ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e)

KAREN L. STROMBOM, Magistrate Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant's filing of a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing the Court committed clear error in applying the "credit as true" rule when it remanded this case for payment of benefits, while the issue of the onset date of disability was outstanding. See Dkt. 25. For the reasons set forth below the Court agrees that this matter should have been remanded for further proceedings without payment of benefits, and therefore that the motion should be granted.

"A district court has considerable discretion when considering a motion to amend a judgment under Rule 59(e)." Turner v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). A Rule 59(e) motion may be granted when "`necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based.'" Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

In reversing defendant's decision to deny benefits, the Court found that although plaintiff should have been found disabled by the ALJ after he turned age 50, it was not clear when he first became disabled. See Dkt. 23. The Court then applied the credit-as-true rule to reverse this matter for an award of benefits, as well as for further proceedings to determine plaintiff's onset date of disability. Id.

The credit-as-true rule states that benefits should be awarded where:

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, in applying the credit-as-true rule the focus is on whether any outstanding issues remain before a determination of disability may be made.1 See Treichler v. Comm'r of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2014); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[I]n social security cases, `the required analysis centers on what the record evidence shows about the existence or non-existence of disability.'") (citation omitted).

The Ninth Circuit nevertheless has recognized that "issues other than the presence or absence of a disability may preclude immediate payment of benefits." Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Regnnitter v. Comm'r of the Social Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to remand for payment of benefits due to unresolved issue concerning date on which disability began); see also Howell v. Astrue, 248 Fed. Appx. 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2007) (remanding for further proceedings because "[a]lthough it is now clear that [the claimant] was disabled at some point before her `date last insured' ... it is not clear whether she is entitled to ongoing disability benefits or to benefits for a `closed' period of disability, nor are the dates of such period clear.").

Given the outstanding issue of plaintiff's onset date of disability, and in light of Howell, Harmon and Regennitter, remand for further administrative proceedings without an award of benefits is more appropriate. Accordingly, defendant's Rule 59(e) motion is GRANTED. The Court's prior reversal and remand order (see Dkt. 23) is thus amended to reflect that this matter shall be remanded for further consideration of the issue of plaintiff's onset date of disability and not in conjunction with an award of benefits. In all other aspects, the prior reversal and remand order shall remain in effect.