REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SHIVA V. HODGES, Magistrate Judge.

Richard Boggs ("Petitioner") proceeding pro se, filed a petition seeking to quash summonses by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). Petitioner also sues the United States of America ("USA") and "Peter Rae and coworkers" (collectively with IRS, "Respondents"). [ECF No. 1].

This matter comes before the court on Respondents' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). [ECF No. 28]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), Petitioner was advised of the dismissal procedures and possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the motion by April 5, 2019. [ECF No. 29]. The motion having been briefed [ECF No. 33, 34], it is ripe for disposition.

All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.). Because the motion to dismiss is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for the district judge's consideration. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the court grant Respondents' motion to dismiss.

I. Factual Background

On December 10, 2018, Special Agent Peter Rae of the IRS's Criminal Investigation division issued seven administrative summonses ("the summonses") in connection with an investigation. [ECF No. 1-2]. The summonses are addressed to six of Petitioner's current and/or former employers and to a company that provides video doorbell subscription services, Ring.com. Id. All seven summonses are addressed to entities outside of the State of South Carolina. Id.

Petitioner initiated this action by filing a Petition on December 19, 2018, seeking: (1) to quash the summonses; (2) a "Bill of Particulars" from the IRS documenting probable cause for its criminal investigation; (3) civil damages of an unspecified amount; (4) a writ of mandamus compelling "the supervisors of this/these errant federal actors and outlaws to discipline them and compel them to cease their unlawful activities . . ."; and (5) a statement of findings by the court "backed up by rulings from the Supreme Court" if the court disagrees with Petitioner's claims as to jurisdiction. [ECF No. 1].

Subsequent to filing his petition, Petitioner filed an "Affidavit of Material Facts In Support of Petition to Quash Summons," [ECF No. 6], a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction [ECF No. 21],1 and a motion to quash the summonses [ECF No. 22].

II. Discussion

A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss2

Dismissal is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) where the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) examines whether a complaint fails to state facts upon which jurisdiction can be founded. It is the plaintiff's burden to prove jurisdiction, and the court is to "regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). The court is "not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, the presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support the legal conclusion. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001). To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is "not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, "[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support the legal conclusion." Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001).

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).

B. Analysis

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Respondents argue the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's claim for relief because he has not provided any evidence that sovereign immunity has been waived. The USA, as a sovereign entity, is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued. Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 693 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315 (1986)). The terms of any such consent, as expressed by statute, "`define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). Any waiver of the USA's sovereign immunity must be unambiguous and strictly construed in favor of the USA. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992). Plaintiff bears the burden of showing an unequivocal waiver and that none of a statute's waiver exceptions apply to the particular claim. Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 650-51 (4th Cir. 2005). Because Plaintiff has not, and cannot, cite a waiver of sovereign immunity, his claim for relief must be dismissed. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2001).

2. Quashing Summonses

The court is also without jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's requests to quash the summonses because they are directed at parties outside of the District of South Carolina. The statute provides "The United States District Court for the district within which the person to be summoned resides or is found shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any proceeding brought under subsection (b)(2). . . ." 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h). Subsection (b)(2) provides the circumstances for proceedings to quash summonses. Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction to quash the summonses.3

3. Mandamus

"The authority of federal courts to issue extraordinary writs derives from the `all writs statute,' 28 U.S.C. § 1651." See Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, 411 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1969). Section 1651 provides, in pertinent part, that federal courts "may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Federal district courts are granted "original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361.

"Mandamus is a drastic remedy, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 516 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held:

In re Braxton, 258 F.3d 250, 261 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing United States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502 (4th Cir. 1999)). The writ "is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff . . . only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty." Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984) (emphasis added). Here, Petitioner has failed to identify a nondiscretionary duty Rae or Rae's supervisors owe him. Therefore, he has failed to present a cognizable claim for mandamus relief.

4. Civil Damages

In his request for damages against Rae and his coworkers, Plaintiff requests restitution from Rae's "personal pay and assets, and not from the government. . . ." Plaintiff cites to criminal statutes Rae has allegedly violated, but such statutes do not give rise to civil liability. To the extent Petitioner seeks to bring a civil rights action against Rae pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unkown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), a petition is not a proper method of obtaining such relief. However, even construing his petition liberally, Petitioner has failed to show that the Bivens doctrine should be expanded to include a claim for damages related to an IRS investigation in light of the complex statutory scheme Congress has provided for the collection of taxes. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has extended Bivens only in limited circumstances, and cautioning that a Bivens remedy will not be available if there are "special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress").

5. Miscellaneous Relief

Petitioner has provided no basis for requesting a "Bill of Particulars" from the IRS documenting probable cause for its investigation. Nor has he provided any authority for requesting the court provide a "statement of findings backed up by rulings from the Supreme Court if it disagrees with any of [Petitioner's] claims about jurisdiction."

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends Respondents' motion to dismiss be granted. If the district judge accepts this recommendation, Petitioner's motions for a preliminary injunction [ECF No. 21] and to quash the summonses [ECF No. 22] will be rendered moot.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must `only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).