ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CYNTHIA IMBROGNO, Magistrate Judge.
BEFORE THE COURT are cross-motions for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 17, 22. Attorney D. James Tree represents Francisco Munoz (Plaintiff); Special Assistant United States Attorney Terrye E. Shea represents the Commissioner of Social Security (Defendant). The parties have consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. ECF No. 6. After reviewing the administrative record and briefs filed by the parties, the court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
JURISDICTION
On December 5, 2007, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning January 1, 2005. Tr. 20; 110. Plaintiff reported that his ability to work was limited by seizures, diabetes, deafness in his right ear, blurred vision and a dislocated arm. Tr. 115. Plaintiff's claim was denied initially and on reconsideration, and he requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Tr. 61-95. A hearing was held on July 14, 2010, at which vocational expert Jinny Lou Lawson, and Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified. Tr. 34-60. ALJ Caroline Siderius presided. Tr. 34. The ALJ denied benefits July 28, 2010. Tr. 20-29. The instant matter is before this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the transcript of proceedings and are briefly summarized here. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 51 years old. Tr. 41. He attended school through the eighth grade, was in special education, and eventually obtained his GED. Tr. 41; 49. He estimated he has been convicted of six or seven DUIs, and he had been incarcerated on a felony sexual assault conviction. Tr. 42. He lives with his father in a trailer. Tr. 43; 46.
Plaintiff has worked in various jobs in agriculture, but he testified that he can no longer work due to problems with his lower back. Tr. 43-44; 105-09. He has undergone surgery on his back, but he still has pain in both his legs and back. Tr. 44. Plaintiff said can walk up to a quarter of mile, but he has to take a break, and he can stand for 15 minutes before he experiences pain in his legs and back and must rest. Tr. 45; 50.
Plaintiff testified that he sleeps most of the day, and his household chores are handled by his niece and his father. Tr. 46. Plaintiff testified that he has experienced symptoms of depression and anxiety his entire life, but the symptoms have improved since he began medication. Tr. 47. He attempted suicide in 2009, and reports he still experiences suicidal thoughts regularly. Tr. 51. Plaintiff testified that since he stopped using street drugs in 2008, he has suffered one "minor relapse." Tr. 52. He testified that he has not drank alcohol in a couple of years. Tr. 43.
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 5, 2007. Tr. 22. At step two, she found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of chronic low back pain status post low back surgery, history of Hepatitis C in remission/dormant, and an affective disorder (depression). Tr. 22. At step three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff's impairments, alone and in combination, did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). Tr. 23. The ALJ found Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a "somewhat restricted light exertion" range of work:
Physically, the claimant is limited as follows: can lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can sit up to six hours a day; can stand and walk up to six hours a day; and can occasionally stoop and crouch. Mentally, the claimant is limited as follows: limited to simple, but not detailed, repetitive 1 to 3 step tasks; must be given instructions either verbally or written; and only occasional contact with coworkers and the public. (See Ex. 5F/1, 22F/1,3) Consequently, the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a somewhat restricted light exertion. Tr. 24.
In step four findings, the ALJ found Plaintiff's statements regarding pain and limitations were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the RFC findings. Tr. 25-26. Also, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant work. Tr. 27. The ALJ concluded that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, and cited "representative occupations" such as housekeeping cleaner and document preparer. Tr. 28.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001), the court set out the standard of review:
A district court's order upholding the Commissioner's denial of benefits is reviewed de novo. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the Commissioner may be reversed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ's determinations of law are reviewed de novo, although deference is owed to a reasonable construction of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).
It is the role of the trier of fact, not this court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). If substantial evidence exists to support the administrative findings, or if conflicting evidence exists that will support a finding of either disability or non-disability, the Commissioner's determination is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987).
SEQUENTIAL PROCESS
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). In steps one through four, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99. This burden is met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents him from engaging in his previous occupation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If a claimant cannot do his past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant can make an adjustment to other work; and (2) specific jobs exist in the national economy which claimant can perform. Batson v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193-94 (2004). If a claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work in the national economy, a finding of "disabled" is made. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I-v), 416.920(a)(4)(I-v).
ISSUES
The question presented is whether substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper legal standards. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to properly weigh the opinion evidence, by finding Plaintiff lacked credibility and by failing to identify specific jobs that Plaintiff could perform. ECF No. 18 at 10-20.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to properly weigh the opinion evidence.2 In analyzing Plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ briefly addressed some of the medical records. Tr. 26. However, the ALJ failed to specifically address and discuss the conflicting medical opinion evidence, and the ALJ failed to explain how the various opinions were weighed, and why certain opinions were rejected. Instead, the ALJ addressed the medical opinion evidence in two sentences:
As for the opinion evidence, the record does contain physical general assistance evaluations in which examiners have indicated that since [the] application date[,] the claimant has been able to perform physical work activity at least commensurate with at least light work (Ex. 21F/20-23). The record does evidence that the claimant has received additional treatment resulting in significant objective improvements.
Tr. 27. The Ninth Circuit has "made it clear that the medical opinions of a claimant's treating physicians are entitled to special weight and that, if the ALJ chooses to disregard them, `he must set forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so, and this decision must itself be based on substantial evidence.'" Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988), quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986). "The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1408. Even if a treating physician's opinion is controverted, the ALJ must provide specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting it. Id.
In this case, the record reveals treating and examining medical provider opinions that indicate Plaintiff was not capable of light work, and in some opinions, not capable of sustaining full time employment. For example, on November 5, 2007, Christopher J. Clark, M.Ed., assessed Plaintiff with marked limitations in expression of anger, physical complaints and global illness. Tr. 180. Mr. Clark also assessed Plaintiff with a marked limitation in social functioning, along with three moderate limitations related to the ability to respond appropriately and tolerate a work environment. Tr. 181. Additionally, Mr. Clark opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in four of five cognitive factors. Tr. 181.
Similarly, on January 9, 2008, Vivek K. Shah, M.D., Plaintiff's treating physician, opined Plaintiff was capable of performing only sedentary work due to back pain and Hepatitis C. Tr. 202-04. Additional medical records reveal assessments that indicate Plaintiff has severe and moderate limitations related to his ability to perform light work, and some records assess limitations related to Plaintiff's ability to sustain gainful employment. See, e.g., Tr. 325-27; 335-37; 341-43; 346; 352-55; 361-66.
In interpreting the evidence and developing the record in a social security disability case, the ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence, but the ALJ must explain why significant probative evidence has been rejected. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984); Howard v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003). The ALJ failed to explain why she rejected significant probative evidence from several medical sources that indicate Plaintiff is incapable of light work. Where a material conflict in the evidence is present, only the ALJ can resolve it. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (1971). This case must be remanded for the ALJ to provide a specific and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting medical evidence, along with her interpretation of, and findings related to the significant, probative medical evidence in this case.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the record and the ALJ's findings, the court concludes the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and is based on legal error. On remand, the ALJ shall evaluate and explain the weight given to the opinions of the medical sources, and, if necessary, provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinions. Additionally, the ALJ will revisit Plaintiff's credibility and specifically identify the testimony, if any, that is not credible or that undermines Plaintiff's subjective complaints in accord with Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, the ALJ will reevaluate her determination at step four and if necessary, make new step five findings. The decision is therefore REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 17, is GRANTED and the matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for additional proceedings.
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 22, is DENIED.
3. An application for attorney fees may be filed by separate motion.
The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide a copy to counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant. Judgment shall be entered for Plaintiff, and the file shall be CLOSED.
