Filed: Jul. 08, 2004
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7-8-2004 Caprio v. Bell Atl Sickness Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential Docket No. 03-2253 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004 Recommended Citation "Caprio v. Bell Atl Sickness" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 442. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/442 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinio
Summary: Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7-8-2004 Caprio v. Bell Atl Sickness Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential Docket No. 03-2253 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004 Recommended Citation "Caprio v. Bell Atl Sickness" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 442. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/442 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinion..
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Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-8-2004
Caprio v. Bell Atl Sickness
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 03-2253
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004
Recommended Citation
"Caprio v. Bell Atl Sickness" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 442.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/442
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
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PRECEDENTIAL Attorney for Appellant
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS Steven D. Spencer
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Kay Kyungsun Yu
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
1701 Market Street
No. 03-2253 Philadelphia, Pa. 19103
Attorneys for Appellees
FRANK J. CAPRIO, Verizon Communications
Inc. and Bell Atlantic Sickness
Appellant and Accident Disability
v. Benefit Plan
BELL ATLANTIC SICKNESS Douglas E. Ress
AND ACCIDENT PLAN; CORE, INC.; Kaufman, Coren, Ress & Weidman
VERIZON, INC. 1525 Locust Street
17th Floor
Philadelphia, Pa. 19102
On Appeal from the United States
District Court James T. Finnigan
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Rich May
(D.C. Civ. No. 00-cv-06155) 176 Federal Street
Honorable R. Barclay Surrick, Boston, MA 02110
District Judge
Attorneys for Appellee CORE, Inc.
Submitted under Third Circuit
LAR 34.1(a) June 28, 2004 OPINION OF THE COURT
BEFORE: AMBRO, BECKER, and
GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
(Filed: July 8, 2004)
I. INTRODUCTION
William T. Wilson This matter comes on before this
MacElree Harvey Ltd court on an appeal brought by Frank J.
17 West Miner Street Caprio from orders entered in the district
P.O. Box 660 court on April 1, 2003, granting a motion
West Chester, PA 19381 for summary judgment made by
defendants Bell Atlantic Sickness and includes administrative appeal
Accident Plan (“Plan”), Verizon, Inc. procedures. Inasmuch as Caprio was
(“Verizon”) and CORE, Inc. (“CORE”) awarded benefits based on sickness but
(“appellees”), denying Caprio’s motion denied more generous accident benefits,
for summary judgment, and entering he seeks in this action to recover accident
judgment in favor of the appellees. We benefits.
will vacate the orders and will remand
the case to the district court for further After certain proceedings in the
proceedings. district court that we need not describe,
appellees moved for summary judgment,
The background of the case is as but the court denied their motion without
follows. Caprio, who claimed to be prejudice in a memorandum opinion on
disabled and who had been employed by May 31, 2002. The court, largely
Bell Atlantic Company of Pennsylvania concerning its opinion with determining
and later by its successor, Verizon, its standard of review under Firestone
brought this action against appellees Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., 101, 109 S. Ct. 948 (1989), concluded
seeking benefits under a Sickness and that it would examine the denial of
Accident Disability Benefit Plan that benefits under an arbitrary and capricious
Bell Atlantic and Verizon provided.1 standard of review. The district court
Caprio made CORE a defendant because then considered our opinion in Pinto v.
it had administrative and fiduciary Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.,
responsibilities under the Plan and made
214 F.3d 377, 387 (3d Cir. 2000),
determinations regarding claimants’ quoting it for the point that “heightened
eligibility for payments, including scrutiny is required when an insurance
determinations with respect to Caprio. company is both plan administrator and
The Plan makes a distinction between funder.” The district court later in its
disabilities attributable to sickness and opinion cited Goldstein v. Johnson &
those attributable to accidents and Johnson,
251 F.3d 433, 442 (3d Cir.
2001), concluding from that case that
Pinto “does not appear to be limited to
1 plans involving insurance companies.”
Even though Caprio sued Verizon,
Inc. appellees indicate that there is no
The district court noted that
such entity and that Verizon
appellees had submitted an affidavit
Pennsylvania, Inc., a subsidiary of
stating that CORE’s compensation was
Verizon Communications Inc., was
“not tied in any way to the results of the
Caprio’s employer. Appellees indicate
disability cases that it manages for Bell
that Caprio also misnamed the defendant
Atlantic.” This representation led the
Plan. These mistakes may be rectified on
court to observe that, according to the
remand by appropriate amendments.
2
affidavit, “CORE has no conflict of disability benefits. The
interest in administering claims under the District Court’s decision
Plan.” Nevertheless, inasmuch as the that CORE did not abuse
court believed that Caprio was entitled to its discretion in denying
answers to interrogatories he had served Caprio’s appeals
before it definitively settled on its concerning the
standard of review, it denied appellees’ classification of his [short
motion without prejudice and ordered term disability] benefits
them to answer Caprio’s interrogatories was also correct.
“for the limited purpose of determining
the appropriate standard of review in this Id. at 11.
case.” Not inappropriately, the court did
not indicate what its result would be on In fact, notwithstanding the
the merits depending on the standard of foregoing statement, the court did not
review it selected. indicate, following the appellees’
renewal of their motion for summary
The appellees apparently judgment, exactly what standard of
answered the interrogatories as in their review it was using, though it had
brief they indicate, in a representation considered this point preliminarily in its
that Caprio does not contradict, that after May 31, 2002 opinion. Moreover, it
“some discovery had been completed,” never said at any time that CORE “did
appellees br. at 3, appellees renewed not abuse its discretion in denying
their motion for summary judgment and Caprio’s appeals . . . .” Indeed, as
Caprio moved for summary judgment. appellees acknowledge, the court did not
Appellees then indicate that the district render any opinion when it granted
court, “without opinion, allowed the summary judgment. Rather, it simply
motion of the defendants-appellees and entered orders granting appellees’
denied Caprio’s motion.” Id. at 4. The motion, denying Caprio’s motion, and
appellees in their brief go on to explain: granting a judgment in favor of the
appellees, following which Caprio
The District Court appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28
correctly held that CORE’s U.S.C. § 1291.
decision must be reviewed
under the arbitrary and
capricious standard
because the [Plan] confers II. DISCUSSION
upon CORE the
discretionary authority to Inasmuch as the district court did
resolve all questions not indicate why it was granting the
relating to eligibility for appellees’ motion for summary
3
judgment, it did not act in conformity that court for further proceedings. In
with our direction in Vadino v. A. Valey those proceedings the court may revisit
Engineers, 903 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. its substantive decision granting
1990), to district courts in this circuit to appellees summary judgment if it
“accompany grants of summary concludes that it would be appropriate to
judgment . . . with an explanation do so.
sufficient to permit the parties and this
court to understand the legal premise for We regret that the consequence of
the court’s order.” See also Forbes v. our disposition is to put the parties to
Township of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d additional expense which they fairly may
144, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2002). Even though attribute to the district court’s failure to
our standard of review is plenary with conform to our directions in Vadino.
respect to the order of the district court, Accordingly, in order that the procedural
see Kemmerer v. ICI Americas Inc., 70 oversight here not be replicated, we point
F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 1995), and thus out that in future cases in which district
we could determine this matter on the courts overlook the procedure we set
merits without remanding, see Vadino, forth in Vadino the parties should
not
903 F.2d at 259-60, we are satisfied that hesitate to bring that case to the court’s
the uncertainties surrounding the court’s attention.
order in this complex matter, both as to
the standard of review it exercised and We make this suggestion even
the basis for its assessment of Caprio’s though we can understand why parties
claim on the merits, require that, in the might be wary of advising a district court
first instance, the district court explain of its oversight, and we do not require
the reasons for its decision. See Gillis v. that they do so. Yet we note that our
Hoechst Celanese Corp.,
4 F.3d 1137, suggestion is consistent with
1149 (3d Cir. 1993). requirements in other situations that
parties bring procedural requirements to
The fact is that we are not certain a court’s attention if it should overlook
whether the district court granted them. Thus, Federal Rule of Civil
summary judgment for appellees through Procedure 24(c) provides that when the
the application of Firestone with or constitutionality of any act of Congress
without our refinement of that case in or statute of a State affecting the public
Pinto. Moreover, whatever standard the interest is drawn in question in an action
court followed, we do not know the in which the United States or the State or
reasoning that led it to grant the any agency, officer, or employee thereof
appellees’ motion for summary is not a party, the court shall notify the
judgment. Thus, we will vacate the Attorney General of the United States or
orders of the district court entered on the State’s attorney general, depending
April 1, 2003, and remand the case to upon the statute implicated, as provided
4
by 28 U.S.C. § 2403, so that he or she determined, however, not to retain
may intervene on the question of jurisdiction because we have authorized
constitutionality. It further provides that the court to revisit its decision on the
the party challenging the constitutionality merits and thus it is conceivable that the
of the legislation “should call the court’s outcome on remand could be
attention of the court to its consequential different from that which it reached
duty.” Similarly, under some case law previously. Moreover, it is possible that
when a party following trial moves for the disappointed party, after considering
judgment as a matter of law and, in the the court’s explanation for its
alternative, moves for a new trial, it determination, may not wish to pursue
should notify the court of the need for it the matter further.2
to make a contingent ruling on the
motion for a new trial if it grants the
judgment as a matter of law but does not
rule on the motion for a new trial. See III. CONCLUSION
Lowenstein v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of
Pennsauken, 536 F.2d 9, 12 n.8 (3d Cir. For the foregoing reasons we will
1976); Arenson v. Southern Univ. Law vacate the orders of the district court
Ctr.,
43 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1995). entered on April 1, 2003, and will
Indeed, if the party does not notify the remand the matter to that court for
court of this procedural requirement it further proceedings. The parties will
may lose the possibility of obtaining a bear their own costs on this appeal.
new trial if the judgment as a matter of
law in its favor is reversed. See
Lowenstein, 536 F.2d at 12 n.8.
In closing we point out that we
have not overlooked our authority to
retain jurisdiction as we did in Forbes
after we remanded that case to the
district court to specify the material facts
in issue which precluded the court from
granting the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 2
Of course, if the court does not grant
action on the basis of qualified immunity.
a summary judgment on the remand it is
Forbes, 313 F.3d at 151. If we retained
unlikely that the order denying summary
jurisdiction, we then could determine the
judgment will be appealable, at least
matter without a new appeal being filed
before a final judgment is entered. See
following the remand, perhaps after
In re Complaint of PMD Enters., Inc.,
additional briefing. We have
301 F.3d 147, 149 (3d Cir. 2002).
5
