R. BRYAN HARWELL, District Judge.
Petitioner Carmen Latrice Rice, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See ECF No. 1. The matter is before the Court for consideration of Petitioner's objections to the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of United States Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker.
The State of South Carolina indicted and tried Petitioner for murder and armed robbery, and the jury convicted her of both charges. See ECF No. 15-24 at pp. 150-51, 160-63. The trial court sentenced her to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for murder and thirty years for armed robbery. See ECF No. 15-24 at pp. 158, 164-65. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions in a published opinion summarizing the facts leading to Petitioner's conviction:
State v. Rice, 375 S.C. 302, 312-13, 652 S.E.2d 409, 413-14 (Ct. App. 2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 710 S.E.2d 55 (2011).
Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), which the state PCR court denied and dismissed with prejudice after an evidentiary hearing. See ECF No. 15-25 at pp. 1-8, 81-93. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the South Carolina Supreme Court; the case was transferred to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which granted the petition and ordered further briefing. See ECF Nos. 15-10, 15-12. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the PCR court's decision in an unpublished opinion. See ECF No. 15-15; Rice v. State, No. 2015-UP-191, 2015 WL 1546200 (S.C. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015). The Court of Appeals denied rehearing, and the South Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari. See ECF Nos. 15-16 & 15-20.
Petitioner then filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See ECF No. 1. Respondent answered by filing a return and a motion for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 15 & 16. The Magistrate Judge issued an R & R recommending that the Court grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment and dismiss Petitioner's § 2254 petition with prejudice. R & R at p. 33. Petitioner has filed timely objections to the R & R, and Respondent has filed a reply to Petitioner's objections. See ECF Nos. 24 & 25.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the R & R to which specific objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error in the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see generally Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . ., to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules."); Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2011) ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 `applies to habeas proceedings.'" (quoting Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407, 412 (4th Cir. 1991))). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). "The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, with all reasonable inferences drawn in that party's favor. The court therefore cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations." Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., 789 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Because Petitioner filed her petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 governs review of her claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This is a "difficult to meet and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Section 2254(d)(1) describes the standard of review to be applied to claims challenging how the state courts applied federal law, while § 2254(d)(2) describes the standard to be applied to claims challenging how the state courts determined the facts." Winston v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 535, 553 (4th Cir. 2010).
Petitioner alleges four grounds for relief in her § 2254 petition: Ground One presents an ineffective assistance claim, and Grounds Two through Four allege trial court errors. See ECF No. 1 at pp. 6-11. The Magistrate Judge recommends granting summary judgment on all grounds, concluding that Ground Two is procedurally defaulted and that Grounds One, Three, and Four fail on the merits. R & R at pp. 10-32. Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Pet.'s Objs. [ECF No. 22].
Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness at trial. See ECF No. 1 at p. 6. The Court must review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient, meaning it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88. Second, the petitioner must show prejudice, meaning "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. In the context of a § 2254 petition, "[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).
As indicated above, Iris Bryant testified at trial about Petitioner's involvement in the armed robbery and murder of Bernard Brennan, asserting Petitioner shot Brennan and took his wallet.
The PCR court denied relief on this issue, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals focused solely on the prejudice prong in conducting its Strickland analysis, ruling as follows: "Even assuming trial counsel was deficient for failing to call Frierson, Rice failed to show prejudice. Through Quattlebaum's testimony, the jury was informed that Bryant admitted Rice did not have anything to do with the crime. Accordingly, Frierson's testimony would have been merely cumulative, and trial counsel was not ineffective." Rice, 2015 WL 1546200, at *2 (internal citation omitted).
The Court finds Petitioner has failed to establish that the state appellate court "unreasonably applied the Strickland standard or unreasonably concluded that [Petitioner] failed to establish Strickland prejudice." Hope v. Cartledge, 857 F.3d 518, 526 (4th Cir. 2017) (analyzing a § 2254 case where Strickland prejudice was the sole issue). The Court of Appeals' analytical approach is wholly consistent with that articulated in Strickland, wherein the Supreme Court explained "a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies." 466 U.S. at 697.
Moreover, "it is clear that failing to introduce cumulative evidence at trial does not give rise to Strickland prejudice." United States v. Wines, 691 F.3d 599, 605 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (2009)). Frierson's testimony would have been merely cumulative to Quattlebaum's testimony, as thoroughly explained in the R & R, and therefore Petitioner has not shown she was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to call Frierson. See R & R at pp. 15-17. See, e.g., Jones v. Catoe, 9 F. App'x 245, 253 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Even assuming that counsel were ineffective for failing to uncover and present this evidence, there is no likelihood that Jones was prejudiced by the failure to present cumulative testimony."); Miller v. Johnson, 2007 WL 1725617, at *24 (W.D. Va. June 12, 2007) (finding no Strickland prejudice because the alleged witness's "testimony would have been merely cumulative"), appeal dismissed, 266 F. App'x 294 (4th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the Court overrules Petitioner's objections concerning Ground One.
Petitioner claims she is entitled to federal habeas relief because there was no physical evidence linking her to the crime. See ECF No. 1 at p. 8. The Magistrate Judge has concluded this claim is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner did not raise it on direct appeal, and that the default cannot be excused. R & R at pp. 17-20. Petitioner objects to this conclusion. See Pet.'s Objs. at p. 2.
Having conducted a de novo review of the record and Ground Two, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion. The Court hereby incorporates by reference the applicable law set forth in the R & R regarding exhaustion, procedural default, and cause and prejudice, see R & R at pp. 17-20, and it concludes Ground Two is procedurally defaulted because it was not presented on direct appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals.
Petitioner challenges the South Carolina Court of Appeals' decision affirming the trial court's exclusion of evidence of third-party guilt. See ECF No. 1 at p. 9. The Magistrate Judge conducted a comprehensive review of Petitioner's claim, the applicable law, and the state appellate court's disposition of the claim. See R & R at pp. 20-29. Petitioner objects, arguing the exclusion of the thirdparty guilt evidence deprived her of "a fair opportunity to receive a fair trial." Pet.'s Objs. at pp. 3, 5.
At trial, Petitioner attempted to introduce evidence that another woman—purported to be "Nikki" or "Tiki"—killed Bernard Brennan. Specifically, Petitioner sought to introduce evidence that (1) a composite sketch
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the state appellate court's holding was not "an unreasonable application of" Holmes and was not "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In Holmes, the United States Supreme Court held a trial court may not exclude a defendant's evidence of third-party guilt based on an assumption that "the prosecution's evidence, if credited, would provide strong support for a guilty verdict" because such an assumption presumes the strength of the prosecution's case and deprives a defendant of a fair trial. 547 U.S. at 330-31; see Hester v. Ballard, 679 F. App'x 273, 283 (4th Cir. 2017) ("In other words, the Holmes Court prohibited trial courts from excluding evidence of third-party guilt based solely on the strength of the prosecution's evidence."). However, the Holmes Court left intact the "widely accepted" evidentiary rules governing third-party guilt, including the rule in State v. Gregory, 198 S.C. 98, 16 S.E.2d 532 (1941)—which the Holmes Court favorably cited and upheld. See 547 U.S. at 330-31 & n.*. In Gregory, the South Carolina Supreme Court held third-party guilt evidence is admissible if it "raise[s] a reasonable inference or presumption as to [the defendant's] own innocence," but is inadmissible if it merely "cast[s] a bare suspicion upon another" or "raise[s] a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another." 198 S.C. at 104, 16 S.E.2d at 534.
Here, the trial court applied the Gregory rule and excluded the third-party guilt evidence regarding Nikki and Tiki because Petitioner could not link either woman to the crime by way of a "specific chain of facts and circumstances." See ECF No. 15-23 at pp. 435-53. The trial court did not exclude the evidence based solely on strength of the State's evidence, and therefore it did not violate Holmes. The Court of Appeals likewise applied Gregory and ruled Petitioner's "proffered evidence casts a mere `bare suspicion' on Nikki or Tiki and fails to connect either to the murder by way of the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime." Rice, 375 S.C. at 322, 652 S.E.2d at 419. Because Holmes favorably cited the Gregory rule (as well as its analogues in other jurisdictions) and did not call it into question, the Court of Appeals' reliance on Gregory to affirm the trial court's exclusion of the third-party guilt evidence was not an unreasonable application of Holmes or determination of the facts. See, e.g., Hester, 679 F. App'x at 283 (holding the West Virginia state court did not unreasonably apply Holmes in excluding third-party guilt evidence because Holmes favorably cited the West Virginia analogue to the Gregory rule);
Additionally, the Court finds the exclusion of the evidence, even if error, was harmless.
Petitioner challenges the South Carolina Court of Appeals' decision affirming the trial court's admission of an in-court identification. See ECF No. 1 at p. 11. The Magistrate Judge has concluded the Court of Appeals' rejection of this claim was neither an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. R & R at pp. 29-32. Petitioner objects to this conclusion. See Pet.'s Objs. at pp. 3-5.
At trial, over Petitioner's objection, Heidi Feagin identified Petitioner as one of the two women who were with Bernard Brennan in Calloway's (the restaurant where Brennan ate before his death). ECF No. 15-22 at pp. 302, 371-72. Significantly, Feagin had never identified Petitioner before trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's admission of Feagin's in-court identification for two reasons: (1) a Neil v. Biggers
As the Magistrate Judge notes, the Fourth Circuit addressed and rejected a very similar claim in Gunnells v. Cartledge, 669 F. App'x 165 (4th Cir. 2016). See R & R at p. 32. In Gunnells, the § 2254 petitioner—from South Carolina—argued "the district court should have explicitly weighed the factors in Neil v. Biggers." 669 F. App'x at 165. The Fourth Circuit disagreed:
669 F. App'x at 165-66 (alteration in original). In Petitioner's case, the South Carolina Court of Appeals cited the holding in State v. Lewis and concluded Biggers did not apply to Feagin's in-court identification. Rice, 375 S.C. at 327-28, 652 S.E.2d at 421-22. This conclusion is not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. The Court overrules Petitioner's objections concerning Ground Four.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules all of Petitioner's objections and accepts the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment.
"The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. A certificate of appealability will not issue absent "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the court's assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. In this case, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to make the requisite showing of "the denial of a constitutional right."
The Court has reviewed the entire record including the § 2254 petition, the motion for summary judgment, the return and attachments, the R & R, Petitioner's objections, and Respondent's reply. The Court has conducted a de novo review of those portions of the R & R to which Petitioner objects. For the reasons stated in this Order and in the R & R, the Court overrules Petitioner's objections and adopts and incorporates the R & R [ECF No. 22] by reference.
Accordingly, the Court
