BRUCE S. JENKINS, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Following briefing by the parties, the Court held a hearing on the Motion on November 9, 2015. Plaintiff was represented by David Holdsworth. Defendant was represented by Richard M. Hymas and Bret F. Randall. Having fully considered the Motion, memoranda, exhibits, declarations, and other evidence submitted by the parties, as well as the arguments of counsel made at the hearing, and the undisputed facts and applicable law relevant to the Motion, the Court granted the Motion. The Court now enters its Memorandum Decision and Order, setting forth the basis for its decision.
Plaintiff Kevin Lee Angel ("Angel") alleges claims against Defendant Lisbon Valley Mining Co. LLC ("Lisbon Valley") for disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").
Lisbon Valley operates a copper mine in San Juan County, Utah. From October 2011 to January 2012, Angel was employed by Lisbon Valley as a haul truck driver, a safety-sensitive position. While interviewing for the job, Angel was told about Lisbon Valley's prescription drug policy and was given a document setting forth the terms of the policy, which he read and signed.
On January 12, 2012, while undergoing a random drug test, Angel tested positive for oxycodone, and was placed on administrative leave.
Angel timely filed a charge of discrimination against Lisbon Valley with the Utah Labor Commission's Antidiscrimination and Labor Division (the "UALD") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"), claiming disability. discrimination under the ADA. Angel later amended the charge to add a retaliation claim. After completing its investigation, the UALD issued a Determination and Order, dated March 6, 2013, finding that there was "no reasonable cause" to believe that Angel was subjected to the discriminatory practices alleged. Angel appealed the no-cause determination to the appeals unit of the UALD, but later withdrew his charge and obtained a right-to-sue letter. This action followed.
Lisbon Valley has filed a motion for summary judgment against Angel on all claims alleged in Angel's Complaint. The Court has determined that, based upon the undisputed evidence presented, there is no genuine issue of material fact and Lisbon Valley is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The following facts are undisputed:
1. During a pre-employment interview, after Angel reviewed the job description for the haul truck driver job for which he was applying, he was specifically asked whether there was anything listed under the essential duties or physical requirements of the job that he could not perform with or without a reasonable accommodation. He said no.
2. During that interview, Angel did not state that he had a disability, nor did he request, or state that he needed, any accommodation in order to perform the duties of the job.
3. During that interview, Angel was told about Lisbon Valley's prescription drug policy, which applies to haul truck drivers. He was given a document setting forth the terms of the policy, which he read and signed.
4. In a subsequent pre-employment meeting, while reviewing and discussing the prescription drug policy, Angel told Lisbon Valley's human resources manager that he sometimes took medication for back pain but that he was not taking any medication at the time. Angel did not state at that time that he had a disability or that he required any type of accommodation in order to perform the duties of his job.
5. The prescription drug policy provides that employees taking, prescription drugs that may impair their ability to safely perform their job must inform human resources of the use of such medication, provide human resources with a copy of the prescription for any such medication, and obtain a release from Lisbon Valley's occupational physician authorizing the employee to work and specifying any work restrictions that must be followed, before the employee may return to work. The policy further states that an employee's failure to disclose that the employee is taking prescription medication could result in immediate termination.
6. Angel was fully aware of the policy's requirements and agreed to comply with them. Specifically, he was aware that the policy required him to disclose the use of oxycodone before working, regardless of his beliefs about his ability to work safely while taking that drug.
7. During a random drug screening test on January 12, 2012, Angel tested positive for oxycodone and was placed on administrative leave.
8. Angel had obtained a prescription for oxycodone in December 2011 and had begun using oxycodone at that time. Angel had not informed human resources of that prescription, presented a copy of the prescription to human resources, or provided human resources with a doctor's release prior to taking the medication and reporting to work, as required by the prescription drug policy.
9. Angel's actions violated Lisbon Valley's prescription drug policy, which he acknowledged in his deposition.
10. On January 13, 2012, one day after the random drug test, Angel showed Lisbon Valley's human resources manager his bottle of oxycodone and a note from the company's occupational physician dated that day.
11. In fact, at no time while he was employed by Lisbon Valley did Angel ever tell Lisbon Valley that he had a disability, nor did he ever ask Lisbon Valley for an accommodation for a disability or inform Lisbon Valley that he needed an accommodation for a disability.
12. On January 19, 2012, Lisbon Valley notified Angel that he had been terminated because of his violation of the company's prescription drug policy.
13. Lisbon Valley has terminated the employment of every other employee who it has learned has violated the company's prescription drug policy.
Summary judgment is warranted if the facts in the record and reasonable inferences drawn favorably to the plaintiff "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the [plaintiff]."
In analyzing ADA cases, this Court applies the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, an employee must prove that he is disabled (as defined by the ADA), that he is qualified for his job, and that he was fired because of his disability.
According to Lisbon Valley, the company did not know that Angel claimed to have a disability prior to his termination?
Because the undisputed evidence establishes that Lisbon Valley did not know that Angel claimed to have a disability prior to his termination, Angel's alleged disability could not have been a determining factor in Lisbon Valley's decision to terminate his employment. As a result, Angel cannot establish his prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
Even if Angel had established a prima facie case, he did not rebut the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason articulated by Lisbon Valley for its actions. Lisbon Valley explained that Angel was terminated because he violated the company's prescription drug policy. Angel has presented no evidence to show that this explanation is a pretext.
In his deposition, Angel admitted that he violated the prescription drug policy by using oxycodone and then coming to work without first notifying human resources that he was taking oxycodone, providing human resources with a copy of the prescription, and obtaining a release from the company's occupational physician.
Angel argued that Lisbon Valley's reason for his termination was pretextual because he did not violate the policy, supposedly because the policy did not apply to him. But Angel's deposition testimony, in which he admits that the policy did apply to him and that he understood he was obligated to comply with the policy, contradicts that argument.
Based on the foregoing, Lisbon Valley is entitled to summary judgment on Angel's discriminatory discharge claim.
Under section 102(b)(5)(A) of the ADA, an employer can unlawfully "discriminate" against an employee by failing to "mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual With a disability who is an ... employee."
Specifically, "the employer must know of both the disability and the employee's desire. for accommodations for that disability."
As stated above, the undisputed evidence establishes that Angel did not tell Lisbon Valley that he had a disability, nor did he put Lisbon Valley on notice that he had a disability. Angel also never asked for an accommodation.
Even if Angel had notified Lisbon Valley after he tested positive for oxycodone that he had a disability and needed an accommodation for the disability (which he did not), Angel still could not prevail on his failure to accommodate claim. Under Tenth Circuit precedent, since reasonable accommodation is always prospective, Lisbon Valley would not have been required to excuse Angel's violation of the prescription drug policy. Retroactive accommodation for a disability is not required under the ADA.
Based on the foregoing, summary judgment is warranted on Angel's denial of accommodation claim.
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, an employee must demonstrate that (1) he engaged in activity protected by the ADA, (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action."
A request for a reasonable accommodation for a disability constitutes a protected activity.
Angel also cannot establish the third element of his prima facie case. For the reasons stated above, Angel has not produced any evidence demonstrating a causal connection between the termination of his employment and any protected activity. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence in the summary judgment record establishes that Angel's employment was terminated because he failed to comply with Lisbon Valley's prescription drug policy, and that Lisbon Valley was not aware that Angel claimed to have a disability until after his employment at Lisbon Valley had ended. Given that evidence, Angel cannot establish a causal connection between any protected activity engaged in by him and the loss of his employment. As a result, Lisbon Valley is entitled to summary judgment on Angel's retaliation claim.
Based on the above reasoning, Lisbon Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Because this ruling disposes of all of Angel's claims, the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Lisbon Valley and close the case.
