ORDER

RICHARD MARK GERGEL, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("R & R") (Dkt. No. 15), recommending that the Court grant Plaintiff's motion to remand (Dkt. No.4). For the reasons stated below, the Court ADOPTS the R & R and GRANTS the motion to remand.

I. Background

Plaintiff Bank of America originally filed this foreclosure action in state court on August 5, 2009. (Dkt. No.4 at 2). Defendant Florine Beeson, a resident of South Carolina, filed a pro se notice of removal (Dkt. No.1) on July 24, 2015. Beeson's notice of removal asserts jurisdiction under several theories, including diversity jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction, and protection of constitutional rights. (See Dkt. No.1). Bank of America filed a motion to remand the action to state court, stating that there is no diversity jurisdiction and that it is only asserting claims under South Carolina law. (Dkt. No.4). Beeson filed timely objections. (Dkt. No. 18).

II. Legal Standard

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made. The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I).

III. Discussion

In her objections to the R & R, Defendant argues that (I) there is a federal question of law, (2) the parties are diverse, and that (3) there is a "federal question of constitutional rights." (Dkt. No. 18). None of these objections has merit.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; their authority is limited to the subject matter authorized by the Constitution or Congress. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992). In addition, a state-court defendant may remove a case to federal district court only if the original action could have been filed in a federal district court. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,392 (1987). Finally, the federalism concerns that removal raises requires district courts to strictly construe removal statutes, resolving any doubts about federal jurisdiction against removal. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).

Here, Plaintiff's complaint and the associated filings1 do not contain any federal claims that would establish federal question jurisdiction. Furthermore, because Defendant is a citizen of South Carolina, the action is not removable on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b)(2) ("A civil action . . . may not be removed if any of the parties in interest . . . is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought."). Finally, Defendant filed the notice of removal well after the thirty-day deadline imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the R & R (Dkt. No. 15) as an Order of this Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to remand (Dkt. No.4) is GRANTED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.