Filed: Mar. 06, 1997
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 1997 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 3-6-1997 United States v. Oser Precedential or Non-Precedential: Docket 95-1107,95-1108 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 Recommended Citation "United States v. Oser" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 58. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/58 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States
Summary: Opinions of the United 1997 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 3-6-1997 United States v. Oser Precedential or Non-Precedential: Docket 95-1107,95-1108 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 Recommended Citation "United States v. Oser" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 58. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/58 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States ..
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Opinions of the United
1997 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-6-1997
United States v. Oser
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 95-1107,95-1108
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997
Recommended Citation
"United States v. Oser" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 58.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/58
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 95-1107 & 95-1108
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
NEIL OSER, a/k/a "Lou"
Neil Oser,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 92-cr-00424)
Argued on Rehearing September 20, 1996
Before a reconstituted panel of SLOVITER, Chief Judge,
ROTH and ROSENN, Circuit Judges*
(Filed March 6, 1997)
Joshua Markowitz
Howard A. Teichman (Argued)
Markowitz & Zindler
3131 Princeton Pike, Bldg. 3D
Lawrenceville, NJ 08648
Attorneys for Appellant
*
The appeal was originally submitted pursuant to Third Circuit
LAR 34.1(a) on May 21, 1996 before a panel consisting of Chief
Judge Sloviter, Judges Sarokin and Rosenn. A judgment order was
entered on July 8, 1996. Appellant filed a petition for
rehearing which was granted by the panel and the panel was
reconstituted after the retirement of Judge Sarokin.
1
Seth Weber (Argued)
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Attorney for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Chief Judge.
Appellant Neil Oser was sentenced in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for his
role in two drug conspiracies to which he pled guilty. He argues
that the district court erred in ordering that the sentences
imposed should run consecutively rather than concurrently and/or
co-terminously with the term of imprisonment which he is serving
for a currency reporting violation to which he pled guilty in the
federal court in New York. He also argues that the district
court erred in setting his criminal history level.
I.
On June 19, 1991, United States Customs Agents at JFK
Airport arrested Neil Oser before he boarded a flight bound for
Lagos, Nigeria for understating on customs forms the amount of
United States currency he was transporting. He had reported that
he was carrying $65,000 in cash, when in fact he carried a total
of $790,000. Oser pled guilty in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York to a charge of failing
to accurately report the transport of cash abroad in violation of
31 U.S.C. § 5316. That plea, a waiver of indictment, and a plea
agreement were entered on November 26, 1991. Oser was released
2
pending sentencing on condition and with notice that he would be
subject to an additional sentence should he commit another
offense while on pretrial release. On July 23, 1993, the
district court in New York rejected Oser’s various requests for a
downward departure and sentenced him to 28 months in prison.
In the interim, Oser was indicted on July 29, 1992, in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and charged with conspiracy
to import heroin into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 963 and money laundering of $7,200 in postal money orders that
were drug payments to his brother in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a). The Pennsylvania indictment included as an overt act
Oser's June 19, 1991 "attempt[] to smuggle" approximately
$800,000 cash out of the United States from New York, although
that paragraph made no reference to drugs or the subsequent
heroin conspiracy described in the indictment. The substance of
the Pennsylvania indictment and all of the remaining overt acts
refer to transactions pertinent to a conspiracy to import heroin
through March 1992.
On September 3, 1993, Oser was again indicted in the
District of New Jersey and charged with conspiracy to import
heroin into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 and
possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The New Jersey indictment alleged that the
criminal activity charged took place from July 1992 through
February 1993, a period that included activity after Oser pled
guilty to the false currency charge in New York. The government
contends that although both the Pennsylvania and New Jersey
3
indictments involve international heroin smuggling activities,
they involved different participants and different time periods,
a contention supported by the facts set forth in the pre-sentence
report.1
Oser pled guilty to the Pennsylvania conspiracy and
money laundering charges on December 3, 1992. The New Jersey
case was transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
May 1994 in order to consolidate for disposition. On June 13,
1994, Oser also pled guilty to the New Jersey conspiracy charge.
On January 26, 1995, the district court sentenced Oser
to a nine year term of imprisonment on the New Jersey charge,
with an additional one year enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3147 and U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7 because Oser committed the New Jersey
offense while on pre-sentence release from the New York
conviction. The district court imposed an identical sentence on
the Pennsylvania conspiracy charge to run concurrently with the
New Jersey sentence. On the Pennsylvania money laundering
charge, the court sentenced Oser to five years, plus an
additional one-year sentence for commission of the crime while on
release, also to run concurrently with the other sentences.
1
According to the pre-sentence report, the Pennsylvania
conspiracy involved only Neil Oser and his brother, Marty Oser,
in an agreement made in Philadelphia with several confidential
informants to import two separate 1 kilogram shipments of heroin
into the United States. The New Jersey conspiracy, by contrast,
involved a much larger and more sophisticated network of couriers
as well as co-conspirators, responsible for importing multi-
kilogram shipments of heroine. The drug network, which may have
been organized by Neil Oser, also allegedly engaged co-
conspirators in distributing the imported heroin to connections
in Chicago.
4
However, the district court ordered the New Jersey and
Pennsylvania sentences to run consecutively to the 10 months
remaining on Oser’s New York sentence.
Oser originally argued in his appellate brief that he
was not put on adequate notice that committing a crime while on
pre-sentence release could result in an increased sentence
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147 and U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7. He withdrew
that argument following a showing by the government that
before Oser was released on the New York charges, he signed an
Appearance Bond which stipulated the conditions of his release
and expressly stated that “DEFENDANT ADVISED BY MAGISTRATE OF
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF 18 U.S.C. § 3156/3147 IN WRITING.”
Gov't App. at 1. That advice appeared on a separate page under
the heading, “Advice of Penalties and Sanctions” that was also
signed by Oser and that clearly warned Oser of the enhanced
penalty he faced for committing a crime while on bond. Id. at 4.
On oral argument, Oser conceded that he did, in fact, receive
sufficient notice that any offense committed while on bond would
result in an enhanced sentence, and he no longer challenges the
one year enhancement imposed by the district court.
Instead, Oser's argument now is limited to his
contention that under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) and § 5G1.3(c) the
district court here was required to impose the conspiracy
sentences to be served concurrent to the New York currency
charges, and that the district court erred in fixing his criminal
history level.
5
We have jurisdiction over the appeal of this sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the construction of
the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary. United States v.
Holifield, 53 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1995).
II.
Section 5G1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines is the
provision designed to guide the district courts in determining
whether a sentence on a defendant subject to an undischarged term
of imprisonment is to run consecutively or concurrently. At the
time of sentencing, that section, which has since been amended,
provided:
§5G1.3Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an
Undischarged Term of Imprisonment
(a)If the instant offense was committed while the
defendant was serving a term of imprisonment
(including work release, furlough, or escape
status) or after sentencing for, but before
commencing service of, such term of imprisonment,
the sentence for the instant offense shall be
imposed to run consecutively to the undischarged
term of imprisonment.
(b)If subsection (a) does not apply, and the
undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from
offense(s) that have been fully taken into account
in the determination of the offense level for the
instant offense, the sentence for the instant
offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to
the undischarged term of imprisonment.
(c)(Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence
for the instant offense shall be imposed to run
consecutively to the prior undischarged term of
imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve a
reasonable incremental punishment for the instant
offense.
U.S.S.G. § 561.3 (1994).
6
Both parties agree that § 5G1.3(a) is inapplicable
here. The second offense (subject of the Pennsylvania
indictment) was committed before Oser was sentenced on the first
offense, the New York money reporting charge. The dispute
instead turns first on the applicability of § 5G1.3(b).
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) requires a judge to impose a
sentence to run concurrently to an undischarged term of
imprisonment when the conduct that gave rise to the prior
conviction has “been fully taken into account in the
determination of the offense level for the instant offense.”
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) (emphasis added). Earlier conduct has been
“fully taken into account” where it has been used as a "§ 1B1.3
(Relevant Conduct) factor in determining the offense level for
the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (n.2). Such a
consideration may occur when the separate offenses are part of
the “same criminal conduct,” or “part of the same course of
conduct.” Id.
The district court determined that Oser’s base offense
level was 34, which it calculated solely because the total
quantity of heroin involved in the two conspiracies to import
heroin from Nigeria was more than 3 but lower than 10 kilograms.
App. at 61. It then imposed a three level enhancement pursuant
to § 2J1.7 because the offense was committed while Oser was on
pre-sentence release from the New York offense.2 Id. It is
2
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7 provides:
If an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 applies,
add 3 levels to the offense level
for the offense committed while on
7
important to note that this enhancement applies irrespective of
any relationship vel non between the New York offense and the
Pennsylvania or New Jersey conspiracies. Thus Oser would have
been subject to this enhancement even if the New York offense for
which he was released had been a sex crime rather than a currency
offense. Nothing in the district court's imposition of sentence
suggests that the fact that Oser had been discovered
underreporting the amount of currency he was carrying as he left
the country was viewed by the district court in Pennsylvania as
relevant conduct in determining Oser's offense level.
The district court acted on the basis of the pre-
sentence report and its rulings on objections thereto by the
parties. That report carefully listed all the "related cases,"
and included the charges against Martin Oser (in the Pennsylvania
(..continued)
release as if this section were a
specific offense characteristic
contained in the offense guideline
for the offense committed on
release.
18 U.S.C. § 3147 states:
[A] person convicted of an offense committed while
released under this chapter shall
be sentenced, in addition to the
sentence prescribed for the offense
to --
(1) a term of imprisonment of not more
than ten years if the offense is a
felony; or
(2) a term of imprisonment of not more
than one year if the offense is a
misdemeanor.
A term of imprisonment imposed under this section
shall be consecutive to any other
sentence of imprisonment.
8
case), and those against Robert Gist and Femi Ojo (in the New
Jersey case). Similarly, the "offense conduct" detailed in the
pre-sentence report covers only the conspiracies in the
Pennsylvania and New Jersey cases. The references to the New
York criminal charge are limited to the fact of its filing and
the fact that Oser was on release when he committed the offenses
covered in the New Jersey indictment. We see no basis to
conclude that Oser's conduct that was the basis of his New York
currency crime, i.e. underreporting of the amount of funds being
carried out of the country, played any part in the determination
of the offense level for his conspiracy sentence.
Oser claims that § 5G1.3(b) applies to him because the
government named his New York underreporting conviction as an
overt act in the Pennsylvania conspiracy indictment, thereby
establishing that the two crimes were “part of the same course of
conduct.” While that contention seems plausible on its face, it
does not withstand close scrutiny.
The Commentary to the guideline gives as an
illustration of the applicability of § 5G1.3(b) the situation
where a defendant has been convicted in federal court for sale of
30 grams of cocaine following an earlier state court conviction
for cocaine sales of 15 grams. The two offenses are to be
treated as part of the same course of conduct if that defendant
would be deemed responsible for the sale of a total of 45 grams
of cocaine as relevant conduct resulting in an offense level of
14. The Commentary states that because the offense level in the
federal case was calculated based on the quantity of drugs in
9
both charges, under § 5G1.3(b) the court should impose the
federal sentence to run concurrently with the state sentence. It
explains: "Because the defendant has already served six months on
the related state charge, a sentence of seven months, imposed to
run concurrently with the remainder of the defendant's state
sentence, achieves this result." U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), comment.
(n.2).
The district court in Oser's case calculated the amount
of heroin from both the Pennsylvania and New Jersey conspiracies
in setting the relevant conduct as involving from 3 to 10
kilograms. At sentencing the court stated that
we will confine ourselves to what was
agreed as the basis for the plea of
guilty in New Jersey, which would
be a quantity between 3 and 10, and
to which one would add the .446 of
a kilogram from Philadelphia . . .
. that is the figure which I will
use as the drug quantity in
calculating the offense level. We
are proceeding, of course, with
these charges grouped and that
explains the linking of the New
Jersey and Pennsylvania charges.
Transcript of Sentencing, January 26, 1995 at 17. Applying the
illustration from the Commentary, this means the court had fully
taken into account the New Jersey conduct in setting the offense
level for the Pennsylvania offense.
Oser relies on the fact that the government included as
an overt act in the Pennsylvania indictment the following
reference to the New York conduct:
On or about June 19, 1991, defendant
NEIL OSER attempted to smuggle
approximately $800,000 cash out of
the United States at John F.
10
Kennedy International Airport in
New York with a final destination
of Lagos, Nigeria.
Except for this single sentence, there is no subsequent reference
or tie-up to Oser's New York conduct occurring in June 1991.
Instead, the Pennsylvania indictment is confined to two
transactions involving importation of heroin from Nigeria, which
began with a telephone conversation between a confidential
informant and Neil Oser's brother Marty in October 1991 (almost
four months after the New York arrest) to set up a meeting to
discuss arrangements for importation of heroin from Nigeria, via
pick up at the airport in Amsterdam, effected early November
1991, and arrangements for a second shipment again through
Amsterdam. The indictment alleged participation by two
confidential informants, one or more Drug Enforcement
Administration agents, and Neil Oser, who in the course of the
conspiracy cashed $7,200 of postal money orders given to his
brother as part payment for one of the deliveries. The last
overt act alleged was a meeting between Neil Oser, his brother
and DEA agents on March 31, 1992 to discuss additional
importation of heroin. The mere reference to the New York
conduct as an overt act, nowhere else explained, cannot be used
to evidence that the underreporting of currency in New York was
part of the same course of conduct charged in the Pennsylvania
indictment.
Nor is there any suggestion that the underreporting was
part of the conduct alleged in New Jersey, which alleged a
conspiracy between Neil Oser and Robert Gist to import
11
multikilograms of heroin from Nigeria from about July 1992 until
February 1993 and which, as further detailed in the pre-sentence
report, involved smuggling heroin into the United States through
the lining of suit jackets, via a sophisticated network of
couriers.
The charge filed in New York is independent of that in
either indictment. The New York waiver of indictment merely
provided that Neil Oser "is accused of knowingly and willfully
failing to file a report as defined in Title 31, United States
Code, Section 5316(b) when knowingly transporting and being about
to transport monetary instruments of more than $10,000 at one
time, to wit, approximately $790,000 in United States currency,
from a place in the United States to a place outside the United
States."
Although Oser's counsel argued before us that the New
York conduct is part of the same course of conduct as alleged in
the other indictments, there is nothing in the New York charges
that refers to drugs or any drug conspiracy. Oser offers nothing
on the record to show a connection. Indeed, if Oser had not
already pled guilty to underreporting the currency carried in New
York, the government would have been free to prosecute him for it
after it secured a conviction on the Pennsylvania drug
conspiracy, regardless of its inclusion as an overt act. See
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 787 (1985) (separate
offenses may be prosecuted separately without offending double
jeopardy, even if one is a predicate act for another); United
States v. Pungitore,
910 F.2d 1084, 1111 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
12
denied, 500 U.S. 915 (1991). Therefore, mere inclusion of a
prior offense as an overt act in a conspiracy is not sufficient
to constitute relevant conduct under § 1B1.1, and it was not
taken into account by the district court in setting Oser's
offense level.
Oser chose to pursue two courses of criminal conduct
separately recognized by Congress: failure to file a truthful
currency report in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316 and
conspiracies to import heroin into the United States in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 963. A concurrent sentence is not compelled by §
5G1.3(b) in this situation.
In light of the dissent's criticism of the government's
actions, we note that the government could not have filed all the
charges together in one proceeding. By the time the government
had a basis to indict Oser for the conspiracy to import heroin
that was the subject of the Pennsylvania indictment, which was
returned on July 29, 1992, Oser had already waived indictment and
entered into a guilty plea on his June 19, 1991 conduct leading
to the currency charge in New York. On that charge, he waived
indictment, pled guilty and entered into a plea agreement on
November 26, 1991. There is nothing in the record to compare
this case with United States v. McCormick, 58 F.3d 874, 878 (2d
Cir. 1995), where it appeared that the government deliberately
seized upon a "perverse incentive" to try related crimes in
separate jurisdictions.
Furthermore, the consolidation of the Pennsylvania
charges and the New Jersey charges do not support the dissent's
13
suggestion that the underlying charges in all three cases were
part of the same course of conduct. The consolidation was
directed for disposition only after Oser pled guilty in
Pennsylvania. The government has consistently argued that the
New Jersey and Pennsylvania conspiracies were separate.
Nonetheless, once Oser also pled guilty in the New Jersey case,
the district court did give Oser the benefit of concurrent
sentences for the Pennsylvania and New Jersey crimes.
Inasmuch as we conclude that subsection (b) does not
apply to Oser's case, it follows that subsection (c) is the
relevant guideline provision for determining whether his sentence
should be imposed concurrently or consecutively to the remainder
of his 28 month New York sentence. Under subsection (c),
characterized as a "policy statement," the sentence for the
offenses at issue, here the Pennsylvania and New Jersey
conspiracies to import heroin, was to be imposed to run
consecutively "to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to
the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental
punishment for the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) (1994).
Application Note 3 sets out a methodology "to assist the court
in determining the appropriate sentence." U.S.S.G. § 3G1.3,
comment. (n.3). At the time of Oser's sentencing that Note
provided, in part,
To the extent practicable, the court should consider a
reasonable incremental penalty to be a
sentence for the instant offense that results
in a combined sentence of imprisonment that
approximates the total punishment that would
have been imposed under § 5G1.2 (Sentencing
on Multiple Counts of Conviction) had all of
the offenses been federal offenses for which
14
sentences were being imposed at the same
time. Id. 3
According to Oser, the district judge did not apply the
appropriate methodology in sentencing him consecutively, and
failed to state any reasons for avoiding the methodology as is
required by United States v. Holifield,
53 F.3d 11, 17 (3d Cir.
1995). We disagree.
The methodology outlined by the Application Note merely
suggests that a judge first approximate the “total sentence” for
a defendant as if the defendant were being sentenced for all his
offenses at the same time; this “total sentence” then provides
the judge with the maximum and minimum range for sentencing the
defendant on the instant offense. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment.
(n.3); United States v. Spiers, 82 F.3d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir.
1996). As long as a consecutively imposed sentence falls within
this maximum and minimum range, a judge has imposed a “reasonable
incremental punishment” as described by the § 5G1.3(c). U.S.S.G.
§ 561.3, comment. (n.3). Beyond that limitation, the court
3
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) was amended effective November 1, 1995,
and now provides the district court with even more discretion to
fashion a sentence for a defendant subject to an undischarged
term of imprisonment. It states:
(Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence for
the instant offense may be imposed to run
concurrently, partially, concurrently, or
consecutively to the prior undischarged term
of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable
punishment for the instant offense.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) (1995). The application note to this section
was changed to correspond to the amendment. See U.S.S.G. §
5G1.3(b), comment. (n.3) (1995).
15
retains broad discretion to choose the length and sequence of
punishment.
The Commentary continues: “Generally, the court may
achieve an appropriate sentence through its determination of an
appropriate point within the applicable guideline range for the
instant federal offense, combined with its determination of
whether that sentence will run concurrently or consecutively to
the undischarged term of imprisonment.” Id.
The district court manifestly considered the guideline
methodology in sentencing Oser for his part in the heroin
importation conspiracies. The court determined on the record
that a base offense level of 34 based on the quantity of heroin,
with Oser's criminal history category II, produced an applicable
guideline range of 168-210 months for the New Jersey offense,
which the court deemed to be the appropriate total sentence for
both the conspiracy offenses. The district judge stated that he
was departing from the guideline range in Oser’s case because of
the government’s submission of a § 5K1.1 letter. Transcript of
Sentencing, January 26, 1995 at 62. The district court
ultimately sentenced Oser to 9 years imprisonment to run
consecutively to the ten month undischarged term of imprisonment
remaining for his New York offense, for a total of 118 months, a
term well below the guideline range. The court then imposed an
additional one year term of imprisonment pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
2J1.7, making Oser’s total sentence 130 months.
Though the district court did not expressly announce to
Oser that its calculations were made following the guideline
16
methodology, the guidelines nowhere require such formality. We
have said that a court is free to abandon the penalty prescribed
by the guideline's methodology as long as the court “indicates
its reasons for imposing the penalty in such a way as to allow us
to see that it has considered the methodology.” Spiers, 82 F.3d
at 1275.
The court clearly explained why it was not imposing the
conspiracy sentences to run concurrently with the 10 months
remaining on the New York sentence. It first stated:
I do not think we are in the double
jeopardy area as a constitutional
matter, nor do I think I have
authority to conclude, while it's
just not good policy and,
therefore, I won't do it, I think
that Congress has been directive.
It says there shall be an
enhancement when you commit a crime
when you're on release and I don't
think I can avoid the impact of
that unless I'm to conclude that
the statute as applied here would
be unconstitutional; it would be
imposing a double punishment. And
I don't think it is.
Transcript of Sentencing, January 26, 1995 at 20.
Later, in sentencing, the district court stated as
follows:
I have concluded . . . in constructing the sentence that I
will not follow the recommendation of the
defense that I make this sentence concurrent
with the sentence which Mr. Oser is now
serving in New York.
. . . I think it would not be harmonious
with the proposition that an
enhancement is to be made of the
sentence to be imposed today for
the reason that Mr. Oser went out
while on release from the New York
charges and engaged in independent
criminal activity
17
. . . to then make today’s sentence
concurrent with the New York
sentence. [It] would not be
harmonious with that enhancement.
Id. at 62-63. The district court's explanation that a concurrent
sentence would run against the policy of Congress and the
Sentencing Guidelines in requiring that the sentence be enhanced
if the crime was committed while on release elsewhere was a
satisfactory basis for the use of a methodology different from
that suggested by the Application Note. We therefore reject
Oser's claim of error in sentencing him to a term of imprisonment
consecutive to that which he was serving in the New York charge.
III.
Oser's final claim is that the district court erred in
placing him in Criminal History Category II. Under U.S.S.G. §
4A1.1, the district court is to "[a]dd 3 points for each prior
sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month"
(emphasis added). Oser contends that the error was counting his
New York conviction as a “prior sentence.” Repeating his earlier
analysis, Oser argues that criminal history points should not
have been assigned for the New York crime since that offense
should be regarded as “part of the instant offense” under
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1), and part of a “common scheme or plan”
under United States v. Hallman, 23 F.3d 821, 825 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied,
115 S. Ct. 216 (1994).
Oser did not raise this objection at his sentencing
hearing, and agreed to a Criminal History Category II at that
time. Thus we review the court’s determination only for plain
18
error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 735-37,
113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778-78 (1993) (“plain error” must
be particularly egregious and seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings).
Under Application Note 1 to § 4A1.2(a), “prior
sentence” means a sentence “imposed prior to sentencing on the
instant offense, other than a sentence for conduct that is part
of the instant offense.” “Conduct that is part of the instant
offense,” in turn means, “conduct that is relevant conduct to the
instant offense under the provisions of § 1B1.3 (Relevant
Conduct).” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), comment. (n.1) (1994). As
explained above, Oser’s currency underreporting offense played no
part in the determination of his base offense level for the
sentence on the heroin conspiracies offense; thus, the conduct
for which he was previously sentenced was not the type of
“Relevant Conduct” that would preclude a separate computation of
criminal history points under § 4A1.2(a)(2).
Contrary to Oser’s suggestion, our decision in Hallman,
23 F.3d at 825, does not require a contrary holding. In Hallman,
where the defendant was indicted in federal court for the offense
of stealing mail in the form of blank checks, we concluded that
the conduct underlying the defendant's state conviction for
forgery was part of the same scheme and conduct as the federal
offense and therefore could not count as a "prior sentence" under
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). See
id. at 826. In that case, the two
crimes were necessarily related; one would not attempt to steal
blank checks without intending ultimately to commit forgery.
19
Here, there is nothing to show a relationship between
the offense of underreporting the currency carried and the drug
conspiracy offenses. Indeed, the New Jersey indictment to which
Oser pled guilty alleged an agreement and acts that began after
Oser’s arrest for underreporting the currency charges.
Therefore, the district judge did not plainly err in assessing
Oser criminal history points for his New York offense pursuant to
§ 4A1.1(a).
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the
district court's judgment of conviction and sentence.
20
United States v. Neil Oser
No. 95-1107/1108
ROSENN, J., dissenting.
I believe that the appellant's indictment and
conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York on the charge of failing to report the
transportation of cash abroad was part and parcel of the larger
conspiracy for which he was indicted and sentenced in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania (for importing heroin into the United
States and money laundering), as well as the conspiracy for which
he was indicted in the District of New Jersey. Thus, the
sentences for the Pennsylvania and New Jersey offenses should
have been imposed under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) concurrently to the
undischarged term of imprisonment that he was then serving under
the New York indictment and sentence. I, therefore, respectfully
dissent.
I.
21
The two conspiracies in Pennsylvania and New Jersey
involved the alleged importation of heroin from Nigeria. (Maj.
op. at 6) The arrest in New York at the JFK Airport on June 19,
1991 was for failure to report $790,000 in cash that he was
carrying as he was about to board a flight for Lagos, Nigeria.
Oser pled guilty to the charges in New York on November 26, 1991,
and the court released him on bail pending the sentence which it
imposed on July 16, 1993. The district court imposed sentence on
Oser for the Pennsylvania and New Jersey offenses while he was
serving time for the New York offense for failure to report the
currency he was carrying. At the time of the Pennsylvania
sentences, Oser had served 18 months of his 28 month New York
sentence. The district court determined that his ten-year
sentence on the Pennsylvania and New Jersey offenses should run
consecutively to this sentence. Thus, Oser's time on this
sentence would not even begin to run until he had served ten more
months in prison. Oser argues now, as he did at sentencing, that
this determination fails to consider the applicable U.S.S.G.
guideline provision, § 5G1.3(b).
This Guideline provision assists the courts in
sentencing a defendant who is subject to an undischarged term of
imprisonment. There are three subparts which limit the court's
discretion. Part (a) is applicable only when the instant offense
was committed either while the defendant was serving a sentence,
or after sentencing but before imprisonment, and mandates a
consecutive sentence. The parties agree that this subpart is
inapplicable, as Oser's subsequent offenses occurred between the
22
time of his guilty plea and his sentencing. Part (b) applies
only if the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from
offenses that were fully taken into account in the determination
of the offense level for the present offense, and mandates that
the prison terms run concurrently. It provides that if
subsection (a) does not apply and "the undischarged term of
imprisonment resulting from offenses that have been fully taken
into account in the determination of the offense level for the
instant offenses the sentence for the instant offenses shall be
imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term of
imprisonment." Part (c), called the policy statement, applies in
all other cases, and permits the court to impose a consecutive,
partially consecutive, or concurrent sentence as desired in order
to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant
offense.
I believe that the record establishes that Oser's New
York conduct was taken into account. Under a reading of
Application note 2 to § 5G1.3, subsection (b) could include
federal charges in other jurisdictions for the same criminal
conduct, or for different criminal charges that were part of the
same course of conduct. Here, the charges in all three states
stem from one ongoing course of criminal conduct concerning a
large-scale conspiracy to import heroin.
The Government argues that the Pennsylvania and New
Jersey indictments, although they involve a continuation of
Oser's drug smuggling activities, cover different time periods
and different co-conspirators. Therefore, the Government claims,
23
they are different courses of conduct. This, it seems, is
contradicted by their consolidation and by the concurrent
sentences imposed for the Pennsylvania and New Jersey charges.
More importantly, the conduct for which Oser was
sentenced in New York, failure to file a currency report, is
cited as an overt act of the conspiracy charged in Pennsylvania.
The Government has thus acknowledged that the act is part of the
same course of conduct. Because it has used this act to charge
Oser with conspiracy, it is estopped from arguing on appeal that
the act is wholly irrelevant to the conspiracies charges to which
he pled guilty. The Government has, in effect, recognized that
the New York offense is part of the same course of conduct as the
present crime, by including it as an overt act of the conspiracy
described in the present indictment. This is supported by the
response of Seth Weber, Assistant United States Attorney, who at
sentencing of Oser in New York City made this statement:
"And when you talk about these criminal charges
being an aberration for Mr. Oser we
may be missing the boat here
because we're dealing with criminal
conduct that spanned two years,
from 1991 through 1993, that we
know of. 1991 when he attempted to
take $800,000 in cash out of the
country without reporting it
knowing that it was a result of
drug proceeds. That's what started
this ball rolling for Mr. Oser."
Therefore, subsection (b) of § 5G1.3 applies.
The point I make is not only of importance to Oser but
to the federal criminal justice system generally. It is not
unusual for some prosecutors to split up a single conspiracy and
24
attempt to charge several discrete conspiracies, with indictments
in different jurisdictions, and thereby obtain multiple
sentences. In United States v. McCormick, 58 F.3d 874 (2d Cir.
1995), the defendant was sentenced in two district courts in the
Second Circuit for separate frauds against two separate banks,
each part of an ongoing fraud conspiracy. The court considering
the second indictment dismissed 31 of the 41 counts, in
recognition of possible double jeopardy issues, but permitted
prosecution of the other ten counts. It then sentenced the
defendant to serve his sentence consecutive to the preceding
sentence.4 Although the Second Circuit affirmed this decision,
it noted:
[T]his result unfairly punishes McCormick for
events to a real extent outside his
control, namely, his prosecution in
two separate fora for a single
pattern of fraudulent activity. It
is acknowledged by the Government
that if McCormick had been subject
to a single prosecution for his
crimes, he would have received, at
most, a single 46-month term of
imprisonment. That he is now
subject to an additional,
consecutive 35-month term creates a
perverse incentive for prosecutors.
In order to maximize the sentences
received by defendants, prosecutors
can, where possible, try defendants
in multiple jurisdictions for
different but related crimes. As
mentioned above, we are bound by
the Guidelines and the law of this
circuit to reach the result in this
case. In our view, however, this
problem deserves a renewed, close
4
The district court in that case specifically noted the existence
of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, and determined that this was a suitable
incremental punishment.
25
examination by the Sentencing
Commission.
McCormick, at 878.
The effect of the prosecutions in the three jurisdictions in the
instant case is to maximize Oser's sentence for what is, in
effect, the same course of conduct. This is impermissible under
the Guidelines, and unreasonable.
Prosecutors have a great deal of discretion in the way
they choose to frame charges against a defendant. In this case,
rather than limit themselves to Oser's substantive offenses, the
prosecutors set out to charge him with conspiracy, and cited his
substantive offenses as overt acts in furtherance of that
conspiracy. This is well within prosecutorial discretion.
However, having chosen to frame their charges in such a fashion,
they are also bound by its limitations. Oser's failure to file a
currency report is either a substantive offense in New York, or
an overt act in furtherance of the Pennsylvania conspiracy.
However, it borders on double jeopardy to permit prosecutors to
have it both ways, and for the court to sentence Oser twice for
conduct essentially part of the conspiracy for which he is being
separately sentenced. The gravamen of Oser's concern is not that
he was indicted in three jurisdictions, but having been indicted
in New York for conduct that was in furtherance of the overall
conspiracy, the ultimate sentence imposed in Pennsylvania should
have been concurrent to the sentence remaining to be served under
the New York indictment, and not consecutive.
26
Therefore, when a defendant is convicted of conspiracy
in one jurisdiction and the evidence includes criminal conduct
for which he has been previously prosecuted and convicted in
another federal jurisdiction, or he has been previously
prosecuted and convicted for different criminal charges that were
part of the same conspiratorial course of conduct, the sentence
imposed in the later conviction must be concurrent with the first
sentence.
The district court in Pennsylvania, therefore, should
have applied U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) in sentencing Oser and have the
sentence it imposed run concurrently with the portion of the New
York sentence which had not yet been served.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
27
