E. CLIFTON KNOWLES, Magistrate Judge.
This is a civil action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Supplemental Security Insurance ("SSI"), as provided under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), as amended. The case is currently pending on Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. Docket No. 16. Defendant has filed a Response, arguing that the decision of the Commissioner was supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. Docket No. 19. Plaintiff has filed a Reply. Docket No. 21.
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record be DENIED, and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff filed his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") on September 4, 2008, alleging that he had been disabled since July 19, 2008, due to back problems, pain in the right side of the body, and depression.
On December 15, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision unfavorable to Plaintiff, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations. TR 7-19. Specifically, the ALJ made the following findings of fact:
TR 12-16.
On February 11, 2011, Plaintiff timely sent a letter requesting review of the hearing decision. TR 153-155. On February 27, 2012, the Appeals Council issued a letter declining to review the case (TR 1-6), thereby rendering the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. This civil action was thereafter timely filed, and the Court has jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, based upon the record as a whole, then these findings are conclusive. Id.
The parties and the ALJ have thoroughly summarized and discussed the medical and testimonial evidence of Record. Accordingly, the Court will discuss those matters only to the extent necessary to analyze the parties' arguments.
This Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to the record made in the administrative hearing process. Jones v. Secretary, 945 F.2d 1365, 1369 (6
"Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Her v. Commissioner, 203 F.3d 388, 389 (6
The reviewing court does not substitute its findings of fact for those of the Commissioner if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings and inferences. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6
In reviewing the decisions of the Commissioner, courts look to four types of evidence: (1) objective medical findings regarding Plaintiff's condition; (2) diagnosis and opinions of medical experts; (3) subjective evidence of Plaintiff's condition; and (4) Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience. Miracle v. Celebrezze, 351 F.2d 361, 374 (6
The claimant carries the ultimate burden to establish an entitlement to benefits by proving his or her "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). "Substantial gainful activity" not only includes previous work performed by Plaintiff, but also, considering Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience, any other relevant work that exists in the national economy in significant numbers regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which Plaintiff lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether Plaintiff would be hired if he or she applied. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
At the administrative level of review, the claimant's case is considered under a five-step sequential evaluation process as follows:
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (footnote added). See also Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1181 (6
The Commissioner's burden at the fifth step of the evaluation process can be satisfied by relying on the medical-vocational guidelines, otherwise known as "the grid," but only if the claimant is not significantly limited by a nonexertional impairment, and then only when the claimant's characteristics identically match the characteristics of the applicable grid rule. Otherwise, the grid cannot be used to direct a conclusion, but only as a guide to the disability determination. Id. In such cases where the grid does not direct a conclusion as to the claimant's disability, the Commissioner must rebut the claimant's prima facie case by coming forward with particularized proof of the claimant's individual vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs, which is typically obtained through vocational expert testimony. See Varley v. Secretary, 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6
In determining residual functional capacity for purposes of the analysis required at stages four and five above, the Commissioner is required to consider the combined effect of all the claimant's impairments; mental and physical, exertional and nonexertional, severe and nonsevere. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by: (1) "rejecting a significant aspect" of the opinion of consultative medical examiner, Dr. Lloyd Huang, and failing to properly evaluate the opinions of treating physicians, Drs. Weaver and Millet; and (2) improperly evaluating and assessing Plaintiff's credibility. Docket No. 16-1. Accordingly, Plaintiff maintains that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner's decision should be reversed, or in the alternative, remanded. Id.
Sentence four of § 405(g) states as follows:
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
"In cases where there is an adequate record, the Secretary's decision denying benefits can be reversed and benefits awarded if the decision is clearly erroneous, proof of disability is overwhelming, or proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking." Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6
With regard to the evaluation of, and weight accorded to, the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Huang, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting Dr. Huang's finding that Plaintiff would need frequent breaks or rest periods. Docket No. 16-1 at 12. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Huang has provided the "only evidence or report in the record from any physician who has actually seen or examined Plaintiff regarding his physical impairments and resulting limitations." Id. at 11. Plaintiff maintains that the treating records "provide substantial support to Dr. Huang's opinion that Plaintiff needs frequent breaks or rest periods." Id. at 12. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the evidence of record demonstrates that: (1) medications, injections, and the use of a TENS unit were not consistently effective in controlling Plaintiff's ongoing pain; (2) any relief Plaintiff experienced was short-lived; (3) Dr. Huang's physical examination yielded many positive findings; (4) treatment notes from Plaintiff's mental health physicians indicated that Plaintiff was in a "great deal of back pain during the session which made it difficult for him to sit for long"; (5) Plaintiff reported the need to lie down or take hot showers in order to get some relief from the pain; and (6) Plaintiff reported that his activities rotated between sitting, standing, and laying down Id. at 12-14. Plaintiff maintains, therefore, that the ALJ's determination that "an allowance for standing/walking/sitting at will allows [Plaintiff] to shift positions as necessary to relieve pain, negating the need for frequent breaks or rest periods" (TR 15) was unsupported by the evidence.
Plaintiff also maintains that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate the opinions of Drs. Weaver and Millet, Plaintiff's mental health physicians. Id. at 14. Plaintiff contends that Drs. Weaver and Millet were treating physicians who completed a Medical Source Statement in September 2010 regarding Plaintiff's mental capabilities and limitations. Id. at 15. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ disregarded the opinions of Drs. Weaver and Millet concerning Plaintiff's mental impairments "without consideration of the required regulatory factors," and instead "performed his own assessment" of Plaintiff's mental capabilities. Id. at 16. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred by stating that his mental impairments were unlikely to meet the durational requirement and by failing to "order a consultative psychological examination or follow up with Dr. Weaver and/or Dr. Millet in order to answer this question." Id. at 17.
Defendant responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff would not require frequent breaks because an allowance for "standing/walking/sitting at will" would be sufficient to allow Plaintiff to change positions when uncomfortable. Docket No. 19. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's treatment records and personal testimony indicate that his pain is "well-controlled" by his treatment regimen. Id. at 15. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to explain how the ALJ's determination that an allowance for standing/walking/sitting at will would be insufficient. Id. at 16. Defendant further asserts that Dr. Huang's determination that Plaintiff's pain requires frequent breaks "stands in conflict with the State Disability Determination Services medical consultants' findings." Id. at 17.
With regard to the ALJ's evaluation of the opinions of Drs. Weaver and Millet, Defendant responds that the opinions of Drs. Weaver and Millet expressed in the September 2010 Medical Source Statement were not supported by clinical findings or by their own treatment notes, so the ALJ was correct in discounting them. Id. at 20. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff's mental health treatment lasted only two months, that treatment notes showed no previous allegations of depression, and that, on his last visit, Plaintiff reported that his primary complaints were physical, he was doing well on his medication, and he denied significant depression. Id. at 20-21. Defendant also argues that the ALJ was not required to order a consultative psychological examination under the circumstances present in the case at bar because the ALJ has discretion in determining when to order psychological examinations. Id. Defendant additionally contends that the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's "mild limitations" lasted no more than eight months was based on sufficient evidence from the record. Id.
In his Reply, Plaintiff reiterates his reports of experiencing pain between a six and a nine on a ten point scale, with little-to-no or short-lived relief, and his need to take a hot shower and/or rotate between sitting, standing, and lying down in order to help control his pain. Docket No. 21. Plaintiff also replies that Defendant erroneously compared his physical medical records to his mental medical records, and notes that these records do not address the same issues. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that both Defendant and the ALJ mischaracterized the seriousness of Plaintiff's mental impairments by only discussing the portions of the records that supported their positions, and that they failed to properly consider his treatment records, relying instead on their own conceptions of his mental state. Id. at 4. Plaintiff argues that "the opinions from Dr. Weaver and Dr. Millet are the only medical opinions of record with regards to Plaintiff's mental impairments," and "[a]s such, their opinions should be given deference by the ALJ." Id.
With regard to the evaluation of medical evidence, the Code of Federal Regulations states:
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d) (emphasis added). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
The ALJ must articulate the reasons underlying his decision to give a medical opinion a specific amount of weight.
The Sixth Circuit has held that, "provided that they are based on sufficient medical data, the medical opinions and diagnoses of treating physicians are generally accorded substantial deference, and if the opinions are uncontradicted, complete deference." Howard v. Commissioner, 276 F.3d 235, 240 (6
20 C.F.R. § 404.1502.
On November 11, 2008, Plaintiff visited Dr. Lloyd K. Huang of the Tennessee Disability Determination Services for a consultative examination. TR 226-229. After a physical examination and review of "x-ray evidence of reduced range of motion on back examination," Dr. Huang opined that "the patient can occasionally lift 20 pounds, frequently lift 10 pounds, can stand and walk for four to five hours of an eight-hour day and can sit for six hours of an eight-hour day with frequent breaks." TR 228. Dr. Huang also noted that Plaintiff "should avoid driving or heavy machinery due to his medications." Id. Dr. Huang opined, "[p]erhaps, vocational rehabilitation for sedentary work would be helpful." Id.
In December 2008, DDS Medical Consultant, Dr. Susan L. Warner, reviewed Dr. Huang's report and completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity assessment regarding Plaintiff, opining that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds, stand and/or walk, with normal breaks, about six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit, with normal breaks, for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday. TR 231. Dr. Warner also opined that Plaintiff could push and/or pull without limitation, and could occasionally climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl, but could never climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds. TR 231-232. She further opined that Plaintiff did not suffer from any manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental limitations. TR 233-234. Dr. Warner noted the following:
TR 235.
With regard to the discounting of Dr. Huang's opinion that Plaintiff would need frequent breaks or rest periods, the ALJ explained:
TR 15.
When determining that an allowance for standing/walking/sitting at will would sufficiently allow Plaintiff to relieve his pain, the ALJ discussed the medical opinions of treating physician Dr. Sun and DDS consultant Dr. Warner, as well as Plaintiff's subjective reports, and noted that Plaintiff's pain was generally regulated. TR 14-15. Specifically, the ALJ recounted Plaintiff's report to Dr. Sun that "the nerve blocks he was receiving every 3 months were helping"; that between July 2008 and August 2010, Dr. Sun found Plaintiff's physical examinations to be "normal except for some tenderness and some limited range of motion"; and that during "nearly all visits," Plaintiff "reported that his medications were working well." Id., citing TR 243-297, 299-341. Dr. Sun's repeatedly normal physical examinations "except for some tenderness and some limited range of motion," and Plaintiff's reports that his medications and injections were "working well" and "helping," are inconsistent with Dr. Huang's assertion that Plaintiff would require frequent breaks.
In his discussion, the ALJ also referenced Dr. Warner's Residual Functional Capacity assessment of Plaintiff, noting her opined "restrictions for light work with no climbing ladders/ropes/scaffolds and occasional posturals." TR 15, citing TR 230-238. As discussed above, Dr. Warner opined that Plaintiff could stand, walk, and sit with normal breaks for "about six hours in an 8-hour workday." TR 231. Dr. Warner also opined that Plaintiff could sit continuously for two hours, and she noted Plaintiff's report that he could walk for approximately ½ mile continuously. TR 235. Dr. Warner's opinion that Plaintiff could stand, walk, and sit with normal breaks for "about six hours in an 8-hour workday" is likewise inconsistent with Dr. Huang's assertion that Plaintiff would require frequent breaks.
The ALJ correctly noted that the record does not contain an opinion from any treating physician regarding Plaintiff's work capabilities. TR 15. Accordingly, there is no treating physician opinion evidence reflecting or supporting Dr. Huang's finding that Plaintiff would require frequent breaks.
With regard to Plaintiff's subjective reports, the ALJ discussed them as follows:
TR 14, 15, citing TR 226-229, 243-297.
Plaintiff's reports that he could walk about half a mile, stand for about an hour at a time, and sit for about an hour at a time are consistent with the ALJ's determination that a sit/stand/walk at will option would be appropriate for Plaintiff.
As discussed, Dr. Huang's opinion contradicts other substantial evidence in the record, including the opinions of Drs. Sun and Warner. As the Regulations state, the ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to a physician's evaluation when that evaluation is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Because the ALJ discussed the evidence of record and noted the absence of any objective or treating opinion evidence supporting Dr. Huang's finding that Plaintiff would require frequent breaks, the ALJ is not bound to accept Dr. Huang's finding. Accordingly, Plaintiff's argument on this point fails.
With regard to Plaintiff's two month mental health treatment with Drs. Millet and Weaver, Plaintiff first saw Dr. Millet at the Matthew Walker Comprehensive Health Center in August 2010, and was diagnosed with "Major Depression, Single Episode, Chronic." TR 368-370. During this visit, Plaintiff stated that he had experienced feelings of depression for six months, was trying to qualify for disability, and needed an evaluation in order to qualify for disability benefits. Id. Dr. Millet referred Plaintiff to Dr. Patricia Weaver for assistance in completing the disability forms. Id.
Dr. Weaver saw Plaintiff a few days after his initial appointment with Dr. Millet in order to complete lab work (TR 366-367), and again on September 11, 2010 in order to complete paperwork relating to his ability to do work-related activities for his attorney (TR 356-365). At his September 11, 2010 appointment, Plaintiff "reported feeling some anxiety but overall good." Id. Plaintiff again returned on September 25, 2010. TR 351-355. During this visit, Dr. Weaver noted that Plaintiff "was having a great deal of back pain during todays [sic] session," which "made it difficult for him to sit for long." Id. Dr. Weaver also noted that Plaintiff received the completed documentation for his attorney regarding his "work readiness." Id. Plaintiff next saw Dr. Weaver on October 9, 2010. TR 348-350. During this appointment, Plaintiff reported that he "was doing well on all current medications" without any negative side effects, but "still experience[d] depression though not as severe as it was when he first started coming to the center." Id. Plaintiff also noted that he continued to experience back pain "on a daily basis," felt anxious in crowds, and sometimes wanted to be left alone. Id. Plaintiff's final appointment at the Center was on October 23, 2010, a little more than two months after his initial appointment. TR 345-347. At this visit, Plaintiff reported "doing well on his current medications" with "no adverse side effects," and denied having "significant depression," but noted continued trouble sleeping and back pains. Id.
Drs. Weaver and Millet completed the Medical Source Statement ("MSS") of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Mental) at issue on September 13, 2010. TR 342-344. In their MSS, Drs. Weaver and Millet opined that Plaintiff was mildly limited in his ability to carry out simple instructions; moderately limited in his abilities to understand and remember simple instructions, make judgments on simple work-related decisions, carry out complex instructions, and make judgments on complex work-related decisions; and markedly limited in his abilities to understand and remember complex instructions, interact appropriately with supervisors and co-workers, and respond to "usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting." Id. They opined, however, that Plaintiff had no limitations on his ability to interact with the public. Id. Drs. Weaver and Millet indicated that their findings were supported by their observations, Plaintiff's reports, and Plaintiff's work history, and they noted:
Id.
In reviewing this evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's "medically determinable mental impairment of depression does not cause more than minimal limitation in the [Plaintiff's] ability to perform basic mental work activities and is therefore nonsevere." TR 12-13. In so finding, the ALJ considered the four functional areas listed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 used to determine mental impairments. Id. The ALJ explained his finding by noting that the Plaintiff "has no restriction in activities of daily living; no difficulties in maintaining social functioning; mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and no repeated episodes of decompensation of extended duration." Id. The ALJ noted that because Plaintiff's "impairment causes no more than `mild' limitation in any of the first three functional areas and he has experienced `no' episodes of decompensation which have been of extended duration in the fourth area," his mental impairment was properly classified as nonsevere according to 20 C.F.R. 416.920a(d)(1). Id.
Moreover, the ALJ stated:
Id.
Contrary to Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinions of Drs. Weaver and Millet, the ALJ explicitly discussed their treatment records and evaluated the information contained in those records per the requirements set forth in the Regulations as shown above. Moreover, although Drs. Millet and Weaver saw Plaintiff on a total of six occasions over a period of approximately two months, the ALJ was not bound to accept the limitations contained in their MSS because they contradicted other evidence in the record, including their own treatment notes, and because they were not supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.
As the Regulations state, the ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to a physician's evaluation when that evaluation is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Instead, when there is contradictory evidence, the evaluation is weighed against the contradictory evidence under the criteria listed above. Id. When the opinions are inconsistent with each other, the final decision regarding the weight to be given to the differing opinions lies with the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2). As such, the Regulations do not mandate that the ALJ accord the opinions contained in the MSS of Drs. Weaver and Millet controlling weight. Accordingly, Plaintiff's argument on this point fails.
Next, with regard to Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ erroneously found that Plaintiff's mental impairments were unlikely to meet the durational requirement, the ALJ properly so found. As noted, the impairment must "last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The record reflects that, although Plaintiff reported at his initial appointment with Dr. Millet that he had been depressed for six months prior to seeking treatment, his condition improved and he felt better after two months of treatment. See TR 345-370. By his own reports, therefore, Plaintiff's depression lasted at most eight months, which is less than the required durational period.
Finally, although Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have ordered a consultative examination regarding his "mental impairments and resulting limitations" in order to establish the durational period of his mental impairments (Docket No. 16-1 at 17), the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that an ALJ is not required to order a consultative examination in order to assist a Plaintiff in establishing disability. See, e.g., Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1182-83 (6
Plaintiff contends that in finding that his subjective complaints were not fully credible, the ALJ did not appropriately address his complaints of pain. Docket No. 16-1. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that his subjective complaints were consistent with his treatment records from Dr. Sun, and he argues that the ALJ erroneously noted that his pain was "well-controlled." Id. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not make clear the weight accorded to Plaintiff's testimony. Id. at 22.
Defendant responds that the ALJ appropriately discredited Plaintiff's credibility because the "treatment notes from examining physicians, the effectiveness of his treatment, and Mr. Bower's reported activities of daily living indicate that his physical impairments cause him a certain amount of pain, but that same evidence does not support his subjective complaints that his pain is disabling." Docket No. 19 at 24.
Plaintiff replies that the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's pain is "well-controlled" is inconsistent with his medical records and testimony. Docket No. 21. Plaintiff also replies that the ALJ selectively used his testimony and ignored other parts without explanation. Id.
The Sixth Circuit has set forth the following criteria for assessing a plaintiff's allegations of pain:
Duncan v. Secretary, 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6
When analyzing the claimant's subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must also consider the following factors and how they relate to the medical and other evidence in the record: the claimant's daily activities; the location, duration, frequency and intensity of claimant's pain; the precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage and effect of medication; and the other treatment or measures to relieve pain. See Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1039 (6
With regard to Plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ in the case at bar stated:
TR 14-15.
When determining that Plaintiff's subjective complaints were inconsistent with the record and his determined RFC, the ALJ discussed, inter alia, reports from treating physician Dr. Sun, supra, regarding the effectiveness of Plaintiff's pain medications, including Lortab, Soma injections, and occasional use of a TENS unit, and Dr. Sun's conclusions that Plaintiff's physical examinations were generally normal except for some minor impairments. Id. Further, the ALJ discussed the reports of DDS physicians Drs. Huang and Warner to show that Plaintiff was limited to "light exertion work, specifically standing/walking 4 to 5 hours and sitting 6 hours with frequent breaks," and some "restrictions for light work with no climbing ladders/ropes/scaffolds and occasional posturals." Id. at 14-15. Finally, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's subjective reports that he takes medication for continuous pain, can cook simple meals, walk half a mile continuously, and sit for one hour. Id. at 15.
As can be seen, the ALJ's decision addresses not only the medical evidence, but also Plaintiff's testimony and his subjective claims, indicating that these factors were considered. Id. It is clear from the ALJ's articulated rationale that, although there is evidence which could support Plaintiff's subjective claims of pain, the ALJ chose to rely instead on medical findings that were inconsistent with Plaintiff's allegations. This is within the ALJ's province.
The ALJ, when evaluating the entirety of the evidence, is entitled to weigh the objective medical evidence against Plaintiff's subjective claims of pain and reach a credibility determination. See, e.g., Walters, 127 F.3d at 531; and Kirk v. Secretary, 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6
After assessing all the objective medical evidence, the ALJ determined that the "objective medical evidence of record does not support [Plaintiff's] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects." TR 15. The ALJ observed Plaintiff during his hearing, assessed the medical records, and reached a reasoned decision; the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence and the decision not to accord full credibility to Plaintiff's allegations was proper. Therefore, this claim fails.
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record be DENIED, and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.