hearing necessarily
would be exposed to the visual image of the juvenile involved
unless elaborate and cumbersome precautions were taken.
A prohibition against making a juvenile's picture or
name available to the public, however, strikes us as an indirect
and unlikely way for Congress to stipulate that all hearings
under the Act will be closed to the public. State statutes that
restrict access to juvenile proceedings generally do so directly
and clearly. Pennsylvania's delinquency law, for example,
provides that "the general public shall be excluded," 42 P.S.
19
§6336(d),0 and Delaware's provides that "[a]ll proceedings before
the court and all records of such proceedings may be private," 10
Del. Code § 972(a).0
We think it far more likely that § 5038(e) was intended
not to limit the discretion of trial judges to regulate access to
juvenile delinquency proceedings, but to foreclose law
enforcement officials from holding press conferences at which the
name and picture of the juvenile would be "made public in
connection with a juvenile delinquency proceeding."0 Section
5038(e), then, like the rest of the Act, provides no evidence of
a congressional mandate to close all juvenile delinquency
hearings and seal all records.
0
The official comment to the Pennsylvania statute adds that
"[t]he statute as drawn permits the court in its discretion to
admit news reporters."
0
Delaware's statute allows the court to open proceedings "to the
extent that the Court may consider publication in the public
interest" and adds that "proceedings in a crime classified as a
felony shall be open to the public." 10 Del. Code Ann. § 972(a).
0
After A.D. and T.Y. were arrested, for example, authorities held
a well-publicized press conference, see Michael A. Fuoco & Mike
Bucsko, It's a federal case, gangs here warned: 7 charged in
robberies facing U.S. law enforcement, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,
March 26, 1993, at A1, and a news release was issued by the U.S.
Attorney, the FBI, the Allegheny County District Attorney, the
Pittsburgh Police Chief, and the Pennsylvania Chief Deputy
Attorney General.
20
V.
The government urges us to construe §§ 5032 and 5038 in
light of the purpose and policy of the statutory scheme of which
they are parts. The purpose of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, the
government stresses, "is to rehabilitate, not to punish." In re
Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To effectuate its
rehabilitative purposes, the Act requires inquiry into the most
sensitive aspects of a juvenile's life. Public access, the
government maintains, would embarrass and humiliate juveniles,
make it difficult to obtain evidence about delicate matters, and
adversely affect the rehabilitation of juveniles by publicly
labelling them as criminals. If §§ 5032 and 5038 were construed
in accordance with this purpose and policy, the government
asserts, public access to delinquency proceedings would be
barred.
We, like the government, recognize the need to avoid
embarrassing and humiliating juveniles, to obtain evidence about
delicate matters, and not to affect the rehabilitation of
juveniles adversely. We are not convinced, however, that
Congress found across-the-board closure of juvenile proceedings
necessary to achieve these goals. Rather, we think Congress left
the delicate task of weighing the interests of the juvenile and
the public to the informed discretion of the district judge in
each case. District judges are experienced at striking this kind
of delicate balance in the first instance in the context of
21
common law and other First Amendment access cases.0 We are
confident that, here as there, they will be sensitive to the
interests of juveniles and faithful to the objectives of the Act,
as they determine the degree to which there will be public access
to proceedings under the Act and the records generated in those
proceedings.
VI.
The Act does not mandate closed hearings and sealed
records in all situations. Accordingly, we will reverse the
order of the district court denying the newspapers' motions to
0
The Supreme Court has stated that the common law provides a
right of access to judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1978). There is also
a "common-law rule of open civil . . . proceedings." Gannett
Co., Inc. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 384 (1979). We discussed
the "common law right of access" in United States v. Criden,
648
F.2d 814, 823 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Criden I"), and in Publicker
Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1984), we
noted that "[t]he existence of a common law right of access to
judicial proceedings and to inspect judicial records is beyond
dispute." See also Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion
Technologies, Inc.,
998 F.2d 157, 161-165 (3d Cir. 1993);
Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
949 F.2d
653 (3d Cir. 1991); Littlejohn v. BIC Corp.,
851 F.2d 673 (3d
Cir. 1988); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hotel
Rittenhouse Assocs.,
800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Supreme Court has noted in common law access cases
how difficult it is "to identify all the factors to be weighted
in determining whether access is appropriate" and has suggested
that "the decision as to access is one best left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in
light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular
case." Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. We have remarked on the need "to
balance the strong public interest favoring access against
legitimate privacy concerns" and observed that "the trial court
is generally given considerable leeway in the delicate balancing
which must be performed." Criden
I, 648 F.2d at 829.
22
open the proceedings and to unseal the record. We instruct the
district court on remand to exercise its discretion concerning
whether, and the extent to which, there should be public access
to the records of these proceedings.0 Any denial or limitation
of access must be supported by factual findings related to the
circumstances of this particular case.
0
As we have noted, the proceedings against A.D. and T.Y.
apparently have concluded. Accordingly, the district court need
not exercise its discretion with respect to attendance at court
hearings in those proceedings. Separate consideration will have
to be given in other cases to hearing access and to record file
access. There well may be situations in which a proper weighing
of the public's interest and the interests of the juvenile will
call for a denial of access to a hearing and nevertheless require
access at a later point to the transcript of that hearing.
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