THOMAS O. RICE, District Judge.
BEFORE THE COURT are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 13, 18). Dana C. Madsen represents Plaintiff. Terrye E. Shea represents Defendant. This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the administrative record and the parties' completed briefing and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendant's motion and denies Plaintiff's motion.
The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
A district court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under §405(g) is limited: the Commissioner's decision will be disturbed "only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error." Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). "Substantial evidence" means relevant evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 1159 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence equates to "more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). In determining whether this standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation. Id.
In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. If the evidence in the record "is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, a district court "may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an error that is harmless." Id. An error is harmless "where it is inconsequential to the [ALJ's] ultimate nondisability determination." Id. at 1117 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ's decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).
A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant's impairment must be "of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v); 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the Commissioner considers the claimant's work activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i); 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity," the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b); 416.920(b).
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activities, the analysis proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant's impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities," the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c); 416.920(c). If the claimant's impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. Id.
At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant's impairment to several impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled and award benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d); 416.920(d).
If the severity of the claimant's impairment does meet or exceed the severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant's "residual functional capacity." Residual functional capacity ("RFC"), defined generally as the claimant's ability to perform physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1); 416.945(a)(1)), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis.
At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in the past ("past relevant work"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f); 416.920(f). If the claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five.
At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also consider vocational factors such as the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Id. If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1); 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other work, the analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore entitled to benefits. Id.
The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. Lockwood v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such work "exists in significant numbers in the national economy." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c); 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, dated December 8, 2010, alleging a disability onset date of May 5, 2009, in both applications. Tr. 192-98, 199-205. These applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Plaintiff requested a hearing. Tr. 95-104, 105-15, 117-26, 127-36, 159-60. A hearing was held with an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on August 16, 2012. Tr. 43-92. The ALJ rendered a decision denying Plaintiff benefits on December 11, 2012. Tr. 18-41.
As a threshold issue, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of Title II of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2014. Tr. 23. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 5, 2009, the alleged onset date. Tr. 23. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: L4 through S1 osteoarthritis and degenerative disc disease; depression; anxiety; personality disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. Tr. 23. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal a listed impairment. Tr. 24. The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff had the RFC
Tr. 26. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. Tr. 34. At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform the representative occupations of bench hand and outside deliverer. Tr. 35. In light of the step five finding, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act and denied her claims on that basis. Tr. 37.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on February 21, 2014, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. Tr. 1-6; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1484, 422.210.
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision denying her disability benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff raises the following three issues for review:
ECF No. 13 at 8-19. This Court addresses each issue in turn.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ violated the Social Security Administration's regulations and Plaintiff's due process rights when the ALJ considered a posthearing medical opinion, which Plaintiff's representative allegedly was not given an opportunity to review and comment on before the ALJ issued his unfavorable decision. ECF No. 13 at 18.
The administrative law judge must base his or her disability determination on "evidence offered at the hearing or otherwise included in the record." 20 C.F.R. § 404.953(a) (emphasis added). In order to aid the ALJ's disability determination where other medical evidence is inconsistent or insufficient, the administration "may ask [a claimant] to have one or more physical or mental examinations or tests," at the expense of the administration. Id. §§ 404.1517, 404.1519, 404.1519a. The procedures for a consultative examination are applicable at the initial level of determination, reconsideration, and hearing. Id. § 404.1519. When any evidence is offered post-hearing, the ALJ, pursuant to internal guidance, is required to give the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, the opportunity to examine additional evidence in order to (1) comment on, object to, or refute the evidence by submitting other evidence, (2) request a supplemental hearing, or (3) cross-examine the author of the evidence. Social Security Administration, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Litigation Law Manual ("HALLEX"), I-2-7-1 (Apr. 17, 2015), available at http://ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-02/I-2-7-1.html. The claimant and appointed representative, pursuant to the ALJ's proffer letter, will be given a time limit to respond to this post-hearing evidence. HALLEX, I-2-7-30 (Apr. 17, 2015).
HALLEX, an internal Social Security Administration policy manual, "does not impose judicially enforceable duties on either the ALJ or [the] court." Lockwood, 616 F.3d at 1072. Although Plaintiff cites to 20 C.F.R. § 404.916(f) for binding regulatory authority in accordance with HALLEX guidance regarding post-hearing evidence, this section appears to apply to hearings before a disability officer at the reconsideration stage, and not to an ALJ's initial hearing. See Filipi v. Chater, F.3d 68 (8th Cir. 1995) (unpublished).
Nonetheless, based on the evidence in the record, it appears the ALJ sent Plaintiff and her representative notice by letter regarding Dr. Everhart's posthearing consultative examination report, which letter gave Plaintiff and her representative opportunity to review and respond to this evidence. After the August 2012 hearing, the ALJ had referred Plaintiff to Dr. Joyce Everhart to provide a consultative examination. Tr. 743. Dr. Everhart examined Plaintiff on September 20, 2012, and, in accordance with a signed authorization from Plaintiff, disclosed her findings to the Social Security Administration. Tr. 735-42. On October 19, 2012, the ALJ sent a letter to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's representative proposing to enter Dr. Everhart's report into the administrative record. Tr. 279-80. In this letter, the ALJ informed Plaintiff's representative that she could, inter alia, submit written comments regarding the report or request a supplemental hearing within ten days of receipt of notice. Id. As Defendant highlights, nothing in the record shows that this letter was undelivered to either Plaintiff or her representative. ECF No. 18 at 6. Plaintiff does not further address Defendant's assertion but appears to have abandoned her due process argument in her reply briefing. See ECF No. 20.
Even if neither Plaintiff nor her representative received notice of the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Everhart's September 2012 report and Plaintiff was able to point to a binding regulation that required such notice, Plaintiff has not shown what prejudice she has suffered as a result of this lack of notice. "Reversal on account of error is not automatic, but requires a determination of prejudice." Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012). "The burden is on the party claiming error to demonstrate not only the error, but also that it affected his `substantial rights,' which is to say, not merely his procedural rights." Id. Nothing in Plaintiff's briefing meets this standard. Accordingly, this Court does not find reversible error.
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ improperly conducted an adverse credibility analysis. ECF No. 13 at 9-13. In support Plaintiff asserts that (1) her physical and mental symptoms were not inconsistent with objective medical evidence; (2) her failure to follow prescribed treatment and undergo surgery was adequately explained—she feared she would face a fate similar to her roommate's daughter who ended up in a wheelchair after surgery; (3) the ALJ misstated the evidence when he found her daily activities were inconsistent with her symptom claims; (4) the ALJ misstated the evidence when he found Plaintiff had made several inconsistent statements; and (5) the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff's "lack of insight" when he found her testimony regarding mental health symptoms vague and unconvincing. Id.
"In assessing the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or the intensity of symptoms, the ALJ engages in a two-step analysis." Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (citing Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009)). First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has proved the existence of a physical or mental impairment with "medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings." 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.908, 416.927; see Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112. A claimant's statements about his or her symptoms alone will not suffice. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.908, 416.927. "Once the claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the Commissioner may not discredit the claimant's testimony as to subjective symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective evidence." Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). As long as the impairment "could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms," the claimant may offer a subjective evaluation as to the severity of the impairment. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-56. This rule recognizes that the severity of a claimant's symptoms "cannot be objectively verified or measured." Id. at 347 (citation omitted).
However, an ALJ may conclude that the claimant's subjective assessment is unreliable, so long as the ALJ makes "a credibility determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit [a reviewing] court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant's testimony." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345 ("[A]lthough an adjudicator may find the claimant's allegations of severity to be not credible, the adjudicator must specifically make findings which support this conclusion."). If there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ's reasons for discrediting the claimant's testimony must be "specific, clear and convincing." Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted). The ALJ "must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony." Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001); see Berry, 622 F.3d at 1234 ("General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints.").
In weighing the claimant's credibility, the ALJ may consider many factors, including "`(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities.'" Chaudry, 688 F.3d at 672 (quoting Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008)). If the ALJ's finding is supported by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in secondguessing. Id. (quoting Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039).
Here, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, the [Plaintiff's] statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the [RFC]." Tr. 27. Because there is no evidence of malingering in this case, the Court must determine whether the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons not to credit Plaintiff's testimony regarding the limiting effect of her symptoms. Chaudhry, 688 F.3d at 672.
This Court finds the ALJ provided the following specific, clear, and convincing reasoning supported by substantial evidence for finding Plaintiff's subjective statements not fully credible: (1) the medical evidence did not support the degree of physical and mental limitation alleged by Plaintiff; (2) the severity of pain alleged was inconsistent with the lack of treatment sought; (3) Plaintiff's testimony regarding disabling symptoms and limitations was inconsistent with her reported daily activities; and (4) the ALJ found Plaintiff made several inconsistent statements throughout the record and found her testimony regarding her mental health symptoms to be vague and unconvincing.
First, the ALJ found the medical evidence did not support the degree of physical limitation alleged by Plaintiff. The ALJ set out, in detail, the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff's physical impairments, see Tr. 27-28, and ultimately concluded that her allegations were inconsistent, Tr. 31. For instance, although Plaintiff testified to "constant `excruciating' back pain that radiated to her lower extremities" and physical limitations as a result, the ALJ noted the following: "[Claimant] displayed a normal gait, and exhibited intact strength, sensation and range of motion [of] the extremities. Diagnostic testing showed no evidence of axonal injury to the nerve roots in the legs, lumbosacral radiculopathy, or peripheral neuropathy." Tr. 31 (internal citations to the record omitted).
Similarly, the ALJ found the medical evidence did not support the degree of mental limitations alleged by Plaintiff. The ALJ set out, in detail, the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff's mental impairments, see Tr. 28-31, and ultimately concluded that her allegations were inconsistent with the medical evidence, Tr. 31. For instance, although Plaintiff "alleged her mental health symptoms caused her problems thinking and understanding things," the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was "able to complete a three-step task, recall two words after a delay, perform serial three counting task, and had no difficulty following conversation." Tr. 31 (citations to the record omitted). Further, although Plaintiff "testified that her depression caused social isolation and crying spells every day," the record showed mental health providers found Plaintiff to be "pleasant, cooperative and personable with good eye contact" and, at most, mildly depressed. Tr. 31 (citations to the record omitted).
These inconsistencies between the Plaintiff's alleged physical and mental limitations and medical evidence provided a permissible reason for discounting Plaintiff's credibility. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958; see also Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) ("While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant's pain and its disabling effects."). Accordingly, this Court does not find error.
Second, the ALJ found Plaintiff's lack of treatment for her back pain suggested that her symptoms were not as debilitating as alleged. Tr. 31. Regarding lack of treatment, the ALJ noted the following:
Tr. 31-32 (citations to the record omitted). Although Plaintiff asserts that she explained at the hearing that she did not want to get surgery because she was afraid of possible complications from a poor surgical result, the ALJ rejected this explanation as inadequate. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (permitting an ALJ to consider "unexplained or inadequately explained" failure to seek treatment when making an adverse credibility finding); see also SSR 82-59, Titles II and XVI: Failure to Follow Prescribed Treatment, 1982 WL 31384 ("An individual may . . . attempt to justify refusal of surgery on the grounds of alleged personal or third party knowledge of persons who did not improve, or perhaps worsened, following surgery similar to that recommended to the individual by a treating physician. However, such reason[] for nonacceptance of surgical treatment will not, in and of itself, negate a finding of `failure' [to follow prescribed treatment]."). Moreover, Plaintiff does not explain her failure to seek pain medication treatment. Accordingly, this Court does not find error.
Third, the ALJ found "the claimant's daily activities are not limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations." Tr. 32. In support, the ALJ noted the following:
Tr. 32 (citations to the record omitted). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to take into account the modifications Plaintiff made to her activities—for instance, Plaintiff asserts she can do housework but it takes much longer. ECF No. 13 at 11. However, as noted by Defendant, the ALJ's characterization of the record is not inaccurate but rather a reasonable interpretation of Plaintiff's testimony. ECF No. 18 at 15-16 (citing Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857). Moreover, considering the RFC explains that Plaintiff can perform "work at a low average pace," the ALJ appears to have taken into consideration Plaintiff's modifications when considering the evidence. These inconsistencies between Plaintiff's alleged limitations and her reported daily activities provided a permissible and legitimate reason for discrediting Plaintiff's credibility." See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 ("Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant's testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment."). Accordingly, this Court does not find error.
Finally, the ALJ, using ordinary techniques of credibility determination, found another reason to discount Plaintiff's statements regarding her physical and mental limitations. Tr. 32. For instance, noting that Plaintiff made various inconsistent statements throughout the record, the ALJ found that although the Plaintiff testified that her back pain limited her ability to drive outside of a threemile radius, she testified to driving to Texas from Washington with a friend.
Finally, Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to properly consider and weigh the medical opinion evidence. ECF No. 13 at 14. Specifically, Plaintiff asks this Court to consider the ALJ's evaluation of the opinions of Dr. Dalley, Dr. Clifford, Dr. Rosekrans, and Dr. Everhart. Id. at 13-18.
There are three types of physicians: "(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant [but who review the claimant's file] (nonexamining [or reviewing] physicians)." Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1201-02 (citations omitted). Generally, the opinion of a treating physician carries more weight than the opinion of an examining physician, and the opinion of an examining physician carries more weight than the opinion of a reviewing physician. Id. In addition, the Commissioner's regulations give more weight to opinions that are explained than to opinions that are not, and to the opinions of specialists on matters relating to their area of expertise over the opinions of non-specialists. Id. (citations omitted).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly weigh the findings of examining psychologist, Dr. Mahlon Dalley, Ph.D. Specifically Plaintiff points to Dr. Dalley's April 2010 and January 2011 examinations in which he opined Plaintiff suffered marked to severe limitations in social functioning and that her mental impairments were likely to interfere with her ability to maintain employment. Tr. 318, 322.
The ALJ properly evaluated the opinion of Dr. Dalley and reasonably provided it only "little weight." In support, the ALJ found Dr. Dalley's opinion internally inconsistent and unsupported by his findings. First, the ALJ noted that the moderate GAF score is inconsistent with the remainder of Dr. Dalley's opinion. Tr. 32. Although Plaintiff disputes the probative value of her GAF score based on its reliability, as Defendant notes, determining whether inconsistencies in evidence or testimony is material is the task of the ALJ. ECF No. 18 at 19 (citing Morgan, 169 F.3d at 603). Second, the ALJ found that Dr. Dalley's opinion regarding Plaintiff's social functioning was unsubstantiated by findings. Tr. 32; see Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings."). Third, the ALJ found that Dr. Dalley's opinion appeared to rely "heavily" on Plaintiff's subjective reports of her symptoms and limitations, which the ALJ previously found to be less than credible. Tr. 32; Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) ("If a treating provider's opinions are based `to a large extent' on an applicant's self-reports and not on clinical evidence, and the ALJ finds the applicant not credible, the ALJ may discount the treating provider's opinion." (quoting Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041)). Accordingly, because the ALJ reasonably evaluated Dr. Dalley's opinion, this Court does not find error.
Plaintiff also contends the ALJ did not properly weigh the findings of state agency psychological consultant Dr. Thomas Clifford, Ph.D. Specifically, Plaintiff points to Dr. Clifford's opinion that Plaintiff would do best with superficial public contact, which opinion was affirmed by state agency psychological consultant, Dr. Michael Brown, Ph.D. ECF No. 13 at 17.
This Court finds the ALJ properly afforded Dr. Clifford's opinion "little weight." The ALJ found the opinion was "inconsistent with the balance of the medical evidence showing [claimant] was pleasant, cooperative and personable with good eye contact." Tr. 33. Further, the ALJ found Dr. Clifford's opinion that Plaintiff would do best with superficial contact was inconsistent with Plaintiff's "statements she had no problem getting along with others and had no conflict with bosses or coworkers during past employment." Tr. 33. Plaintiff's reliance on the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Micus v. Bowen, 979 F.2d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the ALJ erred in relying on claimant's statements to providers that she "felt well or the like" where neither an analysis of these statements' relevance nor an analysis of objective criteria for determining disability was present), to show error is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances presented here considering (a) whether Plaintiff can interact with members of the public is directly relevant to whether she should be limited to superficial public contact, and (b) the ALJ's RFC, as it relates to Plaintiff's mental health limitations, was sufficiently supported by an analysis of objective criteria. See Tr. 28-31. Accordingly, because the ALJ reasonably afforded Dr. Clifford's opinion only "limited weight" in light of the inconsistencies between his opinion and other evidence in the record, this Court does not find error.
Plaintiff also contends the ALJ did not properly weigh the opinion of Dr. Frank Rosekrans, Ph.D., an examining psychologist. Specifically, Plaintiff points to the January 2012 psychological evaluation Dr. Rosekrans, in which he opined that Plaintiff seemed unlikely to return to work. ECF No. 13 at 17.
The Court finds the ALJ properly assigned Dr. Rosekrans' opinion "little weight." In support, the ALJ asserts that Dr. Rosekrans' opinion is "quite conclusory, providing very little explanation of the evidence relied on in forming the opinion." Tr. 34, see Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228 ("[T]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings."). As noted by the ALJ, Dr. Rosekrans is only qualified to express an opinion about what physical or mental limitations a patient's impairments cause, not whether a patient is disabled and unable to work. Tr. 34. Accordingly, the ALJ permissibly rejected Dr. Rosekrans' conclusory opinion.
Finally, Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not properly weigh the opinion of Dr. Joyce Everhart, Ph.D. Specifically, Plaintiff points to Dr. Everhart's September 2012 examination in which she opined that Plaintiff would have difficulty working with the public and would do best not having close interaction with supervisors or coworkers. ECF No. 13 at 17-18.
This Court finds the ALJ properly assigned Dr. Everhart's opinion regarding Plaintiff's social functioning "little weight." In support, the ALJ notes that Dr. Everhart's opinion is not substantiated by findings. Tr. 34; see Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228 ("[T]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings."). Further, the ALJ found Dr. Everhart's opinion inconsistent with the claimant's statements professing no problem getting along with others and no conflict with bosses or coworkers during past employment. Tr. 34. Accordingly, because the ALJ relied on permissible reasons for partially rejecting the opinion of Dr. Everhart, this Court does not find error.
The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, enter Judgment for Defendant, provide copies to counsel, and
