JOHN D. RAINEY, Senior District Judge.
Defendant/Movant Duval Urrea filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. D.E. 399. The Court concludes that it is not necessary to order a Government response because "it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief." See Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts (§ 2255 RULES).
Movant was convicted in 2011 of transporting, aiding and abetting, and conspiring to transport and harbor illegal aliens within the United States, said violations placing in jeopardy the life of another person. Movant was sentenced to a total of 184 months in prison and 3 years' supervised release.
In 2014, Movant filed a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the grounds that his base offense level was improperly calculated and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance (D.E. 280), which the Court denied (D.E. 304, 305). Movant's current § 2255 motion claims: (1) his sentence was unlawfully enhanced by at least 10 levels and is invalid under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2551 (2015); (2) the two-level enhancement for serious bodily injury constitutes double counting; and (3) Movant should have received at least a 3-level reduction because his conduct was minimal or minor.
Because Movant's present § 2255 motion was filed after a previous § 2255 motion, his current motion is second or successive. In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) provides:
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
Movant's motion does not indicate that he has sought or obtained permission from the Fifth Circuit to file the present motion. Until he does so, the Court does not have jurisdiction over the motion. Accordingly, Movant's motion is dismissed as second or successive. See United States v. Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 2000) (district court properly dismissed second or successive claim).
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding "unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Although Movant has not yet filed a notice of appeal, the § 2255 Rules instruct this Court to "issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." Rule 11, § 2255 RULES.
A certificate of appealability (COA) "may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "The COA determination under § 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). To warrant a grant of the certificate as to claims denied on their merits, "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). As to claims that the district court rejects solely on procedural grounds, the movant must show both that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
The Court finds that Movant cannot establish at least one of the Slack criteria. Accordingly, he is not entitled to a COA as to his claims.
For the foregoing reasons, Movant's § 2255 motion (D.E. 399) is
It is so