Filed: Oct. 17, 1995
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 1995 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 10-17-1995 W B v Matula Precedential or Non-Precedential: Docket 95-5033 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995 Recommended Citation "W B v Matula" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 271. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/271 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
Summary: Opinions of the United 1995 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 10-17-1995 W B v Matula Precedential or Non-Precedential: Docket 95-5033 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995 Recommended Citation "W B v Matula" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 271. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/271 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for t..
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Opinions of the United
1995 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-17-1995
W B v Matula
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 95-5033
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995
Recommended Citation
"W B v Matula" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 271.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/271
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1995 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 95-5033
W.B., Parent of the Minor, E.J., on her
own behalf and on behalf of her son, E.J.,
Appellants
v.
JOAN MATULA; MARY ANGELA ENGELHARDT; JUDY BEACH;
CATHERINE BRENNAN; PATRICIA CERICOLA; DR. GARY DANIELSON;
ANN PEARCE; KATHLEEN MAHONY; CAROL BURNS;
FLORENCE NOCTOR; DR. JEFFREY OSOWSKI; NEW JERSEY STATE
BOARD OF EDUCATION; WARREN COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION; MARY LOU VARLEY; MANSFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION;
STATE OF NEW JERSEY; DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DIVISION OF
SPECIAL EDUCATION; EMPLOYEES OF THE MANSFIELD TOWNSHIP
BOARD OF EDUCATION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 93-3124)
Argued August 22, 1995
BEFORE: GREENBERG, COWEN, and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges
(Filed October 17, l995)
Rebecca K. Spar (argued)
Cole, Schotz, Meisel, Forman
& Leonard, P.A.
25 Main Street, 4th Floor
Hackensack, NJ 07601
Attorney for Appellant
David A. Wallace (argued)
1
942 Route 517
P.O. Box 741
Hackettstown, NJ 07840
Attorney for Appellees
OPINION OF THE COURT
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff, on behalf of her disabled child, seeks damages
for the persistent refusal of certain school officials to
evaluate, classify and provide necessary educational services.
The matter was dismissed by the district court on the grounds
that a settlement of the administrative proceeding barred pursuit
of the claims for damages. We conclude that the settlement
agreement was not susceptible to summary disposition. Indeed, we
question the propriety of demanding and receiving a release of
such claims in exchange for providing services to which a
disabled child is otherwise entitled. However, since the
settlement agreement did not clearly waive such claims, we do not
determine whether such a waiver would be against public policy.
We do conclude that the agreement does not bar such claims as a
matter of law, and therefore reverse and remand the matter for
trial.
Plaintiff brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act against school officials, alleging
that the child was deprived of his right to a free, appropriate
2
public education, in violation of the U.S. and New Jersey
Constitutions and federal and state statutes and regulations.
Despite resistance by school officials and following extensive
administrative proceedings, the mother ultimately succeeded in
having her child evaluated, classified as neurologically impaired
and provided with special education services. Plaintiffs then
sued for compensatory and punitive damages incurred in the period
before the school agreed to provide these services. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all
claims predicated upon a settlement of the administrative
proceeding. We will affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate
in part.
I.
Plaintiff W.B. and her minor child, plaintiff E.J., moved to
Hackettstown, New Jersey during the summer of 1991. W.B.'s
requests for special educational services for E.J., defendants'
alleged resistance to these requests, and the damages arising
from this alleged resistance, occurred while E.J. was in the
first and second grades. We will recount these events in some
detail. While some of the facts may be in dispute, most are not,
and in any event, in view of the procedural posture of the case,
we recite the facts from the viewpoint of the plaintiffs.
Before the start of school in the fall of 1991, W.B. met
with defendant Joan Matula, principal of the Mansfield Township
Elementary School ("the school"), to discuss her concerns about
E.J.'s behavioral problems, including touching and hitting other
3
children. W.B. also completed forms at the school in which she
stated that E.J. had received speech therapy.
E.J. entered the first grade in September 1991 and was
placed in a class taught by defendant Mary Angela Engelhardt.
Engelhardt soon reported that E.J. exhibited a variety of
disruptive behaviors, including not paying attention in class,
fighting with other students, failing to remain seated, making
continuous noises and repeatedly touching other children. The
teacher also observed that E.J. had difficulty beginning tasks,
finishing those he did start and coloring within the lines. In
addition, throughout the school year E.J. urinated and defecated
in his pants. In October the school nurse, defendant Florence
Noctor, told W.B. that other children were teasing E.J. because
of his "bathrooming problem." Moreover, within the first few
weeks of school, Engelhardt informed W.B. that E.J. might have
Attention Deficit Disorder/Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder ("ADHD"), a condition with which W.B. was unfamiliar.
In October, W.B. met with Engelhardt and defendant Carol
Burns, Chief School Administrator and the person responsible for
compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act ("§ 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 794. The group
discussed E.J.'s behavioral and academic problems, but no
defendant referred E.J. for an evaluation or special education
services, nor did anyone inform W.B. of E.J.'s possible
entitlement to such services. The same month E.J. began to see
Dr. Lee Monday, a private therapist.
4
After reading about ADHD later in the fall, W.B. raised it
to Dr. Monday, who then diagnosed E.J. as having ADHD. W.B. also
spoke with Matula and Engelhardt and sent them literature about
the disorder. In December W.B. wrote them explaining that she
believed E.J.'s behavioral and academic problems were
attributable to ADHD and specifically requested that E.J. be
permitted to spend additional time with the school's Resource
Team.
The first actual dispute between the parties concerned
evaluation. W.B. asked the school to refer E.J. to the Mansfield
Child Study Team ("CST") for evaluation;1 the school refused, but
finally agreed after W.B. persuaded Matula, Engelhardt, Burns,
and Catherine Brennan, director of the CST,2 to meet in February
1992 with her, Dr. Monday, and a social worker whom Brennan had
agreed to let observe E.J. in the classroom. Brennan had
believed that ADHD did not qualify a child for special services
under IDEA or §504, but when W.B. showed her a memorandum from
the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services to the contrary, Brennan relented and approved the
CST evaluation.
1
Among other duties, each CST in New Jersey is charged with the
responsibility of identifying and diagnosing children needing
special education services, developing public school programs for
disabled children, and referring disabled children for
residential, medical, or psychological treatment. N.J.S.A §
18A:46-5.
2
The duties of a CST supervisor "shall include the coordination
of the special education services in the county." N.J.S.A.
§18A:46-3.
5
In April 1992, the CST determined that E.J. had ADHD and was
eligible for § 504 services. However, because E.J.'s academic
performance was at or above grade level, the CST concluded he was
not classifiable under IDEA and therefore not eligible for those
services offered under IDEA but not the Rehabilitation Act. The
CST concluded:
[E.J.] has developed academic skills in the areas
of reading, mathematics and written language that are
at or above his current grade placement. He is,
therefore, not eligible for special education services
. . . . However, the comprehensive Child Study Team
evaluation does identify the presence of [ADHD] . . . .
For this reason, [E.J.] is considered to be a
handicapped person under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Appendix ("App.") at 98. Though one examining physician on the
CST recommended a speech evaluation, audiometry, and
tympanometry, these suggestions were not included in the CST
report.
Despite the CST finding that E.J. suffered from ADHD and was
thus entitled to § 504 services, defendants did not begin
providing them. Concerned that the CST evaluation had not fully
assessed E.J., W.B. asked defendants to fund an independent
evaluation. Defendants refused.
In June 1992, W.B. initiated her first IDEA administrative
proceeding before the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law
("OAL"), seeking an independent evaluation of E.J., his
classification as neurologically impaired (a status which would
render him eligible for IDEA services), development of an
Individual Education Plan ("IEP"), and costs and fees. We will
refer to this proceeding as "E.J. I." In July 1992, on the date
6
of the E.J. I hearing, respondent Mansfield Board of Education
("the Board" or "Mansfield") signed a consent order agreeing to
an independent evaluation and adjourning the hearing on the
balance of W.B.'s petition.
The independent evaluation took place soon thereafter.
According to ALJ McGill, who heard the first and all subsequent
petitions between W.B. and the Board, the evaluation
was very significant because the determination was made
for the first time that E.J. had Tourette's syndrome
and a severe form of obsessive-compulsive disorder in
addition to ADHD. Thus, W.B. was substantially correct
in her belief that the evaluation by the Mansfield CST
did not properly identify E.J.'s problems.
E.J. v. Mansfield, OAL Dkt Nos. EDS 11659-93/11798-93, Sept. 1,
1994 ("E.J. IV"), at 49.
In September 1992 E.J. entered the second grade, joining a
class taught by defendant Judy Beach, but his problems continued.
Defendants were still not providing § 504 services.
As to classification, despite the findings of the
independent evaluation, in November the CST concluded that E.J.
was perceptually impaired but not neurologically impaired. The
distinction is important, because the former classification would
result in a lower level of IDEA services for E.J. than the
latter. W.B. attempted to persuade the school to reclassify her
son as neurologically impaired, and in December 1992, Mansfield
cross-petitioned to have E.J. classified as perceptually
impaired.3
3
W.B. filed three other petitions in January and February 1993,
seeking to have Mansfield provide her with (1) a written daily
log of E.J.'s behavior problems, (2) independent speech,
occupational therapy, and educational evaluations, and (3)
7
In April 1993, after nearly ten days of hearings, W.B. and
the Board entered into a settlement stipulating that, as W.B. had
sought, E.J. would be classified as neurologically impaired. The
stipulation also incorporated a thirty-page IEP that extended
through the 1993-94 school year and provided for $14,000 for W.B.
for attorneys fees and costs. ALJ McGill approved the
settlement, E.J. v. Mansfield Board of Education, OAL Dkt. Nos.
5192-92/10038-92, April 12, 1993 ("E.J. I"), and later observed
that "the settlement was consistent with the overwhelming weight
of the evidence . . . . [I]t would appear that W.B. was
substantially correct on the question of classification." E.J.
IV at 49-50. E.J. had nearly completed second grade.
mediation to resolve her request that the Board fund E.J.'s
private psychotherapy. Eventually W.B. prevailed in these
requests too. See discussion of E.J. IV, infra.
8
More administrative proceedings followed,4 culminating in a
final round of petitions filed in November and December 1993.
These too were consolidated and referred to ALJ McGill, who held
hearings for twenty-seven days, and on September 1, 1994 issued a
fifty-four page opinion ordering the Board to (1) place E.J. in a
private school at the Board's expense; (2) pay prospectively for
E.J.'s sessions with the private therapist, Dr. Monday; (3)
reimburse W.B. for the cost of an independent learning disability
evaluation of E.J. which the Board had refused to provide; and
(4) provide a supplemental occupational therapy evaluation. E.J.
IV at 54. The ALJ McGill's final paragraph is instructive:
This decision would not be complete without a
comment on Mansfield's seemingly endless attacks on the
parent, W.B. Evidently, Mansfield believes not only
that W.B. is overly persistent, but also that she is
4
Shortly after the E.J. I settlement, W.B. requested a few
modifications to the IEP and then that E.J. be placed in a
private school because the Board was unable to provide the free
appropriate education to which E.J. was entitled. The Board
refused, two petitions followed, and they were consolidated
before ALJ McGill. At the hearing, W.B. withdrew her request for
private placement. The Board asked that the withdrawal be with
prejudice or conditions, but ALJ McGill granted it without
prejudice. E.J. v. Mansfield Board of Education, OAL Dkt. Nos.
EDS 6199-93/6302-93, August 6, 1993 ("E.J. II") at 9. In August
1993, the ALJ found further that there had been no change of
circumstances since implementation of the IEP and dismissed
W.B.'s petition to modify it. Id. at 5, 8.
Before the decision in E.J. II was rendered, W.B. filed
another petition alleging changed circumstances that necessitated
E.J.'s placement in a private school. This petition was referred
to ALJ McGill, and on September 1, 1993 he denied it, reasoning
that no changed circumstances warranted amending the IEP. E.J.
v. Mansfield Board of Education, OAL Dkt. No. EDS 7538-93
(September 1, 1993) ("E.J. III"). W.B. appealed E.J. III to the
district court in an action which was consolidated with the
instant damages action. W.B. and the Board eventually entered
into a stipulation of dismissal regarding the E.J. III claims.
See note 8, infra.
9
trying to wear down the district to obtain services to
which E.J. is not entitled. In my view, however, W.B.
was essentially correct about the major points in
dispute in these proceedings including evaluation,
classification and placement. Nonetheless, the
district has consistently denied W.B.'s reasonable,
appropriate, and meritorious requests related to E.J.'s
education. The basic dynamic of this entire dispute is
that the district has denied W.B.'s meritorious
requests and W.B. has been left with no alternative to
an enormously burdensome struggle in order to obtain
E.J.'s rights under IDEA. In my view, the burden
placed on W.B. was unnecessary, unwarranted and largely
the product of the district's unwillingness to
recognize and appreciate E.J.'s neurological
impairments despite ample reliable evidence thereof.
E.J. IV at 54. According to plaintiffs, Mansfield has appealed
E.J. IV to the district court.
The instant action
W.B. commenced this proceeding in July 1993, several months
after the Board settled E.J. I by classifying E.J. as
neurologically impaired and approving an IEP. The complaint
alleged causes of action directly under § 504; causes pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of procedural due process, the
equal protection clause, and rights secured by IDEA, its
regulations, § 504, and state statutes; causes pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1985; and causes directly under the New Jersey
Constitution and statutes. W.B. sought compensatory and punitive
damages for defendants' failure to provide E.J. a free,
appropriate public education.
The district court consolidated the action with W.B.'s
appeal of E.J. III. After the parties consented or stipulated to
the dismissal of a number of defendants, those remaining in the
case were Matula, the principal; Engelhardt, E.J.'s first grade
10
teacher; Beach, his second grade teacher; Brennan, director of
the CST; Burns, the school administrator; and Noctor, the school
nurse, as well as Dr. Gary Danielson, the school psychologist and
a member of the CST; Patricia Cericola, a speech and language
therapist and member of the CST; and Ann Pearce, a
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11
