Filed: May 21, 2004
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 5-21-2004 USA v. Williams Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential Docket No. 03-2434 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004 Recommended Citation "USA v. Williams" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 652. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/652 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States
Summary: Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 5-21-2004 USA v. Williams Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential Docket No. 03-2434 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004 Recommended Citation "USA v. Williams" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 652. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/652 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States ..
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Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-21-2004
USA v. Williams
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 03-2434
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004
Recommended Citation
"USA v. Williams" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 652.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/652
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
PRECEDENTIAL Esther Salas, Esquire
Louise Arkel, Esquire
UNITED STATES COURT OF Federal Public Defender
APPEALS 972 Broad Street
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Newark, NJ 07102
_______________
Counsel for Appellant
No. 03-2434 George S. Leone
______________ Ricardo Solano, Jr.
Office of the United States Attorney
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 920 Broad Street
Room 700
v. Newark, NJ 07102
MARTIN WILLIAMS, Counsel for Appellee
a/k/a Lewis Johnson,
a/k/a Peter Ejoh,
a/k/a Peter Anderson,
Appellant OPINION
_______________
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Appeal from the United States District
Court
Appellant, Martin Williams, is a
for the District of New Jersey
Nigerian national who filed pro se motions
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 96-cr-00587 )
in the District Court of New Jersey seeking
District Judge: Honorable William H.
dismissal of the detainer lodged against
Walls
him in May 2002 for violating the terms of
_______________
his supervised release. He argued, inter
alia, that the period of supervised release
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR
included as part of his 1997 sentence
34.1(a)
should have been deemed extinguished
on February 13, 2004
upon his subsequent deportation. After the
District Court denied his motion, Williams
Before: SCIRICA,Chief Judge, ROTH
pleaded guilty. On appeal, Williams raises
and MCKEE, Circuit Judges
this same issue, one of first impression in
this Circuit. After careful consideration,
(Filed: May 21, 2004 )
we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
1
and (b)(2). After pleading guilty, on
I. Factual and Procedural History October 3, 2002, Williams was sentenced
to seven months imprisonment and two
On September 27, 1996, Williams years of supervised release.
pleaded guilty to bank fraud in violation of On May 31, 2002, the District Court
18 U.S.C. § 1344 and obstruction of for the District of New Jersey issued an
correspondence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § order to show cause why Williams should
1702. Pursuant to the sentencing not be found in violation of the conditions
guidelines, the United States District Court of the supervised release imposed on him
for the District of New Jersey sentenced in connection with his 1996 bank fraud
Williams to 16 months imprisonment and conviction. After a detainer was lodged
five years of supervised release. The terms against him, Williams moved to dismiss
and conditions of Williams’ supervised the detainer arguing, among other things,
release included that (1) “the defendant that his period of supervised release had
shall not commit another federal, state, or ended upon his deportation.
local crime,” and (2) “[i]f deported, the
defendant shall not re-enter the United The United States District Court for
States without the written permission of the District of New Jersey denied
the Attorney General.” Williams’ motion to dismiss the detainer.
Subsequently, on April 29, 2003, Williams
After Williams completed his term pleaded guilty to violating the condition of
of imprisonment on July 18, 1997, he was his supervised release which prohibited
released into the custody of the him from committing another federal,
Immigration and Naturalization Service. state, or local crime. That same day, the
On July 23, 1997, he was deported to District Court revoked Williams’
Nigeria. previously imposed term of supervised
release and sentenced him to seven months
Sometime after his deportation, but imprisonment.
before his term of supervised release was
to end, Williams re-entered the United On appeal, Williams contends that
States. On September 6, 2001, he was his term of supervised release terminated
arrested under an alias in the Northern upon deportation in 1997, thereby
District of Illinois. Charged with credit depriving the District Court of jurisdiction
card fraud, Williams pleaded guilty and to revoke the term of supervised release.
was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment
and three years of supervised release. II. Jurisdiction and Standard of
Review
On April 30, 2002, Williams was
indicted for illegally re-entering the United The District Court had jurisdiction
States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) in this criminal matter pursuant to 18
2
U.S.C. § 3231, which confers original States. Id. at 670-71. Williams alleges that
jurisdiction over all offenses against the the reasoning underlying Porat is equally
laws of the United States, and, more applicable in the instant case and that
specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), which probation cannot supervise a defendant
governs the authority of a court to revoke who has been deported.
a term of supervised release. We have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 We disagree. Williams’ reliance on
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). United States v. Porat is misplaced. Porat
dealt with a defendant whose supervised
Our review of issues of jurisdiction release included home detention and
is plenar y. S ee G rand Un ion therefore required active supervision. See
Supermarkets of the Virgin Islands, Inc. v. 17 F.3d at 670-71. In contrast, a condition
H.E. Lockhart Mgmt, Inc.,
316 F.3d 408, of supervised release requiring that a
410 (3d Cir. 2003). defendant not commit any federal, state, or
local crime can be easily enforced against
III. Discussion a defendant who after deportation illegally
re-enters the United States and commits
Williams contends that his term of another federal, state, or local crime during
supervised release terminated on the date the term of his supervised release
he was deported from the United States. (including the offense of illegal reentry).
He bases this argument on our decision in Enforcement of the condition in this case
United States v. Porat, 17 F.3d 660 (3rd does not require supervision in a foreign
Cir. 1994), where we held that a defendant country.
whose period of supervised release was
conditioned on home detention in Israel Moreover, the language of § 3583
must serve that period of supervised does not provide for automatic termination
release in the United States.
Id. at 671. of supervised release upon deportation. To
The decision in Porat was based on the the contrary, the statute provides that in
fact that home detention is perhaps the such cases “the court may provide, as a
most serious and constraining condition of condition of supervised release, that [the
supervised release and therefore proper defendant] be deported and remain outside
supervision is required.
Id. at 670. We the United States, and may order that he be
reasoned that, because there was no delivered to a duly authorized immigration
ongoing contact with a probation officer official for such deportation.”
Id. § 3583
and the defendant could decide to end (d) (3). We see from the language of §
cooperation with the District Court, 3583 that Congress was aware that some
making it difficult or even impossible to defendants sentenced to supervised release
bring the defendant before it to impose would be deported yet chose not to provide
remedial measures, the defendant had to for automatic termination of supervised
serve his complete sentence in the United release when the defendant was deported.
3
The omission of such language defeats
William’s contention. See United States v.
Ramirez-Sanchez, 338 F.3d 977, 981 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“Had Congress intended for
deportation to terminate a term of
supervised release, it could have provided
so”); United States v. Brown,
54 F.3d 234,
238 (5th Cir. 1995) (“If Congress intended
for deportation to terminate this sentence,
it could have specifically provided for
such to occur. However, Congress has not
done so . . . ”). Indeed, it would be
inconsistent for Congress to authorize a
district court to order a defendant to
“remain outside the United States”
following deportation as a condition of
supervised release but concurrently intend
that condition to extinguish upon
deportation. See
Brown, 54 F.3d at 239
(“This is a clear indication that a term of
supervised release remains in effect after
the defendant is deported.”).
We will follow the other courts of
appeals that have held that supervised
release is not automatically extinguished
by deportation. See Ramirez-Sanchez, 338
F.3d at 980; United States v. Cuero-Flores,
276 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 2002); United
States v. Akinyemi,
108 F.3d 777, 779 (7 th
Cir. 1997);
Brown, 54 F.3d at 238-39.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
4
