ROBERT S. LASNIK, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on "Defendant Thoracic Surgery Directors Association's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint" (Dkt. # 120) and "Defendant American Board of Thoracic Surgery, Inc.'s Motions to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint" (Dkt. # 121).
Plaintiff, a Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine ("DO"), applied for a congenital cardiac surgery ("CCS") fellowship sponsored by the University of Washington School of Medicine in 2015, 2016, and 2017. His application was rejected each time. After the 2017 rejection, the program director informed plaintiff that his application had been rejected because he did not meet one of the eligibility requirements, namely "[c]ertification or eligibility for certification by the American Board of Thoracic Surgery." Dkt. # 4-1 at 21.
Defendant Thoracic Surgery Directors Association ("TSDA") operates a match program through which applicants apply for training residencies and fellowships, including the CCS fellowship to which plaintiff applied. In order to participate in the CCS match program, TSDA requires that applicants be board certified or eligible to be board certified by defendant the American Board of Thoracic Surgery ("ABTS"). Plaintiff was not eligible for certification by the ABTS because he did not complete a course of training accredited by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education ("ACGME"). Plaintiff alleges that the eligibility requirements ABTS set for board certification and TSDA set for the CCS match impermissibly excluded DOs in violation of federal and state antitrust laws.
The question for the Court on a motion to dismiss is whether the facts alleged in the complaint sufficiently state a "plausible" ground for relief.
Having considered the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint, the submissions of the parties, and the remainder of the record, the Court finds as follows:
In order to state an antitrust claim under federal law, plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state a plausible antitrust injury. "Antitrust injury" means "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). For the reasons set forth in the Order Granting in Part Provider Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff's federal and state antitrust claims fail as a matter of law.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to violate federal and state antitrust laws and to discriminate against him in violation of RCW 70.41.235. He does not dispute that if, as found above and in the Order Granting in Part Provider Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, he has failed to allege a viable antitrust or statutory claim, his conspiracy claim based on the same conduct fails as a matter of law.
"As with any claim sounding in negligence, where a plaintiff brings suit based on negligent infliction of emotional distress we test the plaintiff's negligence claim against the established concepts of duty, breach, proximate cause, and damage or injury." Snyder v. Med. Serv. Corp. of E. Wash., 145 Wn.2d 233, 243 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a breach of any duty TSDA or ABTS owed plaintiff to refrain from violating federal or state antitrust laws.
Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim is based on antitrust violations that he has not adequately alleged.
For all of the foregoing reasons, ABTS and TSDA's motions to dismiss (Dkt. # 120 and # 121) are GRANTED.