JAMES R. SPENCER, Senior District Judge.
Clifton Eugene Johnson, a Virginia inmate proceeding prose and in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only `a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to `give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id at 570, rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes prose complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
In his Complaint, Johnson alleges that Dr. Boakye denied him adequate medical care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
(Compl. 1-2.) Johnson fails to identify what reliefhe seeks.
To allege an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts that indicate (1) that objectively the deprivation suffered or harm inflicted "was `sufficiently serious,' and (2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a `sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). With respect to the denial of adequate medical care, "a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A medical need is "serious" if it "`has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.'" Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)).
In the context of delayed medical care, the objective-prong analysis does not end there. In addition to demonstrating that a medical need that was objectively serious, a plaintiff must also establish that the delay in the provision of medical care "`resulted in substantial harm.'" Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 2001)); see Webb v. Hamidullah, 281 F. App'x 159, 165 (4th Cir. 2008). "[T]he substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain." Shabazz v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:10CV190, 2012 WL 442270, at *5 (E.D. Va. 2012) (quoting Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001)).
The subjective prong requires the plaintiff to allege facts that indicate a particular defendant acted with deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). "Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing of mere negligence will not meet it." Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)).
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Farmer teaches "that general knowledge of facts creating a substantial risk of harm is not enough. The prison official must also draw the inference between those general facts and the specific risk of harm confronting the inmate." Quinones, 145 F.3d at 168 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); see Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating same). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the deliberate indifference standard requires a plaintiff to assert facts sufficient to form an inference that "the official in question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm" and "that the official in question subjectively recognized that his actions were `inappropriate in light of that risk.'" Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rich, 129 F.3d at 340 n.2).
"To establish that a health care provider's actions constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the treatment must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness." Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986)). Absent exceptional circumstances, an inmate's disagreement with medical personnel with respect to a course of treatment is insufficient to state a cognizable constitutional claim, much less to demonstrate deliberate indifference. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970)). Furthermore, in evaluating a prisoner's complaint regarding medical care, the Court is mindful that "society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care" or to the medical treatment of their choosing. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04). In this regard, the right to medical treatment is limited to that treatment which is medically necessary and not to "that which may be considered merely desirable." Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977). Moreover, "[i]t may not be seriously contended that any prisoner detained for however short a period is entitled to have all his needed elective medical care performed while in custody. . . ." Kersh v. Bounds, 501 F.2d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1974).
Johnson fails to allege facts to satisfy the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment.
In his Complaint, Johnson identifies a number of hypothetical complications that could potentially occur to a diabetic who fails to take care of himself or who fails to receive proper care. However, Johnson does not allege that he personally experienced any of these complications as a result of Dr. Boakye's alleged inattention. At most, Johnson states, "[a]s me being an insulin dependent diabetic, I have been going through so much pain and suffering over 19 years. . . ." (Compl. 2.) Johnson's bare allegation of "pain and suffering" during a period of nineteen years, is insufficient to satisfy the requisite level of seriousness for an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Boakye. See Hanrahan v. Mennon, 470 F. App'x 32, 33 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that a condition is sufficiently serious of it is "`a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain'" (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996))); Strickler, 989 F.3d at 1381.
Johnson also alleges no injury from the delay in being seen by Dr. Boakye. Johnson does not allege that he suffered any adverse effects from the approximately two-month delay. See Mata, 427 F.3d at 751. Thus, he fails to allege facts indicating that the delay in his chronic care appointment itself caused him substantial harm. See Webb, 281 F. App'x at 166. Because Johnson alleges no injury from Dr. Boakye's actions, he fails to satisfy the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Arbuckle v. Ahern, No. C-12-3076 EMC (pr), 2014 WL 2038316, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2014) (finding no deliberate indifference when inmate failed to demonstrate any harm from four missed blood sugar checks). Accordingly, Johnson fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim for relief.
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 41) will be GRANTED. Johnson's claim and the action will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Dr. Boakye's Motion for Waiver of Oral Argument (ECF No. 44) is DENIED AS MOOT.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
