SUSAN K. LEE, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is a motion seeking Court approval of a settlement involving a minor filed by Defendant Donna Fernandes ("Defendant Fernandes"), the mother and guardian of the minor, Defendant A.F. (the "Minor Defendant") [Doc. 21]. The parties have presented a copy of the signed Settlement Agreement and Release to the Court.
A hearing was held on December 18, 2015, to determine whether the parties' proposed settlement of this matter is in the best interest of the Minor Defendant. Present at the hearing were: (1) Defendant Fernandes and the Minor Defendant, (2) Attorney William G. Schwall ("Attorney Schwall") for Defendant Fernandes and the Minor Defendant, and (3) Attorney William A. Harris, III ("Attorney Harris") for Defendant Sara Kathryn Camp ("Defendant Camp"). Holly V. Rhea ("Attorney Rhea") for Plaintiff Thrivent Financial for Lutherans ("Plaintiff") participated by telephone.
In connection with the divorce of Milton Terrell Fugate, Jr. ("Decedent") and Defendant Fernandes, and pursuant to a Permanent Parenting Plan entered by the Circuit Court of Cocke County, Tennessee in January 2004 (the "Parenting Plan"), Decedent was required to maintain a term life insurance policy in the minimum amount of $250,000.00 [Doc. 11-2 at Page ID # 188]. The Parenting Plan did not specify the Minor Defendant was to be the named beneficiary of the $250,000.00 policy or specify for how long the policy was to be maintained. To date, no such policy has been located.
This matter arose when multiple individuals claimed an interest in the proceeds of a life insurance policy issued by Plaintiff on the life of Decedent for $80,000.00 ("the Policy"). The Policy named Decedent's former wife, Defendant Camp, as the beneficiary. Plaintiff filed a complaint for interpleader against Defendant Camp, Defendant Fernandes, as parent and guardian of the Minor Defendant, the Minor Defendant, and Milton Fugate, Sr. (Decedent's father),
When minors are involved in a settlement, the district court must make an independent determination that the settlement is in the minor's best interest. See Green v. Nevers, 111 F.3d 1295, 1301 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-121. In considering whether a settlement is in the best interest of the minor, a court "must consider and then determine what constitutes fair and reasonable compensation to the attorney regardless of any agreement specifying an amount, whether contingent or otherwise." Dean v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 860 F.2d 670, 673 (6th Cir. 1988).
In Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166 (Tenn. 2011), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that courts should consider the ten factors set forth in the Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) ("RPC 1.5") when determining a reasonable attorneys' fee along with determining whether the settlement protects the best interest of the minor. These ten factors are:
Wright, 337 S.W.3d at 176-77 (quoting Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5(a)). These factors are not exclusive and each factor may not be relevant in every case. Id. at 177 n.17.
Courts should not consider any fee agreement because it is not binding on the minor but rather "should review the case on the premise that there is no enforceable fee contract" and determine "what the reasonable fee would be in the absence of a [fee] contract." Id. at 183. In the context of a settlement involving a minor, courts must balance the determination of what is a reasonable fee to ensure that attorneys have the necessary incentive to accept cases involving minors in the future and what is in the best interest of the minor considering the minor's present and future needs. Id. at 185.
The proposed settlement is the result of arms' length negotiations and provides the Policy proceeds of $80,000.00 and accrued interest will be distributed as follows:
At the hearing, testimony about the proposed division of Policy proceeds between Defendant Camp and the Minor Defendant was presented. Decedent took out the Policy during his approximately eight-year marriage to Defendant Camp. Upon their divorce approximately two years ago, Decedent did not change the beneficiary designation. Defendant Camp has a good relationship with the Minor Defendant. The proposed settlement provides the Minor Defendant, who is currently 16 years old, with over half of the Policy proceeds.
The parties agreed that Tennessee law and the unique facts of this case informed the settlement negotiations. While the Parenting Plan required Decedent to maintain a term life insurance policy in the minimum amount of $250,000.00, the Parenting Plan is woefully silent as to the beneficiary designation or the term of the policy. The parties dispute whether the Policy could be applied to Decedent's monetary obligations to the Minor Defendant given the Decedent's failure to procure a policy under the ambiguous Parenting Plan. See Holt v. Holt, 995 S.W.2d 68, 77 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that when a divorce decree mandates that a former spouse maintain a life insurance policy and name a certain individual as a beneficiary, "the divorce decree creates in [that individual] a vested right to any life insurance policy obtained by the Decedent that satisfies the mandate in the decree."). Given the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court
Under the terms of the settlement, Plaintiff and Attorney Schwall will receive attorneys' fees and expenses that deplete the Policy proceeds available to the Minor Defendant.
While it appears that Attorney Schwall has adequately represented the Minor Defendant, the Court is troubled that he has not kept records of his time as keeping accurate time records is part of the responsibility of an attorney seeking payment of fees in cases involving minors. See Wright, 337 S.W.3d at 181 ("[A]n attorney representing a minor should keep a record of time spent on the minor's case, even if that attorney does not ordinarily keep track of time as part of the attorney's practice."). In spite of the lack of contemporaneous time records, the Court
Attorney Rhea testified as to Plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees and expenses for bringing this interpleader action. Attorney Rhea testified that Plaintiff is paying reduced rates for this matter — $280.00 an hour for partners' time, $200.00 an hour for associates' time, and $150.00 an hour for paralegals' time, which Attorney Rhea testified are reasonable and customary rates for this type of work. Attorney Rhea attested that her firm, Burr & Forman LLP, has represented Plaintiff for several years including in several interpleader matters. Attorney Rhea further stated that Plaintiff is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees because it is a disinterested stakeholder in this matter. In the proposed settlement agreement before the Court, Plaintiff is seeking the reduced amount of $4,500.00 for its attorneys' fees and expenses.
Courts have discretion in determining whether to allow an interpleader plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees and costs and they are "rarely awarded as a matter of course." Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Kelling, 170 F.Supp.2d 792, 794 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 2, 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the somewhat unique facts of this case and considering the factors set forth in Wright, the Court
Accordingly, the motion to approve the minor settlement [Doc. 21] is
Upon receipt of the funds, the Court Clerk is
It is further
SO ORDERED.