PAIGE J. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, Mary Lee Evans, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the defendant, Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss on July 14, 2017, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 24.) As Evans is proceeding pro se, the court entered an order pursuant to
In June 2013, Evans applied for DIB and SSI, alleging disability beginning September 25, 2010. Evans's applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, and she requested a hearing before an ALJ. A video hearing was held on June 17, 2015 at which Evans, who at that time was represented by counsel, appeared and testified. After hearing testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ issued a decision on August 10, 2015 concluding that Evans was not disabled from September 25, 2010 through the date of the decision. (ALJ Decision, ECF No. 24-2 at 38-48.)
The Appeals Council denied Evans's request for review on October 24, 2016, making the decision of the ALJ the final action of the Commissioner. (Notice of Appeals Council, ECF No. 24-2 at 52-55.) On that same date, the Appeals Council sent the notice via mail addressed to Evans, with a copy to Evans's counsel. The notice specifically informed Evans of her right to commence a civil action within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt, that her date of receipt was presumed to be within five days after the date of the notice, and that any extension request of the sixty-day time period must be made in writing. (
Judicial review of final decisions made by the Commissioner of Social Security on claims arising under Title II or Title XVI of the Social Security Act is prescribed in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which states in relevant part:
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The date of receipt of the notice is presumed to be five days after the date of such notice, unless the plaintiff makes a reasonable showing to the contrary.
The sixty-day statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling.
In the instant matter, the Notice of Appeals Council is dated October 24, 2016. Allowing five days for mailing pursuant to the applicable regulations, Evans is presumed to have received the notice on October 29, 2016. The time period within which Evans could file a civil action began on that day and expired sixty days later on December 28, 2016, unless Evans can make a reasonable showing that she did not receive the notice. The Appeals Council did not receive any request from Evans for an extension of time beyond the sixty days in which to file her complaint. (Nicoll Decl. ¶ 3(d), ECF No. 24-2 at 4.) Evans filed the instant action on January 19, 2017, approximately 22 days after the expiration of the deadline.
Evans does not make any argument or present any evidence in response to the Commissioner's motion. Accordingly, Evans has failed to show that she did not receive the notice of the Appeals Council by October 29, 2016.
Based upon the foregoing, the court recommends that the Commissioner's motion to dismiss be granted. (ECF No. 24.)
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must `only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'"
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b);