Filed: Dec. 28, 2011
Latest Update: Dec. 28, 2011
Summary: ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE DAVID HITTNER, District Judge. Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Continuance (Document No. 552). Having thoroughly considered the motion, submissions, and applicable law, the Court issues the following decision. On June 18, 2009, a federal grand jury for the Southern District of Texas returned a twenty-one count indictment charging Robert Allen Stanford and others with, inter alia, conspiring to commit securities fraud and money
Summary: ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE DAVID HITTNER, District Judge. Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Continuance (Document No. 552). Having thoroughly considered the motion, submissions, and applicable law, the Court issues the following decision. On June 18, 2009, a federal grand jury for the Southern District of Texas returned a twenty-one count indictment charging Robert Allen Stanford and others with, inter alia, conspiring to commit securities fraud and money l..
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ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
DAVID HITTNER, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Continuance (Document No. 552). Having thoroughly considered the motion, submissions, and applicable law, the Court issues the following decision.
On June 18, 2009, a federal grand jury for the Southern District of Texas returned a twenty-one count indictment charging Robert Allen Stanford and others with, inter alia, conspiring to commit securities fraud and money laundering, and conspiring to obstruct and obstructing an investigation of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). On May 4, 2011, a federal grand jury returned a fourteen-count superseding indictment abandoning the securities fraud allegations and adding charges against Stanford for conspiracy to commit and committing mail and wire fraud.1
On January 26, 2011, this Court issued an order finding Stanford incompetent to stand trial. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), this Court ordered that Stanford be committed to the custody of the Attorney General and undergo medical treatment for his then-impaired mental capacity. On February 18, 2011, Stanford was admitted to the Bureau of Prisons Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina ("FMC-Butner") for psychiatric evaluation. On November 4, 2011, following an eight-month evaluation period, the FMC-Butner medical staff submitted a report to the Court summarizing their findings and concluding that Stanford is competent to stand trial. On December 20, 2011, the Court commenced a three-day hearing on Stanford's current mental competency to stand trial. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence admitted at the hearing, the Court determined that Stanford had recovered to such an extent that he is now able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his defense.
On June 21, 2011, the Court issued an order stating that jury selection in this matter would commence in January 2012.2 Stanford now seeks to continue this setting. As an initial matter, the Court notes that district courts have broad discretion in ruling on a motion to continue and setting a trial date. United States v. German, 486 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir.2007) ("Trial judges have broad discretion in deciding requests for continuance, and we review only for an abuse of that discretion resulting in serious prejudice." (emphasis added)). The circumstances of this case, as reflected by the Court's lengthy record, demonstrate that a continuance is unwarranted.
First, Stanford has had an extensive legal defense team. Since the inception of this case over two and one-half years ago, Stanford has been represented by fourteen different attorneys. The Court's record reflects that for the first sixteen months of the case, Stanford was represented by the following retained attorneys: Dick DeGuerin, Kirk Kennedy, Michael Sydow, Kent Schaffer, Alan Dershowitz, George McCall "Mac" Secrest, Michael Essmyer, Robert S. Bennett, Sean Buckley, and Stephen Cochell.3 Then, on October 27, 2010, the Court issued an order declaring Stanford indigent and unable to afford defense counsel. Pursuant to the government-funded Criminal Justice Act ("CJA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, the Court appointed two very experienced criminal defense attorneys — Robert Scardino4 and Ali Fazel5 — to represent Stanford at the government's expense. Subsequently, the Court appointed two additional criminal defense attorneys, John Parras and Ken McGuire, as assistant counsel. Therefore, four full-time attorneys have been working on Stanford's defense.6
Second, the discovery in this matter has been liberal. Throughout this case, the Government has maintained an open discovery file. All of the Government's evidence is electronically stored in a searchable database to which Stanford's defense team has been granted access from the very beginning. The Government has provided Stanford's defense team with a database index, describing the various categories of evidence. Moreover, the Government has specially designated all of the documents it deems most relevant to its case-in-chief and most likely to be introduced at trial. These categories and special designations enable Stanford's defense team to review the contents of key documents and then search within the relevant database categories for other similar documents, all electronically.7 Furthermore, the Court has provided extensive leeway to Stanford's defense team by issuing third-party subpoenas, conducting discovery hearings, ordering and facilitating document production, and administering and approving CJA funds for such expenses.8
Third, the expenses in this case have already been massive. As an ancillary filing with this Court, Stanford filed an ex parte appendix in support of his motion for continuance. One of the reasons Stanford raises therein is that his defense team is in need of additional CJA funds to obtain further discovery of documents in the possession of the Receiver. Stanford claims that his defense team is unable to complete desired discovery because of CJA budgetary restraints.9 The Court notes, however, that since the appointment of Stanford's current defense team, this Court has already approved the payment of $1,683,862.60 in government funds to two defense-retained companies responsible for trial preparation and electronic-discovery management. This Court has also approved the payment of $78,820.68 in government funds to a defense-retained investigation company responsible for locating and securing witnesses to testify at trial. The Court further notes that for just the three-month period beginning September 2011 and ending November 2011, Stanford's defense team has submitted additional expense vouchers for services already rendered by its two electronic-discovery companies totaling $945,191.98 and for its investigation company totaling $34,197.73.10 Stanford, as an indigent defendant, is entitled to a solid, capable, and competent defense, not the deluxe or "perfect" defense that he might have otherwise desired were he still in control of the millions (or even billions) of dollars indicative of his past lifestyle.11 Given that the Government has maintained an open electronic-discovery system through which a large number of documents obtained by the Government from the Receiver relating to the specific criminal allegations in this case have been available, the Court fails to see how Stanford will be seriously prejudiced if he is not permitted to expend an additional $787,000.00 in government funds just for reproduction costs of 3,000 boxes of documents of unknown content.
Fourth, this case needs to be tried. To date, Stanford has already been in pre-trail detention for over two and one-half years. In the Court's January 26, 2011 Order of Psychiatric Evaluation, the Court specifically admonished "the attorneys representing the Government and Stanford to diligently prepare this case to proceed to trial notwithstanding Stanford's absence."12 Moreover, while this case has been deemed complex for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, the Court is mindful that the aim of the Speedy Trial Act is to vindicate the interest not just of defendants, but also of the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The public's interest in a speedy trial is particularly acute in such a case as this in which thousands of investors allegedly purchased CDs from Stanford under false pretenses and subsequently lost billions of dollars. This trial will decide not just whether Stanford is guilty of the criminal charges, but also whether hundreds of millions of dollars of investor funds currently frozen may be forfeited and returned to his alleged victims.
Accordingly, based on all of the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant's Motion for Continuance (Document No. 552) is DENIED. Jury selection is this matter will commence on January 23, 2012 at 10:00 a.m.