MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
EMILY C. MARKS, Chief District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Now before the Court are motions by Plaintiff Greymorr Real Estate, LLC ("Greymorr") for default judgment against Defendant Stanley D. Foster. (Doc. 13 & 21).
On May 30, 2019, the Plaintiff filed suit against Stanley D. Foster ("Foster"), the United States of America, and the State of Alabama Department of Revenue in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama (collectively "Defendants"). (Doc. 1-1). The case was removed to federal court by the United States on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, 1444, and 1446, because the United States is a party to this quiet title action. (Doc. 1).
Greymorr alleges in its complaint that the Defendants have an interest in, or have an interest that clouds title to, the real property located at 2212 Semahat Drive, Montgomery, Alabama, 36106. Greymorr alleges that on April 9, 2013, the Probate Court of Montgomery County decreed that the property be sold for unpaid taxes and alleges that the property was sold on June 5, 2013 to Nebraska Alliance. (Doc. 1-1). Greymorr attaches to the complaint the tax deed. (Doc. 1-1). A quitclaim deed subsequently was issued to Greymorr. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). Greymorr alleges that all proceedings regarding the initial sale on June 5, 2013, the issuance of the tax deed, and the issuance of the quitclaim deed were completed in conformity with Alabama law. (Doc. 1-1 at 3).
Foster failed to file an answer or otherwise appear in this lawsuit within the time limits set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, on September 6, 2019, the Clerk entered a default against Foster. (Doc. 26). On August 29, 2019, Greymorr filed a Motion for Default Judgment (doc. 21), requesting that judgment be entered in its favor against Foster. Foster did not file a response to the Greymorr's default judgment motion within the time given by the Court in its order to show cause why the motion ought not be granted. (Doc. 28). For reasons to be discussed, the motion for default judgment is due to be GRANTED.
II. JURISDICTION and VENUE
This Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1444, because the United States is a party to this action to quiet title. 28 U.S.C. § 2410. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), the Clerk of Court must enter default when "a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise. . . ." Further, "[i]f the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain . . . the clerk — on the plaintiff's request, with an affidavit showing the amount due — must enter judgment for that amount and costs against a defendant who has been defaulted for not appearing. . . ." FED.R.CIV.P. 55(b)(1).
Once a default has been entered, "[t]he defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established." Nishimatsu v. Const. Co., Ltd. V. Houston Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). A district court need not hold a hearing to determine damages when "all essential evidence is already of record." S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231-32 & n.13 (11th Cir. 2005).
IV. DISCUSSION
In support of its motion for default judgment, in addition to the allegations of the complaint, Greymorr submits an affidavit of Theresa Laughlin ("Laughlin"), Vice President of Greymorr. (Doc. 21-3). In this affidavit, Laughlin attests that the Montgomery County Tax Collector sold to Nebraska Alliance Realty Company property with a Parcel Identification Number of 03-10-08-27-01-003-024.054. (Doc. 21-3 at 2-3). She further attests that Nebraska Alliance Realty Company transferred its interest by quitclaim deed to Greymorr. (Doc. 21-3 at 3). She further states that no one has redeemed the property from the June 5, 2013 tax sale. (Doc. 21-3 at 3).
Greymorr's allegations in the complaint and the supporting evidence concerning the sale of the property provide a sufficient basis for the Court to enter default judgment against Foster. See McGuire v. Rogers, 794 So.2d 1131, 1138 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (stating that "[o]ne claiming under a tax title bears the burden of proving compliance with each and every requirement as to assessment, failure to pay taxes, giving of notice, holding of sale and execution of the tax deed."). The motion for default judgment is, therefore, due to be GRANTED.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motions for Default Judgment (doc. 13 & 21) are GRANTED against Defendant Stanley D. Foster and it is DECLARED as follows:
1. As against any claim of Stanley D. Foster and all who claim title under Stanley D. Foster, Greymorr Real Estate, LLC, is the owner in fee simple and is entitled to the immediate, exclusive, and peaceable possession of the real property located in Montgomery County, Alabama, which is more particularly described as follows: Montgomery County Parcel I.D.: 03-10-08-27-01-003-024.054; legal description: Lot 4, Block O, according to the Map of Green Acres Plat No. 22, as said Map appears of record in the Office of the Judge of Probate of Montgomery County, Alabama, in Plat Book 35, Page 234 ("the Property").
2. As against any claim of Stanley D. Foster and all who claim title under Stanley D. Foster, all proceedings regarding the sale of the Property for taxes on June 5, 2013 (the "Tax Sale"), the subsequent issuance of a tax deed of the Property to Nebraska Alliance Realty Company, and Nebraska Alliance Realty Company's conveyance of the Property to Greymorr, were completed in conformity with Alabama law.
3. Any title or interests claimed by Stanley D. Foster in the Property is QUIETED in favor of Greymorr Real Estate, LLC.
4. The claims of Stanley D. Foster and all who claim title under Stanley D. Foster in and to the Property are without any right.
5. Stanley D. Foster has no right of redemption from the Tax Sale, no estate, no title, no lien, nor interest in or to the Property or any part of the Property.
6. Stanley D. Foster and all persons claiming under Stanley D. Foster are permanently enjoined from asserting any estate, right of redemption, title, lien, or interest in or to the Property or any part of the Property.
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on December 1, 2013, the fee to file an appeal is $505.00
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 S.Ct. 911 (1945)). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Perez-Priego v. Alachua County Clerk of Court, 148 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1998). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), the Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment entered by a magistrate judge, but only if the parties consented to the magistrate's jurisdiction. McNab v. J & J Marine, Inc., 240 F.3d 1326, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2001).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judgment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Under this section, appeals are permitted from the following types of orders:
i. Orders granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions; However, interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1472-73 (11th Cir. 1986);
ii. Orders appointing receivers or refusing to wind up receiverships; and
iii. Orders determining the rights and liabilities of parties in admiralty cases.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 S.Ct. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the order or judgment appealed from is entered. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend or reopen the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time to file an appeal may be reopened if the district court finds, upon motion, that the following conditions are satisfied: the moving party did not receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order within 21 days after entry; the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice, whichever is earlier; and no party would be prejudiced by the reopening.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court lacks jurisdiction, i.e., authority, to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
