REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

E. CLIFTON KNOWLES, Magistrate Judge.

This is a civil action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security finding that Plaintiff was not disabled and denying Plaintiff Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), as provided under the Social Security Act ("the Act"), as amended. The case is currently pending on Plaintiff's "Motion for Judgment Based Upon the Administrative Record or in the Alternative, Motion for Remand." Docket No. 12. Defendant has filed a Response, arguing that the decision of the Commissioner was supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. Docket No. 14.

For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's "Motion for Judgment Based Upon the Administrative Record or in the Alternative, Motion for Remand" be DENIED, and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed his applications for DIB and SSI on September 11, 2003, alleging that he had been disabled since December 31, 2002, due to back, neck, and knee pain, depression, and panic attacks. Docket No. 10, Attachment ("TR") 17, 62-63, 85-88, 118-119, 127-128, 393-394, 398-400. Plaintiff's application for DIB was denied both initially (TR 62-63) and upon reconsideration (TR 64-65). His application for SSI was also denied both initially (TR 393-394) and upon reconsideration (TR 395-396). Plaintiff subsequently requested (TR 75-76) and received (TR 77-84) a hearing. Plaintiff's first hearing was conducted on October 12, 2006, by Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Linda G. Roberts. TR 410, 415, 626-671. Plaintiff and a vocational expert, Dr. Gordon Doss, appeared and testified. TR 410, 626. On January 24, 2007, ALJ Roberts issued a decision unfavorable to Plaintiff, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations. TR 407-415. Plaintiff sought review from the Appeals Council (TR 416), which remanded the case for a second hearing. TR 417-421. In its letter of remand, the Appeals Council directed the ALJ to obtain additional evidence concerning Plaintiff's physical and mental impairments, further evaluate Plaintiff's mental impairments, further consider Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, and obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert. TR 420.

On April 3, 2008, ALJ Roberts held Plaintiff's second hearing. TR 17, 672-733. Plaintiff and vocational expert Rebecca Williams ("VE") appeared and testified. Id. On October 29, 2008, ALJ Roberts issued a second decision unfavorable to Plaintiff, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations. TR 17-29. Specifically, ALJ Roberts made the following findings of fact:

TR 24-29.

On December 23, 2008, Plaintiff timely filed a request for review of the second hearing decision. TR 619-625. On December 17, 2010, the Appeals Council issued a letter declining to review the case (TR 9-11), thereby rendering the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. This civil action was thereafter timely filed, and the Court has jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, based upon the record as a whole, then these findings are conclusive. Id.

II. REVIEW OF THE RECORD

The parties and the ALJ have thoroughly summarized and discussed the medical and testimonial evidence of Record. Accordingly, the Court will discuss those matters only to the extent necessary to analyze the parties' arguments.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Standards of Review

This Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to the record made in the administrative hearing process. Jones v. Secretary, 945 F.2d 1365, 1369 (6th C Cir. 1991). The purpose of this review is to determine (1) whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision, and (2) whether any legal errors were committed in the process of reaching that decision. Landsaw v. Secretary, 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986).

"Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Her v. Commissioner, 203 F.3d 388, 389 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). "Substantial evidence" has been further quantified as "more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance." Bell v. Commissioner, 105 F.3d 244, 245 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)).

The reviewing court does not substitute its findings of fact for those of the Commissioner if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings and inferences. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). In fact, even if the evidence could also support a different conclusion, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached. Her, 203 F.3d at 389 (citing Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). If the Commissioner did not consider the record as a whole, however, the Commissioner's conclusion is undermined. Hurst v. Secretary, 753 F.2d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing Allen v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Futernick v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 647 (6th Cir. 1973))).

In reviewing the decisions of the Commissioner, courts look to four types of evidence: (1) objective medical findings regarding Plaintiff's condition; (2) diagnosis and opinions of medical experts; (3) subjective evidence of Plaintiff's condition; and (4) Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience. Miracle v. Celebrezze, 351 F.2d 361, 374 (6th Cir. 1965).

B. Proceedings At The Administrative Level

The claimant carries the ultimate burden to establish an entitlement to benefits by proving his or her "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). "Substantial gainful activity" not only includes previous work performed by Plaintiff, but also, considering Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience, any other relevant work that exists in the national economy in significant numbers regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which Plaintiff lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether Plaintiff would be hired if he or she applied. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

At the administrative level of review, the claimant's case is considered under a five-step sequential evaluation process as follows:

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (footnote added). See also Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1181 (6th Cir. 1990).

The Commissioner's burden at the fifth step of the evaluation process can be satisfied by relying on the medical-vocational guidelines, otherwise known as "the grid," but only if the claimant is not significantly limited by a nonexertional impairment, and then only when the claimant's characteristics identically match the characteristics of the applicable grid rule. Otherwise, the grid cannot be used to direct a conclusion, but only as a guide to the disability determination. Id. In such cases where the grid does not direct a conclusion as to the claimant's disability, the Commissioner must rebut the claimant's prima facie case by coming forward with particularized proof of the claimant's individual vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs, which is typically obtained through vocational expert testimony. See Varley v. Secretary, 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987).

In determining residual functional capacity for purposes of the analysis required at stages four and five above, the Commissioner is required to consider the combined effect of all the claimant's impairments; mental and physical, exertional and nonexertional, severe and nonsevere. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B).

C. Plaintiff's Statement Of Errors

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in: 1) improperly weighing the medical opinions of record and failing to give a reasonable explanation for doing so; 2) improperly weighing the consultative examiners' opinions of record; 3) using the "pick and choose" method to evaluate the medical evidence and the credibility of Plaintiff; and 4) relying on the vocational expert's testimony at Plaintiff's hearing, instead of relying on her responses to interrogatories, and also by allowing the vocational expert to use Plaintiff's office manager job as past relevant work without establishing that it was gainful employment. Docket No. 13. Accordingly, Plaintiff maintains that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner's decision should be reversed, or in the alternative, remanded. Id.

Sentence four of § 405(g) states as follows:

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

"In cases where there is an adequate record, the Secretary's decision denying benefits can be reversed and benefits awarded if the decision is clearly erroneous, proof of disability is overwhelming, or proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking." Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, a court can reverse the decision and immediately award benefits if all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately establishes a plaintiff's entitlement to benefits. Faucher v. Secretary, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Newkirk v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 316, 318 (6th Cir. 1994).

1. Weight Accorded to the Opinions of Treating Physicians

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ does not explain the weight given to the opinions of the treating physicians of record. Docket No. 13. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that he was seen by three main treating physicians: primary care physician, Dr. Leon Campbell, from September 14, 1999 until August 6, 2003; Dr. Acharya (and Nurse Practitioner, Mr. Berry), at North Terrace Medical Clinic from December 8, 2003 through October 5, 2004; and Dr. Mallipeddi at Centerstone Mental Health Facility, where Plaintiff was diagnosed with panic disorder with agoraphobia and was given a Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") of 50. Id. Plaintiff contends that the opinions of these treating physicians should have been accorded the greatest weight in the ALJ's evaluation because "the Court has repeatedly held that the opinions of a treating physician are entitled to great weight and generally are entitled to greater weight than the contrary opinions of a consulting physician who has examined the claimant on only a single occasion." Id.

Defendant responds that Plaintiff relies on Sixth Circuit law that is outdated because it pre-dates the 1991 Social Security Administration regulations entitled, "Evaluating medical opinions about your impairment(s) or disability." Docket No. 14, citing 20 CFR § 404.1527 (1991). Defendant maintains that this regulation supersedes the Sixth Circuit law on which Plaintiff relies, and, therefore, that the ALJ properly accorded the opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians little weight because they did not meet the requirements of the regulation. Id. Defendant further contends that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's assignment of little weight to the opinions of Dr. Campbell, Dr. Acharya and Nurse Practitioner Berry, and Dr. Mallipeddi. Id.

With regard to the evaluation of medical evidence, the Code of Federal Regulations states:

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d) (emphasis added). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

If the ALJ rejects the opinion of a treating source, he is required to articulate some basis for rejecting the opinion. Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 321 (6th Cir. 1987). The Code of Federal Regulations defines a "treating source" as:

20 C.F.R. § 404.1502.

It is undisputed that Dr. Campbell was Plaintiff's primary care physician and had treated Plaintiff for several years. As a treating physician, the Regulations permit the ALJ to accord controlling weight to Dr. Campbell's opinion, as long as that opinion is consistent with, and supported by, the evidence of record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d).

The record, however, does not contain any disability related assessments completed by Dr. Campbell regarding Plaintiff. As far as the record shows, Dr. Campbell did not complete a medical source statement concerning Plaintiff's physical ability to do work-related activities, or complete any other form rendering an opinion regarding Plaintiff's abilities or lack thereof. The ALJ in the case at bar, however, was aware that Dr. Campbell was Plaintiff's primary care physician, and that he had been so for several years. In fact, the ALJ summarized the medical records from Dr. Campbell as follows:

TR 19-20.

In her decision, the ALJ also mentioned Dr. Campbell as follows:

TR 24, 26.

It is unclear why Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not specifying the weight she accorded Dr. Campbell's opinion, and erred in not according Dr. Campbell's opinion great weight, because Dr. Campbell did not provide any statements asserting that Plaintiff had functional limitations, much less did he render an opinion regarding Plaintiff's abilities or lack thereof. See TR 502-618. Because Dr. Campbell did not render an opinion regarding Plaintiff's abilities or lack thereof, there was no opinion for the ALJ to discuss or to accord any weight. Moreover, as can be seen from the quoted passages above, the ALJ explicitly noted that Dr. Campbell was a treating physician who had seen Plaintiff "for several years" and the ALJ discussed Dr. Campbell's records. The ALJ considered the medical records from Dr. Campbell in making her determination, and Plaintiff's argument on this point fails.

Dr. Acharya treated Plaintiff from December 2003 through March 2004 at North Terrace Medical Clinic. TR 20; 285-93. On November 13, 2006, Dr. Acharya completed a Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities (Physical) form regarding Plaintiff. TR 23, 460-63. In that form, Dr. Acharya opined that Plaintiff would be able to do the following: lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally;2 stand and/or walk for "at least" 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; sit for less than 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; perform limited pushing and/or pulling with his upper and lower extremities; occasionally climb, balance, and stoop; occasionally reach, handle, finger, and feel; never crawl, kneel, or crouch; and avoid exposure to temperature extremes, irritating inhalants, and hazards such as unprotected heights and moving machinery. TR 460-63. Dr. Acharya also noted that Plaintiff had limited vision. TR 462.

As support for each of Dr. Acharya's opined functional limitations, he states, "By history from client." TR 460-63. He goes on to state:

TR 463.

By his own acknowledgment, Dr. Archarya's opinion was based upon Plaintiff's reported history, and not on objective test results. In the case at bar, the ALJ accorded Dr. Acharya's opinion little weight because "he merely repeated the claimant's own opinion and because he had not seen the claimant for at least a year." TR 27. The ALJ is not bound by conclusory statements of a treating physician that a claimant is disabled because the definition of disability requires consideration of both medical and vocational factors. See, e.g., King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984); Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 1988).

Moreover, as has been discussed, supra, in order to qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must have a disability that has lasted for twelve consecutive months or is expected to last for twelve consecutive months or result in death. Because Dr. Acharya had not seen Plaintiff in "at least a year" at the time he completed his Medical Source Statement regarding Plaintiff, the ALJ was correct to discount his opinions expressed therein.

With regard to Plaintiff's arguments concerning the ALJ's consideration of Mr. Berry's opinion, Mr. Berry is a Nurse Practitioner. See TR 307. The Regulations provide that the ALJ may properly:

20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d) (emphasis added).

The ALJ discussed Mr. Berry's opinion that Plaintiff had a "physical or mental" impairment and a "severe, chronic disability" that would last "an indefinite period in accordance with the definitions of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development [sic]." TR 21-22. While the ALJ acknowledged Mr. Berry's opinion as those of an "other source," she accorded them little weight because, "[Mr. Berry] was using a disability standard other than that of SSA and because he could not identify a specific impairment upon which to base his opinion." TR 27. The weight accorded to Mr. Berry's opinion was proper.

With regard to Plaintiff's arguments concerning the weight accorded to the opinion of Dr. Mallipeddi, the ALJ properly accorded the opinion of Dr. Mallipeddi little weight. As the ALJ summarized:

TR 19-20.

The ALJ found that Dr. Mallipeddi's opinion that Plaintiff had some difficulties with social interaction was consistent with the other medical evidence. TR 25. The ALJ accorded little weight to Dr. Mallipeddi's assigned GAF score of 50, however, because:

TR 27.3

As the Regulations state, the ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion when that evaluation is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Instead, when there is contradictory evidence, the treating physician's opinion is weighed against the contradictory evidence under the criteria listed above. Id. The ALJ in the case at bar accepted the portions of Dr. Mallipeddi's opinion that were consistent with the evidence of record, and discounted the portions that were not. The Regulations do not require more.

As can be seen, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, the ALJ explained the weight accorded to the opinions of the treating physicians of record. Moreover, as has been discussed, despite Plaintiff's argument that the opinions of these treating physicians should have been given the greatest weight simply because the Court has repeatedly held that the opinions of a treating physician are entitled to great weight, the ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to a treating physician's evaluation when that evaluation is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). The ALJ in the case at bar considered the evidence of record, properly evaluated that evidence, and rendered a reasoned decision. Plaintiff's argument fails.

2. Weight Accorded to the Opinions of Consultative Examiners

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions of three consultative examiners of record: Dr. Wilburn, Dr. Rinehart, and Mr. Stair. Docket No 13. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Wilburn's opinion should have been accorded more weight than that of Dr. Rinehart because Dr. Wilburn is a specialist, while Dr. Rinehart is not. Plaintiff further asserts that the ALJ does not explain why she accorded greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Rinehart over Dr. Wilburn. Id. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ was required to give "good reasons" for doing so. Id. Lastly, Plaintiff contends that, while the ALJ placed great weight on Mr. Stair's opinion, he does not reasonably explain his decision to accord little weight to the GAF score of 50 assigned to Plaintiff by Mr. Stair. Id.

Defendant responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's accordation of weight to the opinions of Dr. Wilburn, Dr. Rinehart, and Mr. Stair. Docket No. 14. Defendant maintains that the ALJ's decision to grant Dr. Rinehart's opinion more weight than Dr. Wilburn's is supported by the specificity of Dr. Rinehart's report. Id. Defendant also asserts that the ALJ properly accorded great weight to Mr. Stair's opinion concerning moderate limitations and symptoms and accorded the GAF score of 50 little weight because it was inconsistent with the rest of his opinion. Id.

The ALJ summarized Dr. Wilburn's examination findings as follows:

TR 21, 294-97.

Dr. Wilburn also observed that, "At the same time, as mentioned above, the patient's complaints appear to be predominantly subjective with very low objective findings to go along with those either clinically or radiographically." TR 296.

The ALJ summarized Dr. Rinehart's examination findings as follows:

TR 23, 484-86.

Dr. Rinehart further noted that, "At this particular time, [Plaintiff] had fairly good mobility . . ." TR 486. Dr. Rinehart opined, "Based on exam and observation, at this time I feel that he has no impairment related physical limitations." Id.

In the case at bar, the ALJ accorded Dr. Rinehart's opinion "more weight" and Dr. Wilburn's opinion "little weight." TR 27. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion that the ALJ did not give "good reasons" for the weight she accorded to each opinion, the ALJ clearly articulated that she accorded Dr. Wilburn's opinion "little weight" because it was much less specific than Dr. Rinehart's. As the ALJ also noted, Dr. Wilburn opined that, (1) Plaintiff's subjective complaints "[we]re much greater than his objective findings"; (2) Plaintiff "really ha[d] very few objective physical abnormalities in his plane x-rays"; and (3) Plaintiff was "capable of doing some modified work." TR 21; 296.

While Plaintiff is correct that Dr. Wilburn is a specialist, and that the opinion of specialists are generally accorded greater weight than opinions of non-specialists, the regulations also provide that, "the better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that opinion." See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Dr. Rinehart submitted the assessment form on which he based his medical opinion, while Dr. Wilburn did not. See TR 294-97; 484-92. Additionally, Dr. Rinehart included more physical examination areas in his opinion than did Dr. Wilburn, and tested for more symptoms, such as signs for clubbing, cyanosis, and edema. Id. Because Dr. Rinehart's opinion was more specific than Dr. Wilburn's, the ALJ properly decided to accord the opinion of Dr. Rinehart more weight.

With respect to Mr. Stair, the ALJ summarized his evaluation findings as follows:

TR 23-24, 493-97 (underlining in original).

As explained by the ALJ, she accorded the opinion of Mr. Stair great weight:

TR 27.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ does not reasonably explain her decision to not accord great weight to Mr. Stair's assignment of a GAF score of 50. As can be seen however, the ALJ clearly stated that she discounted it because a GAF score of 50 was inconsistent with the rest of Mr. Stair's opinion. A GAF score of 50 indicates serious symptoms or a serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. Significantly, however, as demonstrated above, Mr. Stair reported that Plaintiff had a moderate panic disorder and a moderate depressive disorder. TR 24. Mr. Stair further reported that Plaintiff had satisfactory abilities to interact appropriately with the public, to interact appropriately with supervisors, to interact appropriately with co-workers, and to respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. Mr. Stair also reported that Plaintiff had no limitations in his abilities to understand and remember short and simple instructions, to carry out short and simple instructions, to make judgments on simple work-related decisions, to understand and remember complex instructions, to carry out complex instructions, and to make judgments on complex work-related decisions. Id. Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ does not reasonably explain her decision to accord the GAF score assigned by Mr. Stair fails.

3. Plaintiff's Credibility

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by using the "pick and choose" method to evaluate Plaintiff's credibility. Docket No. 13. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have fully credited his complaints of pain, and contends that the ALJ did not consider the record as a whole when rejecting his credibility. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the fact that he attempted to return to work in 2003 and tried to continue cutting hair on and off during this time "should not be held against him as a credibility issue." Id.

Defendant responds that even a facial reading of the ALJ's decision shows that the ALJ did not make a conclusory determination regarding Plaintiff's credibility. Docket No. 14. Defendant further maintains that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's testimony is not credible. Id.

The Sixth Circuit has set forth the following criteria for assessing a plaintiff's subjective allegations:

Duncan v. Secretary, 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting S. Rep. No. 466, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24) (emphasis added); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929 ("[S]tatements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled. . . ."); and Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1182-83 ("[T]hough Moon alleges fully disabling and debilitating symptomology, the ALJ, may distrust a claimant's allegations . . . if the subjective allegations, the ALJ's personal observations, and the objective medical evidence contradict each other."). Moreover, "allegations of pain . . . do not constitute a disability unless the pain is of such a debilitating degree that it prevents an individual from engaging in substantial gainful activity." Bradley v. Secretary, 862 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1988).

When analyzing a claimant's subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must also consider the following factors and how they relate to the medical and other evidence in the record: the claimant's daily activities; the location, duration, frequency and intensity of claimant's pain; the precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage and effect of medication; and the other treatment or measures to relieve pain. See Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1039 (6th Cir. 1994) (construing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)). After evaluating these factors in conjunction with the evidence in the record, and by making personal observations of the claimant at the hearing, an ALJ may determine that a claimant's subjective complaints of pain and other disabling symptoms are not credible. See, e.g., Walters v. Commissioner, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997); Blacha v. Secretary, 927 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1990); and Kirk v. Secretary, 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 1981).

In the case at bar, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some of his alleged symptoms, but that Plaintiff's statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not credible to the extent Plaintiff alleged. Finding Plaintiff's testimony inconsistent with his own statements to physicians, the ALJ explained:

TR 26.

The ALJ continued:

Id.

As can be seen, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion that the ALJ uses the "pick and choose" method of evaluation, the ALJ's decision specifically addresses in great detail not only the medical evidence, but also Plaintiff's testimony and his subjective claims. Discounting credibility is appropriate when the ALJ finds contradictions among the medical reports, the claimant's testimony, the claimant's daily activities, and other evidence. See Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (citing Bradley, 682 F.2d at 1227; cf. King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974-75 (6th Cir. 1984); and Siterlet v. Secretary, 823 F.2d 918, 921 (6th Cir. 1987)). It is clear from the ALJ's detailed articulated rationale that, although there is evidence which could support Plaintiff's claims, the ALJ chose to rely on medical findings that were inconsistent with Plaintiff's allegations. This is within the ALJ's province; therefore, Plaintiff's argument fails.

4. Testimony of the Vocational Expert

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not giving the VE's written responses to interrogatories weight in making her decision. Docket No. 13. Specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that the ALJ, when reaching her decision, considered the answers that the VE rendered at the hearing, rather than her responses to the written interrogatories that were later presented to her. Id.

Defendant responds that Plaintiff does not cite to anything in the Act, Regulations, or case law that supports Plaintiff's position that the ALJ must accord greater weight to written interrogatories presented to a VE than to a VE's hearing testimony. Docket No. 14. Defendant also maintains that Plaintiff's assertion is a mischaracterization of what the ALJ did, because the ALJ considered the interrogatories sent to the VE and determined that she would rely on the VE's testimony because it was consistent with her written responses. Id.

In the case at bar, the ALJ found:

TR 28.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not giving the VE's written responses to interrogatories weight in making her decision. Defendant, however, correctly points out that there is no such law mandating the ALJ do so. Moreover, the ALJ clearly stated that the VE's written responses to the interrogatories were "consistent" with her testimony:

TR 28-29.

As the ALJ explained, the VE's written responses to the interrogatories were "consistent with her testimony" and "duplicative of what [she] asked Ms. Williams at the hearing." Id. The ALJ's explanation demonstrates that she was not only aware of the two sets of interrogatories, but that she reviewed the VE's answers to them. The ALJ articulated her reasoning for relying on the VE's hearing testimony, and Plaintiff has not adduced any authority establishing that that reliance was somehow erroneous. Plaintiff's argument fails.

Plaintiff lastly contends that the ALJ erred in allowing the VE to use the office manager job as past relevant work without establishing that it was gainful employment. Docket No. 13. Plaintiff maintains that this clerical work was not sufficient to be deemed past relevant work. Id.

Defendant responds that Plaintiff's argument is moot because the ALJ clearly stated that Plaintiff could not perform past relevant work. Docket No. 14. Specifically, the ALJ only considered Plaintiff's past relevant work as a cosmetologist in making her decision. Id.

As an initial matter, regardless of what past Plaintiff positions the ALJ considered, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work. TR 27. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff was correct in his assertion, it would not constitute grounds for either reversal or remand, as any such error would have been harmless.

Moreover, Defendant is correct that the ALJ considered only Plaintiff's work as a cosmetologist as past relevant work. Specifically, the ALJ stated:

TR 27 (emphasis added). There is no indication in the ALJ's decision that she considered Plaintiff's past work as an office manager as past relevant work. Plaintiff's argument fails. Because there is nothing in the ALJ's decision establishing that she considered the office manager job as past relevant work, Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ needed to first establish that it was gainful employment is moot.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Based Upon the Administrative Record or, In the Alternative, Motion for Remand be DENIED, and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.

Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.