ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PAIGE J. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge.

The plaintiff, Richard Livingston, a self-represented litigant, filed this diversity action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 raising state law claims of promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant. (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF Nos. 3 & 18.) Defendant filed an answer and raised counterclaims of conversion and breach of fiduciary duty against the plaintiff. (ECF No. 28.) This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 45.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendants' motion. (ECF No. 47.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 74.) Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted in part.1

BACKGROUND

The following facts are either undisputed, or are taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. Plaintiff Richard Livingston is the son of Phyllis Elaine Busby Livingston, who died on December 3, 2013. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 5.) At the time of her death, Phyllis Livingston was married to Defendant Robert Sackett, who is Plaintiff's stepfather. (Id. at 1.) Phyllis Livingston died intestate, and Defendant was appointed as the personal representative of the estate on May 2, 2014. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Exs. 1 & 2, ECF Nos. 45-2 & 45-3.)

Prior to his mother's death, Plaintiff owned rental property in Michigan. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6.) At some point, the rental property went into foreclosure when Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy, and the lender set a redemption price for the rental property of $178,115. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 2.) Central to Plaintiff's claims in this matter is the allegation that his mother promised Plaintiff she would purchase his rental property from foreclosure for his benefit.2 (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that in furtherance of her promise, his mother obtained pre-qualification for a loan from a bank, paid $5,000 to the bank toward a down payment, paid $5,000 as a good faith deposit, paid a $300 application fee to the bank, and entered into a purchase agreement for the rental property with the bank. (Id.) Defendant was also a party to the purchase agreement, but Plaintiff was not.3 (Id. at 3.)

Plaintiff further alleges that he relied on his mother's promise to redeem the rental property from foreclosure when he invested approximately $20,000 to improve the property while he was still in possession of it. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff also alleges that based on his mother's promise, he enrolled in a technical school in pursuit of a career in data analytics and database development. (Id. at 4.)

Phyllis Livingston died in December 2013 without having purchased Plaintiff's rental property. (Id. at 5.) In February 2014, Defendant assigned his interest in the purchase agreement for the rental property to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff entered an agreement with two lenders to finance his purchase of the property. (Id.) Defendant was appointed as the personal representative of the estate of Phyllis Livingston on May 2, 2014, and thereafter, Plaintiff made "repeated requests and demands" to Defendant to transfer $30,623 out of the estate to finance Plaintiff's purchase of the rental property, but Defendant refused. (Id.) Plaintiff was never able to redeem the property, and the bank took possession of the property on July 20, 2015. (Id.)

Phyllis Livingston owned stocks in her former employer that were managed by Computershare, Inc. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Exs. 4a & 4b, ECF Nos. 45-5 & 45-6.) Before Defendant was appointed as the personal representative of Phyllis Livingston's estate, Plaintiff submitted documents to Computershare to have the stocks liquidated and the proceeds distributed to Plaintiff's account at Huntington National Bank. (Id.; Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 7.) Plaintiff received $73,991.82 in proceeds from the stock sales before the estate learned of Plaintiff's actions and stopped the sale of stock and transfer of the proceeds. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Exs. 16 & 17, ECF Nos. 45-20 & 45-21.) Upon learning that Plaintiff may not have had authority to order the liquidation and transfer of Phyllis Livingston's stocks, Huntington National Bank instituted a declaratory judgment action in this court and interpled Plaintiff and Defendant to determine the proper ownership of the stock proceeds.4 (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 6., ECF No. 45-8.) Contemporaneously, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Allowance of a Creditor's Claim in the Lexington County Probate Court in the matter of Phyllis Livingston's estate, asserting he was entitled to money from the estate based on the decedent's alleged promise to purchase Plaintiff's rental property. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 14a, ECF No. 45-16.) Following a hearing on the matter, the Lexington County Probate Court issued an order finding Plaintiff admitted that the stock sale proceeds deposited in his Huntington National Bank account belonged to the estate, and the court ordered the funds deposited into the trust account of the law firm representing the estate.5 (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 7, ECF No. 45-9.) However, while Plaintiff received $73,991.82 in proceeds from the stock sales, his Huntington National Bank account only held $59,280.36 at the time the Lexington County Probate Court order was issued. (Id.) Consequently, only the smaller sum was transferred back to the estate.

Plaintiff also filed a Petition for Removal of the Personal Representative in the Lexington County Probate Court in the matter of the estate of Phyllis Livingston, but the Lexington County Probate Court denied the petition by order dated July 22, 2015, finding Plaintiff did not offer any evidence that Defendant mismanaged the estate. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 10, ECF No. 45-12.)

As noted above, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant personally, and as the personal representative of the estate of Phyllis Livingston, asserting state law claims of promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant answered and asserted counterclaims for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Standards

In his motion, Defendant challenges both the sufficiency of the Plaintiff's pleading and his proof. A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court "may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic." Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).

At the proof stage, summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248.

The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

B. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Promissory Estoppel

Defendant argues Plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim fails due to Plaintiff's failure and inability to offer any evidence demonstrating that Phyllis Livingston intended to purchase Plaintiff's Michigan rental property for Plaintiff's benefit. Under South Carolina law, promissory estoppel requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) an unambiguous promise by the promisor; (2) reasonable reliance on the promise by the promisee; (3) reliance by the promisee was expected by and foreseeable to the promisor; and (4) injury caused to the promisee by his reasonable reliance. N. Am. Rescue Prods., Inc. v. Richardson, 769 S.E.2d 237, 241 (S.C. 2015) (citing Davis v. Greenwood Sch. Dist. 50, 620 S.E.2d 65, 68 (S.C. 2005)). Promissory estoppel should only be applied where "refusal to apply it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of a fraud or would result in other injustice." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Satcher v. Satcher, 570 S.E.2d 535, 538 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002)).

"Unlike a contract which requires a meeting of the minds and consideration, promissory estoppel looks at a promise, its subsequent effect on the promisee, and in certain cases bars the promisor from making an inconsistent disposition of the property." Satcher, 570 S.E.2d at 539 (involving the issue of whether the plaintiff relied on his grandfather's promise to give real property to the plaintiff after the grandfather's death). "[T]he doctrine's elements represent a balancing between affording a remedy where contract law cannot, and ensuring the doctrine's application is not, itself, an inequity against the party estopped." Barnes v. Johnson, 742 S.E.2d 6, 11 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Satcher, 570 S.E.2d 535). Thus, the party asserting promissory estoppel must show a promise was made that was unambiguous, with clearly articulated and definite terms, and the asserted injury resulted from an inconsistent disposition by the promisor. Id. ("Thus, promissory estoppel has broad applicability to prevent injustice, but where a promise is unclear or the alleged harms are unconnected to the inconsistent disposition, the doctrine does not risk imposing its own inequity against the party sought to be estopped.").

In the case at hand, Plaintiff fails to forecast any admissible evidence that would support his allegation that Phyllis Livingston promised to purchase his Michigan rental property for his benefit.6 Absent evidence from the decedent, Plaintiff cites to actions Phyllis Livingston took before she died that are consistent with her intent to purchase the property—applying for a loan and signing a purchase agreement. However, such evidence would tend to show only that Phyllis Livingston intended to buy the property, not that she would buy it for Plaintiff's benefit. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence beside his own, inadmissible self-serving word that would show Phyllis Livingston made an unambiguous promise to Plaintiff. See Richardson, 769 S.E.2d at 241. Further, even assuming Phyllis Livingston intended to buy the property for Plaintiff's benefit, Plaintiff has failed to identify any evidence of the specific terms of that promise. See Barnes, 742 S.E.2d at11. Plaintiff has alleged only that Phyllis Livingston would purchase the property "on his behalf," but he fails to even plead facts alleging, much less provide evidence of, the manner in which Phyllis promised to benefit Plaintiff via the purchase. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to point to evidence that would show that "a promise was made that was unambiguous, with clearly articulated and definite terms." See Barnes, 742 S.E.2d at 11. Accordingly, Plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim fails.

2. Plaintiff's Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim

Challenging the sufficiency of Plaintiff's pleading, Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to allege any particular instances of wrongful conduct that amounts to a breach of his fiduciary duty. He also argues, attacking the sufficiency of Plaintiff's proof, that, even assuming Plaintiff properly pled that a duty was breached, Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence to prove such an allegation.

"To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) a breach of that duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, and (3) damages proximately resulting from the wrongful conduct of the defendant." RFT Mgmt. Co., L.L.C. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P., 732 S.E.2d 166, 173 (S.C. 2012). South Carolina law provides that a personal representative owes a fiduciary duty to all beneficiaries of the estate, and is liable to interested persons for damage or loss resulting from a breach of that duty. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 62-3-703; 62-3-712; see also Turpin v. Lowther, 745 S.E.2d 397, 401 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013). The Code provides:

S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-703(a).

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant neglected his duties as personal representative to settle the decedent's estate expeditiously for the purpose of denying Plaintiff his rights as a beneficiary. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 9.) Plaintiff claims he was damaged financially by Defendant's neglect because a portion of the estate belonging to Plaintiff could have been used to finalize the purchase of Plaintiff's rental property. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendant ignored his settlement offers and used the settlement process in bad faith to delay litigation, ensured Plaintiff would not have legal counsel, and filed fraudulent documents with the probate court. (Id.)

The court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that would plausibly show Defendant breached his fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's bald assertions that Defendant "neglected his duties" or "used the settlement process in bad faith" are wholly unsupported by specific facts that would plausibly suggest the assertions are true. Thus, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations as to his breach of fiduciary duty claim fail to even meet the minimum pleading standards. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress

Defendant argues Plaintiff is unable to prove the elements of his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to plead that Defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, failed to demonstrate that Defendant failed to perform certain duties, and failed to produce evidence that Plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a result of Defendant's conduct. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 11, ECF No. 45-1 at 11.)

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under South Carolina law, a plaintiff must show:

Bergstrom v. Palmetto Health All., 596 S.E.2d 42, 48 (S.C. 2004) (citing Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant caused the bank to abandon the purchase agreement with Plaintiff by neglecting his duties as the personal representative of the estate and reporting Plaintiff's acquisition of Phyllis Livingston's stock shares to Michigan law enforcement. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 10.) Plaintiff alleges this caused him anxiety, sleeplessness, and high blood pressure resulting from the collateral consequences of his inability to redeem his rental property—homelessness, loss of income, lack of transportation, and damage to his professional development and career. (Id.)

The court finds Plaintiff has failed to forecast any evidence that would support his claim that Defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress, that Defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, or that Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress caused by Defendant. As discussed below, Plaintiff has not identified any evidence that Defendant has neglected or mismanaged the estate, nor has Plaintiff presented any evidence that Defendant managed the estate with the intention of harming Plaintiff. As to Defendant's alleged reporting of Plaintiff to Michigan law enforcement, the court finds such conduct does not meet the requisite standard for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress under South Carolina law, especially considering the fact that Plaintiff admitted the stock shares he liquidated and had transferred to his bank account were property of the estate, of which Defendant had a duty protect as the personal representative. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 7, ECF No. 45-9 at 1.) Finally, while Plaintiff alleges he suffered anxiety, sleeplessness, and high blood pressure as a result of Defendant's conduct, he has failed to point to any evidence that could establish that Defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of his purported injuries. Accordingly, the court finds Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails.7

4. Counterclaim for Conversion

Defendant argues Plaintiff is liable to Phyllis Livingston's estate for conversion because Plaintiff has not yet paid back to the estate all of the proceeds from the liquidated stock shares that Plaintiff had transferred to his bank account. Specifically, Defendant alleges that while Plaintiff received $73,991.82 in proceeds from Phyllis's liquidated stocks, the estate received only $59,280.36 from Huntington National Bank pursuant to the probate court's order to deposit the proceeds of the stocks into the trust account of the attorney representing the estate. Accordingly, Defendant argues, Plaintiff must have used $14,711.46 of the proceeds before Huntington National Bank put a "hold" on his account pursuant to Defendant's claim that the proceeds were assets of the estate.

Under South Carolina law, conversion is "the unauthorized assumption in the exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another to the exclusion of the owner's rights." SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v. Cox, 392 S.E.2d 789, 792 (S.C. 1990) (citing Owens v. Andrews Bank & Trust Co., 220 S.E.2d 116 (1975)). "In order to prevail in a conversion action, the [counterclaimant] must prove either title or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion." Oxford Fin. Cos., Inc. v. Burgess, 402 S.E.2d 480, 482 (S.C. 1991) (citing Causey v. Blanton, 314 S.E.2d 346 (1984)). Conversion may arise by illegal detention of another's chattel, which may include money if it is capable of being identified as a determinate sum. Id.; see also Mullis v. Trident Emergency Physicians, 570 S.E.2d 549, 551 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) ("There can be no conversion of money unless there is an obligation on the defendant to deliver a specific, identifiable fund to the plaintiff.") (citing Richardson's Rests., Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of S.C., 403 S.E.2d 669, 672 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991)).

The undisputed record in this case shows Plaintiff represented to Computershare, the company that held Phyllis Livingston's stock shares, that he was the rightful owner of the stock shares following his mother's death. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 4a, ECF No. 45-5 at 2.) Plaintiff accomplished this by executing an irrevocable stock power that was endorsed with a Medallion Signature guarantee stamp endorsement from Huntington National Bank, where Plaintiff had a personal account. (Id.; Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 16, ECF No. 45-20.) The record also conclusively shows Plaintiff had no authority to transfer the stock shares because he was not the representative of Phyllis Livingston's estate. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2, ECF No. 45-3.) Based on Plaintiff's transfer request that misrepresented his right to the stock shares based on the Medallion Signature Guarantee Stamp, Computershare liquidated the stocks and transferred $73,991.82 to Plaintiff's personal Huntington Bank Account.8 (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 16, ECF No. 45-20.).

At a probate court hearing on June 22, 2015, Plaintiff admitted that all of the proceeds of the liquidated stocks were assets of Phyllis Livingston's estate. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 7, ECF No. 45-9.) Thus, the probate court ordered that all of the proceeds from the stock transfer that were being held in Plaintiff's account at Huntington National Bank at that time, which totaled $59,280.36, be transferred to the trust account of the attorney representing the estate. (Id.) The difference between the amount of money Plaintiff wrongfully transferred from Computershare and the amount he forfeited to the estate is $14,711.46. Therefore, Defendant argues Plaintiff converted $14,711.46 of liquidated stock proceeds in his Huntington National Bank for his personal use.

Plaintiff does not dispute that he liquidated the stock shares and used some of those proceeds for his own personal use. (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 74 at 12.) He argues that at the time, his sister was closing another account of the decedent and it was agreed within the family that Plaintiff would receive $17,500 from that account. (Id.) He claims he used some of the money from the liquidated stock shares because "it was necessary to do so while awaiting payment from the other account." (Id.)

Initially, the court notes Plaintiff fails to present any evidence that would support his assertion that an agreement existed that Plaintiff would receive $17,500 from one of his mother's accounts that was being closed out by his sister. Nor does he identify the account. But even if that were true, it would not entitle Plaintiff to take money that was an asset of the estate and convert it to his own personal use. Plaintiff's right to any money from the estate will be determined by the probate court. See generally S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-101. He has no authority to take control of estate assets in the first place and extra-judicially determine the share of the assets to which he is entitled. Defendant has presented proof in the record that Plaintiff detained funds that belong to the estate and that Plaintiff has yet to return $14,711.46 of those funds. Plaintiff has offered no evidence or argument to the contrary. Accordingly, the court finds summary judgment should be granted in Defendant's favor as to his counterclaim for conversion.9

5. Defendant's Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim

Defendant argues he is entitled to summary judgment on his claim that Plaintiff breached his fiduciary duty to the estate when he converted the stock share proceeds to his own personal use. The court disagrees.

As explained previously, to establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a party must prove the existence of a fiduciary duty, a breach of that duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, and damages proximately resulting from the wrongful conduct of the defendant. RFT Mgmt. Co., L.L.C. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P., 732 S.E.2d 166, 173 (S.C. 2012). Defendant argues that because Plaintiff represented to Computershare that he represented the decedent's estate, Plaintiff then owed a fiduciary duty to the estate's heirs. However, Defendant cites no authority to support this proposition, and the court is aware of none. While a personal representative of an estate has certain duties under South Carolina law, the court is not aware of any such duties imposed on those not legally appointed to represent the estate. See generally S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-712. Consequently, Defendant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff owed a fiduciary duty to the heirs of Phyllis Livingston's estate. Therefore, the court finds Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to his claim for breach of fiduciary duty should be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the court recommends Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted in his favor as to Plaintiff's claims; granted as to Defendant's counterclaim for conversion, and denied as to Defendant's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must `only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).