REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THOMAS E. ROGERS, III, Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Presently before the court are Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 56 and 62). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised on August 12, 2019, and August 26, 2019, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to the motions could result in dismissal of his case. A response to Defendant Chavis's Motion for Summary Judgment was due by September 12, 2019, add an additional three days if served by mail, and a response to Defendant Specht's Motion for Summary Judgment by September 26, 2019, add an additional three days if served by mail. Plaintiff failed to file a response to either motion. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.

II. RULE 41(b) DISMISSAL

"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them, and this authority includes the power to order dismissal of an action for failure to comply with court orders. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)." Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir.1989).

The Fourth Circuit, in Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir. 1978), recognizing that dismissal with prejudice is a harsh sanction which should not be invoked lightly, set forth four considerations in determining whether Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate: (1) the degree of personal responsibility on the part of the plaintiff; (2) the amount of prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay; (3) the presence or absence of a drawn out history of deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion; and (4) the effectiveness of sanctions less drastic than dismissal. Id. at 70.

Subsequently, however, the Fourth Circuit noted that "the four factors ... are not a rigid four-pronged test." Ballard, 882 F.2d at 95. "Here, we think the Magistrate's explicit warning that a recommendation of dismissal would result from failure to obey his order is a critical fact that distinguishes this case from those cited by appellant. . . . In view of the warning, the district court had little alternative to dismissal. Any other course would have placed the credibility of the court in doubt and invited abuse." Id. at 95-96.

In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and, thus, is entirely responsible for his actions. It is solely through Plaintiff's neglect, and not that of an attorney, that Plaintiff has failed to respond to the Motions for Summary Judgment despite the court's warnings that a failure to do so may result in dismissal. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has abandoned his claims against Defendants.

In the alternative, the motions for summary judgment are discussed below.

III. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The federal court is charged with liberally construing the complaints filed by pro se litigants, to allow them to fully develop potentially meritorious cases. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The court's function, however, is not to decide issues of fact, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990), nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. If none can be shown, the motion should be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet "the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits." Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).

To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves). Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position through "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with ... affidavits, if any." Id. at 322; see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.

IV. MERITS

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in this action on November 28, 2018, alleging he was unlawfully arrested by the Darlington County Sheriff's Department for attempted murder and armed robbery without a warrant on or about January 23, 2016. Plaintiff asserts that evidence was introduced at the trial of the case that "Exposed Defendants fabricated facts for bogus I.D. and probable cause." Plaintiff is suing both Defendants in their individual capacity. (ECF No. 10 at 3 of 12).

Defendant Chavis argues that Plaintiff has not made any allegations of personal involvement by him in connection with either arrest or prosecution of the charges against Plaintiff. Additionally, Defendant Chavis asserts that he is currently the duly elected sheriff of Darlington County, South Carolina having been elected to office in November 2016, and sworn into office in January 2017. Therefore, Defendant Chavis argues that he could not have had any involvement in the arrest of Plaintiff in January 2016 in the capacity of Sheriff of Darlington County. Defendant Chavis also contends that while he was a law enforcement officer prior to the arrest of Plaintiff in January 2016, he was not the arresting officer and had no involvement with said arrest or prosecution. Defendant Chavis submitted the Darlington County Detention Center records and the Darlington County Clerk of Court's General Sessions file related to the prosecution of the charges at issue which contains no indication that Defendant Chavis had personal involvement in the arrest, detention, or prosecution of Plaintiff in 2016.

Defendant Specht asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment as he was not personally involved in the arrest, detention or prosecution of Plaintiff in January 2016. (See Specht affidavit, ECF No. 62-2 and exhibits). Specht asserts that he was involved in the arrest of Plaintiff in 2009 but Plaintiff did not make allegations regarding the 2009 arrest in the amended complaint. Defendant Specht contends that he is currently employed by the City of Hartsville Police Department but worked with the joint task managed by the Sheriff's Department while still employed by the City of Hartsville. However, Specht asserts that the task force ended and he has not been associated with the Darlington County Sheriff's Department since 2014. Defendant Specht submitted a copy of the arrest warrant and a copy of the Darlington County Detention Center Records identifying that the affiant and the arresting officer, respectively, were other individuals not named in this lawsuit.

In order to assert a plausible § 1983 claim against any particular state actor, a "causal connection" must exist between the conduct alleged by the plaintiff and the particular defendant named in the suit. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.159, 166 (1985); Rizzo v. Good, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury resulting from a specific defendant's specific conduct and must show an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir.1977) (for an individual to be liable under § 1983, the Plaintiff must show that the defendant named acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights).

The Plaintiff here must demonstrate that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal right. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 and Harris v. City of Va. Beach, 11 Fed. App'x 212, 215 (4th Cir.2001) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against five defendants when the plaintiff did not allege any of the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of his civil rights). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that these Defendants were personally involved in the arrest warrant, the arrest, the detention, or the prosecution of the Plaintiff with regard to the allegations in the amended complaint pertaining to the 2016 arrest. Therefore, it is recommended that the motions for summary judgment be granted.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that this case be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).

In the alternative, it is recommended that the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Chavis and Defendant Specht (ECF Nos. 56 an 62) be granted and this action dismissed.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must `only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).