OPINION AND ORDER

REED C. O'CONNOR, District Judge.

Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by petitioner, Jimmy Ray Murrell Jr., a state prisoner confined in the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), against Lorie Davis, director of TDCJ, Respondent. After considering the pleadings and relief sought by Petitioner, the Court has concluded that the petition should be dismissed as time-barred.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 15, 2013, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty in the 291st District Court of Wise County, Texas, Case No. CR16812, to aggravated robbery and the trial court assessed his punishment at 50 years' imprisonment. Adm. R., State Habeas R., vol. 3, 1147, ECF No. 10-17. Petitioner did not directly appeal his conviction or sentence. Pet. 3, ECF No. 1. On January 20, 2015, Petitioner filed a state habeas-corpus application, raising the same or similar claims presented herein, which was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on April 1, 2015, without written order.2 Adm. R., State Habeas R., vol. 3, 1165, ECF No. 10-17 & "Action Taken," ECF No. 10-1. Petitioner filed this federal habeas petition on January 12, 2016,3 wherein he raises the following grounds for relief:

Pet. 6-7, ECF No. 3

Respondent contends the petition is time-barred under the federal statute of limitations. Resp't's Preliminary Answer 4-7, ECF No. 8.

II. DISCUSSION

Title 28, United States Code, § 2244(d) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Section 2244(d) provides:

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2).

In an apparent attempt to trigger subsection (B), Petitioner argues that the AEDPA applies to both federal and state habeas-corpus petitions; that the prerequisite that he waive his right to appeal in a plea-bargain case is a state-created impediment affecting "both appellate levels — federal and state habeas equally"; and that the fact that the state courts considered his state habeas application, "which was tantamount to an out-of-time appeal," on the merits is indicative that the limitations-bar was "lifted" by the state courts, thereby encouraging "pursuit of federal oversight." Pet'r's Resp. 2-4, ECF No. 13. The AEDPA does not apply to the filing requirements of a Texas state habeas application, and nothing in the record suggests some state-created impediment prevented Petitioner from filing a timely federal petition.

Also, in an apparent attempt to trigger subsection (D) or equitable tolling, discussed infra, Petitioner argues that (all spelling and/or grammatical errors are in the original)—

Id. at 6. Under subsection (D), the statute of limitations commences when a petitioner knows, or through the exercise of due diligence could discover, the factual predicate of his claims, not when a petitioner learns the legal significance of those facts. Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000).

Instead, because Petitioner's claims involve matters related to the 2013 Wise County plea proceedings and resulting judgment of conviction, subsection (A) applies to this case. Under that provision, the limitations period began to run on the date on which the judgment of conviction became final by the expiration of the time for seeking direct review. For purposes of this provision, the judgment of conviction became final and the one-year limitations period began to run upon expiration of the time Petitioner had for filing a timely notice of appeal on February 14, 2013, and closed one year later on February 14, 2014, absent any applicable tolling. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2; Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 200-02 (5th Cir. 1998).

Petitioner's state habeas application filed on January 20, 2015, nearly a year after limitations had already expired did not operate to toll the limitations period under the statutory provision. Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000). Therefore, Petitioner's petition is untimely unless he can demonstrate that he is entitled to tolling as a matter of equity.

For equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way" and prevented him from filing a timely petition or he can make a convincing showing that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005)). Ignorance of the law, pro se status, incarceration, prison lockdowns, and limited access to legal materials are common problems for inmates seeking postconviction habeas relief and do not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000); Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1999); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089-90 (11th Cir. 2000). Petitioner does not demonstrate that exceptional circumstances prevented him from filing a timely petition or make any reference to actual innocence in his petition.

Accordingly, Petitioner's federal petition was due on or before February 14, 2014. His petition filed on January 12, 2016, is therefore untimely.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is DISMISSED as time-barred. Further, for the reasons discussed, a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.