MEMORANDUM OPINION

T.S. Ellis, III, United States District Judge.

This declaratory judgment case arises from a dispute between the parties regarding whether a maritime insurance policy issued by plaintiffs ("the Policy") covers defendant's alleged damages and liabilities stemming from an incident in October 2013, in which the Indian government seized the SEAMAN GUARD OHIO ("the OHIO"), a vessel operated by defendant, detained the guards and crew aboard the OHIO ("Guards" and "Crew"), and charged the Guards and Crew with illegally importing weapons into the country ("the Incident"). Before the Court in this matter are (i) plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and (ii) defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.1 ECF Nos. 94, 100.

A summary judgment decision in one party's favor will necessarily decide the issue against the other party because the counterclaims in AdvanFort's Third Amended Counterclaims ("TAC") are essentially the reverse of the claims in plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). The dispositive issue for both plaintiffs' FAC and AdvanFort's TAC is whether or not the Policy provides coverage for any claims arising out of the Incident. The summary judgment motions have been fully briefed and argued and are thus ripe for disposition.

I.

The procedural history of this case pertinent to the resolution of the pending summary judgment motions may be succinctly stated. On December 4, 2018, plaintiffs filed their FAC, seeking a declaratory judgment against defendant AdvanFort that plaintiffs had no obligation to provide insurance coverage to AdvanFort with respect to any damage, loss, and/or expense incurred as a result of the Incident. Specifically, the FAC sought declaratory relief that:

On April 18, 2019, AdvanFort filed their Third Amended Counterclaims ("TAC"), seeking (i) declaratory relief that the Incident was covered under the Policy, (ii) damages for plaintiffs' breach of their obligations under the Policy, and (iii) additional damages based on plaintiffs' bad faith breach of the Policy.3 Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss defendants' TAC on May 2, 2019, which remains pending.

Plaintiffs efforts to conduct discovery met with resistance from defendant from the outset, as defendant repeatedly provided inadequate answers to plaintiffs' interrogatories.4 Accordingly, on July 25, 2019, the Magistrate Judge granted, in part, plaintiffs' motion for discovery sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii), Fed. R. Civ. P. ECF No. 89. Specifically, the July 25th Order concluded that the appropriate remedy, to which plaintiffs were entitled for defendant's discovery defalcations, was as follows:

In granting plaintiffs' motion for discovery sanctions, the Magistrate Judge concluded that (i) defendant had acted in bad faith by failing to comply with the Magistrate Judge's earlier discovery orders, (ii) defendant's non-compliance with the Magistrate Judge's earlier discovery orders severely prejudiced plaintiffs, and (iii) the need for deterrence in this case weighed in favor of a significant sanction. ECF No. 89, 14-16.

On August 20, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 94, 95. On September 3, 2019, defendant filed a motion in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and a cross-motion for summary judgment ("Defendant's SJ Motion"). ECF No. 100, 101.

In response to Defendant's SJ Motion, plaintiffs filed a motion for supplemental sanctions, alleging defendant violated the July 25th Order in Defendant's SJ Motion. ECF No. 105. On October 2, 2019, the Magistrate Judge granted, in part, plaintiffs' motion for supplemental sanctions (the "October 2nd Order"). ECF No. 113. On October 7, 2019, defendant filed an objection to the sanctions imposed by the Magistrate Judge's October 2nd Order. ECF No. 115. On October 9, 2019, the Magistrate Judge awarded plaintiffs $28,468.90 in attorney fees and costs in relation to the July 25th Order and the October 2nd Order. Most recently, by order dated October 16, 2019, defendant's objection to the Magistrate Judge's October 2nd Order was overruled. Specifically, the October 16th Order concluded that the Magistrate Judge's October 2nd Order was not clearly erroneous, but instead clearly correct.

Accordingly, at this time, the following matters are at issue and ripe for disposition: (i) plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and (ii) defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and summary judgment must be entered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant.

II.

The first step in resolving the summary judgment motions is to be clear as to the content of the summary judgment factual record. The July 25th and October 2nd Orders, which granted, in part, plaintiffs' motions for sanctions, have established much of the summary judgment factual record in this case. See ECF No. 89, 113. Specifically, the October 2nd Order did three things: (i) it struck the August 30, 2019 declarations from Ahmed Farajallah and Samir Farajallah (collectively, the "Farajallah Declarations") (ECF Nos. 101-2, 101-3); (ii) it struck paragraphs 1, 3-6, and 8-16 of defendant's statement of undisputed facts in Defendant's SJ Motion (ECF No. 101); and (iii) it deemed undisputed paragraphs 2, 7, 10-13, 16, and 25 of plaintiffs' brief in support of their motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 95).5

As a result, the statement of undisputed material facts listed below is based substantially on plaintiffs' statement of undisputed facts. Defendant's remaining undisputed facts and remaining disputes with plaintiffs' facts, after taking into account the effect of the October 2nd Order and the October 16th Order, have been incorporated where relevant and discarded where immaterial.

III.

The standard for summary judgment is too well-settled to require extensive discussion here. Simply put, summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and based on those undisputed facts the moving party "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To serve as a bar to summary judgment, facts must be "material," which means that the disputed fact "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Importantly, at the summary judgment stage, courts must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the non-movant." Dennis v. Columbia Collection Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002).

IV.

Plaintiffs' FAC seeks a declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which states that plaintiffs have no obligation to provide AdvanFort coverage, indemnity, or defense under the Policy for any loss or expense associated with the Incident whatsoever. Plaintiffs' brief in support of their motion for summary judgment argues plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief because:

Defendant's TAC, on the other hand, seek a declaratory judgment to the opposite effect as plaintiffs — that the Incident, and all liabilities stemming therefrom, were covered under the Policy — and seek damages for plaintiffs' breach of their obligations under the Policy. Defendant's SJ Motion argues defendant is entitled to declaratory relief because:

V.

The Policy contains three separate coverage sections that are at issue here.34 First, the General Marine Liabilities section provides coverage for sums that the Insured is legally liable to pay for "bodily injury" and "property damage" claims by third parties whose injuries arise out of defendant's provision of "Insured Services." Second, the Maritime Employers Liability section provides coverage for the Insured's liability for "bodily injury" claims by employees who are injured while engaged in "Insured Services." Third, the Professional Indemnity section provides coverage for the Insured's liability for claims arising from defendant's breach of a "professional duty" in its performance of "Insured Services." In short, all three sections of the Policy at issue limit coverage to claims arising from defendant's employees' provision of "Insured Services" and claims by employees who are injured while performing "Insured Services."35 In addition, the Policy contains twenty-seven "General Exclusions" from coverage and six "Conditions Precedent" to coverage. If an incident falls within a general exclusion or a condition precedent is not met, the Policy provides no coverage for any resulting liability.

Under Virginia law,36 "[i]t is axiomatic that when the terms in a contract are clear and unambiguous, the contract is construed according to its plain meaning." Barber v. VistaRMS, Inc., 272 Va. 319, 329, 634 S.E.2d 706 (2006). The words used in the contract "are normally given their usual, ordinary, and popular meaning." City of Chesapeake v. States Self-Insurers Risk Retention Group, Inc., 271 Va. 574, 578, 628 S.E.2d 639 (2006). Furthermore, although "[a]mbiguities in the instrument must be construed in favor of the insured," courts must interpret insurance policies consistent with "the clearly-stated intent of the parties." Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 792 F.3d 520, 532 (4th Cir. 2015).

VI.

A.

Here, the undisputed material facts establish, as a matter of law, that the nature and basis of any claims related to the Incident do not fall within the scope of the Policy. The Policy explicitly excludes coverage for any bodily injury or property damage that arises out of the use of any vessel operated by or rented to AdvanFort, unless the vessel has been declared to plaintiffs and accepted by plaintiffs. The facts establish that the OHIO was operated by AdvanFort at the time of the Incident, and that the OHIO was not declared to plaintiffs or accepted by plaintiffs. Thus, all claims related to the Incident, if any, do not fall within the scope of the Policy.

The Policy lists twenty-seven "General Exclusions." For anything that falls within these twenty-seven General Exclusions, the Policy explicitly states that the insured, AdvanFort, "shall not" be reimbursed.37 General Exclusion 5 excludes: "Bodily Injury or Property Damage or both arising out of the ... use ... of any ... Vessel ... operated by or rented... to any Insured. This Exclusion does not apply to any Claim arising out of the operation of ... any Vessels that are declared to and accepted by Insurers."38 In other words, claims arising out of any incident involving a vessel operated by or rented to AdvanFort are excluded from coverage under the Policy, unless said vessel has been declared to plaintiffs, and accepted by plaintiffs.

The Incident, and all of AdvanFort's alleged liabilities and losses flowing from the Incident, arose out of AdvanFort's use of the OHIO, which AdvanFort leased and operated at the time of the Incident.39 Since the OHIO was leased and operated by AdvanFort at the time, there is no coverage under the Policy for any claims associated with the Incident. See James River Ins. Co. v. Doswell Truck Stop, LLC, 297 Va. 304, 827 S.E.2d 374, 377 (2019) (recognizing that a similar exclusion was "broad in its scope" and required only "a reasonable causal connection between the ownership, maintenance or use ... and the injury").

AdvanFort claims that the OHIO was declared to plaintiffs and accepted by plaintiffs, which would nullify the force of this General Exclusion. AdvanFort, however, has not provided any clear or persuasive evidence to support this conclusory claim. The arguments made by AdvanFort, and the documents submitted to support those arguments, are discussed infra.

As an initial matter, it is vital to define the terms "declare" and "accept." Neither term is defined in the Policy, but words used in a contract "are normally given their usual, ordinary, and popular meaning." City of Chesapeake, 271 Va. at 578, 628 S.E.2d 539. According to Webster's Dictionary, "declare" means "to make known formally, officially, or explicitly."40 Thus, for the OHIO to be "declared to" plaintiffs, AdvanFort had to tell the plaintiffs explicitly that AdvanFort wanted the Policy to cover AdvanFort's operation of the OHIO. In addition, Webster's Dictionary defines "accept" as "to receive (something offered) willingly," "to give admittance or approval to," or "to make a favorable response to."41 Thus, for the OHIO to be "accepted by" plaintiffs, plaintiffs must have admitted, approved, or made some favorable response to AdvanFort's declaration of the OHIO, a declaration which the evidence shows was never made.

AdvanFort argues that it declared the OHIO through several documents submitted with AdvanFort's application for the Policy, which mention the OHIO and other vessels operated by AdvanFort in descriptions of AdvanFort's business.42 But passing reference to the existence of the OHIO in hundreds of pages of documents describing AdvanFort's general operations does not qualify as declaring the OHIO to plaintiffs for coverage under the Policy. In all of the documents in the summary judgment record, there is no evidence that suggests that AdvanFort specifically requested coverage for the OHIO, or any other vessel AdvanFort operated. In fact, the Policy itself does not mention the OHIO, or any other AdvanFort-operated vessel, anywhere in its 60 pages.43 There is no admissible, reliable evidence to support the argument that AdvanFort declared the OHIO to plaintiffs for coverage under the Policy.

Furthermore, even if AdvanFort had declared the OHIO, which did not occur, defendant would have to show that plaintiffs accepted the OHIO for coverage under the Policy. This never occurred. Yet, AdvanFort argues that the mere fact that the Policy was issued establishes that plaintiffs accepted the OHIO for coverage under the Policy.44 This argument is completely unpersuasive. The summary judgment record contains no evidence that plaintiffs even acknowledged any request by AdvanFort to include the OHIO in the risk insured under the Policy, let alone that plaintiffs approved or made a favorable response to any such request. Ian Brazier, a Marine Claims Manager at Travelers, has declared under penalty of perjury that normally, vessels are covered under an insurance policy "by attaching a risk schedule that lists particular vessels," which then requires "written acknowledgement" from the underwriters of the insurance policy.45 As already discussed, the Policy makes no mention at all of the OHIO, nor any other AdvanFort operated vessel, anywhere in its 60 pages. Moreover, the Policy contains no risk schedule that lists particular vessels, nor any written acknowledgement from the plaintiffs that any particular vessel operated by AdvanFort had been accepted for coverage.

In sum, General Exclusion 5 makes clear that any vessel operated by AdvanFort is not covered under the Policy unless explicitly declared to plaintiffs, and favorably accepted by plaintiffs. No admissible or plausible evidence has been presented that the OHIO was declared to plaintiffs, and no admissible or plausible evidence has been presented that the OHIO was accepted by plaintiffs. The Incident, and all of AdvanFort's alleged liabilities and losses flowing from the Incident, arose out of AdvanFort's use of the OHIO, which AdvanFort leased and operated at the time of the Incident. Thus, there is no coverage for any claims that arose out of the Incident because any such claims fall outside the scope of the Policy. Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that there is no coverage for any of the alleged claims made by the Guards, the Crew, SGI, or any other party stemming from the Incident.

B.

Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that the OHIO had been declared to plaintiffs, and accepted by plaintiffs, which did not occur, there is still no coverage under the Policy for defendant's alleged liability regarding any claims arising out of the Incident, because neither the Crew nor the Guards were performing "Insured Services," as required by the Policy, at the time of the Incident.

The Policy defines "Insured Services" as "[t]he provision of off-shore security services to Vessels or other off-shore units including the provision of guards on board."46 The meaning of this provision is unambiguous; "Insured Services," or "[t]he provision of off-shore security services to Vessels," are plainly limited to protecting client vessels. First, it is clear that "the provision of off-shore security services" means actually protecting a vessel or other off-shore unit, not merely doing something in preparation to protect a vessel or other off-shore unit.47 Second, and importantly, the definition of Insured Services is limited to providing security services "to Vessels," not "[for the benefit of] Vessels." Thus, read in its entirety, it is clear that the definition of "Insured Services"—i.e. "[t]he provision of off-shore security services to Vessels or other off-shore units including the provision of guards on board"—is limited to the actual protection of client vessels, not other preparatory activities that might indirectly benefit the client vessels. Indeed, at the time of the Incident, no identified client vessel even existed. Thus, neither the Crew nor the Guards could have been engaged in Insured Services at the time of the Incident.

Other provisions in the Policy confirm that the plain meaning of "Insured Services," namely protecting client vessels, is in accordance with the parties' intent at the time the parties agreed to the Policy. For example, the Policy provides that "it is understood that Insured Persons may be required to discharge weapons in a general direction or aimed at specific targets in the provision of Insured Services."48 This provision confirms that Insured Services is limited to and is focused on protecting client vessels, which was not taking place at the time of the Incident. Nor is that the only provision of the Policy that sheds light on the meaning of Insured Services. The Policy provides coverage for "Diversion Expenses", defined as:

The use of the term "Insured Services" in this and the previous Policy provision confirm that the parties intended "Insured Services" to mean protecting client vessels. Guards who are protecting a client vessel from pirates may have to discharge weapons, and a client vessel may have to be diverted to seek medical treatment for guards who are protecting the vessel. Thus, there is no doubt that the plain and unambiguous meaning of Insured Services is services provided to client vessels.

In contrast, nothing in the Policy suggests that risks associated with preparing to protect client vessels qualify as "Insured Services." Defendant argues that an exclusion to the Marine Employer's Liability section of the Policy proves the contrary. The "Liability Ashore" exclusion states that:

Rather than supporting defendant's argument, however, this exclusion supports the opposite conclusion, namely that Insured Services do not include transport to and from client vessels under the Policy. If Insured Services included transport to and from client vessels, the exclusion would read "Insured Services should be deemed to commence from the time the Insured Person departs for the Vessel ..." Instead, the Policy introduces a new term "active service" to denote this conduct. The Liability Ashore exclusion, therefore, provides further evidence that the plain, unambiguous meaning of "Insured Services" is actually protecting client vessels, not preparatory steps to protecting client vessels such as transporting guards to and from client vessels.51 In any event, the Guards were not even being transported to a client vessel at the time of the Incident; the OHIO was refueling.

Given that the plain, unambiguous meaning of "Insured Services" is limited to protecting client vessels, and given that the undisputed facts demonstrate that the Guards and Crew were not performing "Insured Services" aboard the OHIO at the time of the Incident, it follows that there is no coverage under the Policy. The undisputed facts show that the Guards were merely passengers aboard their own vessel, performing tasks that, at most, can be characterized as preparation to protect client vessels, an activity not covered by the Policy. The fact that such tasks might have been performed for the benefit of clients at some future time is immaterial; the Guards were simply not providing security services to any vessel at the time of the Incident. Accordingly, it is clear that the Guards and Crew were not performing "Insured Services" at the time of the Incident.

C.

Defendant seeks to avoid the conclusion that there is no coverage under the Policy because the Crew and Guards were not performing Insured Services at the time of the Incident by arguing that the Liability Ashore exclusion implies that there is coverage under the Policy for shuttling guards back and forth between client vessels. This argument fails, even assuming arguendo that this reading of the Policy is correct, because the factual record shows that the OHIO was not shuttling the Guards to a client vessel at the time of the Incident; the OHIO was refueling.

Moreover, as discussed in VI.A. supra, the OHIO was operated by AdvanFort at the time of the Incident, and AdvanFort-operated vessels were excluded from coverage under the Policy unless declared to the plaintiffs, which did not occur here. Beyond this, the Policy contains six Conditions Precedent to plaintiffs' liability under the Policy. The Policy defines "Condition Precedent" as a "requirement of this Contract with which the Insured must comply. Any failure will mean that the Insured may not be reimbursed under this Contract for any Claim."52 One of the Conditions Precedent is "Contractual Agreement," which states:

There is no evidence of any contract between AdvanFort and any client pertaining to any of the Crew or Guards aboard the OHIO at the time of the Incident. As a result, a condition precedent to coverage under the Policy was not met, and, thus, the Liability Ashore exclusion, however read, does not cover any claims against defendant arising out of the Incident.54 None of the Guards on the OHIO could be in "active service" at the time of the Incident as there were no contracts in place between AdvanFort and a client vessel and the OHIO was simply refueling, not heading to meet any client vessel.

Thus, no reading of the Liability Ashore exclusion provides coverage under the Policy for any of AdvanFort's alleged liabilities arising out of the Incident.

D.

Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that (i) the OHIO was declared to plaintiffs and accepted by plaintiffs, (ii) AdvanFort had contracts with clients for the Guards aboard the OHIO to perform security services, and (iii) the Guards were performing "Insured Services" while the OHIO was refueling, none of which is true on this factual record, there would still be no coverage under the Policy because defendant would still have to show defendant incurred legal liability as a result of a "Bodily Injury" or "Property Damage" claim that arose out of the "Insured Services" performed during the Incident. Here, defendant has produced no evidence of any such claims by the Crew, Guards, SGI, or any other party, despite being required to produce such information in discovery.

It appears from this factual record that no "Bodily Injury" claims were ever made against AdvanFort.55 AdvanFort claims that the Crew and Guards asserted claims against AdvanFort "for the harm [the Crew and Guards] suffered while in jail, and for the time they were in jail."56 Yet, AdvanFort cannot identify any specific physical injury, sickness, or disease for which any of the Crew or Guards claimed AdvanFort was legally responsible.57 Rather than Bodily Injury claims, the Crew and Guards asked AdvanFort to pay them the wages that AdvanFort had stopped paying as soon as the Crew and Guards were arrested.58 Ahmed Farajallah's and Samir Farajallah's depositions emphasized that the Crew's and Guards' claims related to unpaid wages, not bodily injury. Ahmed Farajallah stated that the $6.7 million in alleged damages was calculated based on "what [the Crew and Guards] would have made monthly multiplied by the number of months."59 Similarly, Samir Farajallah stated that the $6.7 million figure represented the Crew's and Guard's damages for "being in jail" based on what the Crew and Guards would have earned had they been "free men."60 Moreover, Guards Paul Towers, John Armstrong, Nick Dunn, Ray Tindall, and Billy Irving have all declared that they never asserted any bodily injury claims against AdvanFort.61 And Paul Towers, as "the only one of the guards who communicated directly with AdvanFort while [they] were detained in India," further declared that no one else asserted any bodily injury claims against AdvanFort either.62

Thus, any alleged claims made by the Crew or Guards were claims for the payment of back wages. Back wages do not fall within the Policy's definition of "Bodily Injury."63 Since no Bodily Injury claims were ever made against AdvanFort, there is no coverage under the Policy for AdvanFort's alleged liabilities to the Crew or Guards stemming from the Incident.

Similarly, the claims allegedly asserted against AdvanFort by SGI and AdvanFort's clients are not covered under the Policy because these alleged claims do not seek damages for "Bodily Injury" or "Property Damage." Instead, the alleged claims asserted against AdvanFort by SGI and AdvanFort's clients are contract claims. Under Virginia law, a general liability policy that provides coverage for the insured's legal liability for property damage does not cover the insured for contract damages; it covers the insured solely for tort liability. Boiler Brick & Refractory Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 Va. 50, 52, 168 S.E.2d 100 (1969).

AdvanFort seeks to avoid this result by arguing, implausibly, that these alleged claims are property damage claims.64 The Policy defines "Property Damage" as "[p]hysical damage to tangible property ... or destruction of tangible property ..., including loss of use of tangible property... so damaged or destroyed."65 AdvanFort argues that SGI's purported claims against AdvanFort are worth $20.9 million, and that AdvanFort paid $1,125,000 to SGI in late 2013, in partial settlement of SGI's claims. Of the $20.9 million figure, only $900,000 is for alleged physical damage to the OHIO.66 The remaining $20 million consists of AdvanFort's alleged contractual obligation to pay charter hire and late delivery fees to SGI under the Charter Party, as AdvanFort was obligated to pay charter hire fees regardless of whether AdvanFort had access to the OHIO67 Thus, the $20 million in alleged damages unquestionably constitutes contract damages, for which the Policy provides no coverage.

The $900,000 of alleged damages to the vessel, supposedly involving damage to the navigational equipment, the hull, and the fuel tanks of the OHIO,68 does appear, at first blush, to amount to a property damage claim. On closer inspection, however, the record provides no evidence that any such claims actually exist. All of the correspondence between SGI and AdvanFort, produced by AdvanFort in discovery, demands payment of charter hire and overdue fees, but does not refer to any claim for physical damage to the OHIO.69 Significantly, a letter from Samir Farajallah, then CEO of AdvanFort, to Ian Brazier of Travelers on May 13, 2014, which outlines AdvanFort's claims to date from the October 2013 Incident, specifically notes that AdvanFort "do[es] not know whether the vessel suffered Property Damage," but does make a claim for "Charter Hire" fees.70 Although AdvanFort did not know whether the OHIO had suffered property damage in May 2014, AdvanFort had allegedly already paid $1,125,000 to SGI in partial settlement of SGI's claims against AdvanFort months earlier.71 Thus, this alleged partial settlement payment could not have been related to property damage. And moreover, the summary judgment record provides no evidence that SGI has ever made a claim against AdvanFort for property damage to the OHIO at any point after May 2014.

In the end, even assuming, as is not true, that (i) the OHIO was declared to plaintiffs and accepted by plaintiffs, and assuming further that (ii) AdvanFort had contracts with clients for the Guards onboard the OHIO to perform security services, and assuming further that (iii) the Guards were performing "Insured Services" while the OHIO was refueling, there is still no coverage under the Policy for any of AdvanFort's alleged liabilities arising out of the Incident because there have been no "Bodily Injury" or "Property Damages" claims brought against AdvanFort, as required by the Policy.

VII.

In sum, there are multiple reasons why there is no coverage under the Policy, any one of which is fatal to AdvanFort's claim to the contrary. First, any and all claims pertaining to the Incident are barred from coverage under the Policy because the OHIO was operated by and rented to AdvanFort at the time of the Incident, and AdvanFort had not declared the OHIO to plaintiffs, nor had plaintiffs accepted the OHIO for coverage, as required by the Policy. Second, the factual record establishes that the OHIO was refueling at the time of the Incident, not providing off-shore security services or even traveling to any identified client vessel. Thus, "Insured Services" were not being provided at the time of the Incident, as required by the Policy, and therefore, the Policy does not provide coverage for any claims arising out of the Incident. Third, the Policy does not provide coverage for any claims arising out of the Incident because no legitimate claims of "Bodily Injury" or "Property Damage" have been brought against AdvanFort by the Crew, the Guards, SGI, or any other party, as required by the Policy. Accordingly, the summary judgment factual record establishes that the Policy does not provide coverage for any alleged claims against, or liabilities incurred by, AdvanFort with respect to the Incident.

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment must be granted and defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment must be denied.

An appropriate order will issue separately.