MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS, Chief District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Lois and Paul Casto's Motion to Remand and Request for Reasonable Attorney's Fees. ECF No. 5. Upon considering the arguments by the parties, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Remand, but DENIES Plaintiff's Request for Reasonable Attorney's Fees.

This action was filed in the Circuit Court of Putnam County, West Virginia on October 2, 2015. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege claims against Defendant for violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, negligence, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. It is undisputed that the Complaint raised only state law claims. However, on May 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. The Proposed Amended Complaint includes, inter alia, a claim under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. Before the state court ruled upon the motion, Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.1 removed this action on June 30, 2016, on grounds of federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiffs moved to remand because the state court never granted the motion and, thus, Defendant's motion was premature.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), "a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b))(3), in part. The pivotal issue presented in this matter is when does the thirty-day period for removal commence. Plaintiffs argue that, because the motion to amend was never granted, a federal question does not yet exist and this Court lacks jurisdiction. On the other hand, Defendant insists that Plaintiffs' motion triggered the start of the thirty-day clock.

It is well established that removal jurisdiction is strictly construed. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). In deciding a motion to remand, the party seeking removal bears the burden of showing federal jurisdiction exists. Id. (citation omitted). In addition, a district court must "`resolve all doubts about the propriety of removal in favor of retained state jurisdiction.'" Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1993)).

In determining what triggers the removal period, the district court in South Carolina found that "[a] minority of courts have held that the removal period begins when a plaintiff files a motion to amend." Nolan v. Sunstate Carriers, Inc., C/A No. 4:09-2043-RBH, 2009 WL 5031308, at *3 (D. S.C. Dec. 14, 2009) (citations omitted). On the other hand, the court stated that "[t]he majority of courts . . . have held that the thirty-day removal period does not begin to run until a state court judge enters an order granting leave to file an amended complaint." Id. (citing Hibbs v. Consol. Coal Co., 842 F.Supp. 215 (N.D. W. Va. 1994) (other citations omitted)); see also Savilla v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 91 Fed. Appx. 829, 830-31 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (vacating the decision of the district court and finding that removal was not premature where state court granted a motion for leave to file an amended complaint and the Second Amended Complaint was filed with the motion, signed by counsel, and served upon opposing counsel). In other words, "[w]here leave to amend is required, an amended complaint cannot be operative until that leave has been granted. Simply put, in federal court, there is simply no such thing as `contingent' subject matter jurisdiction." McDonough v. UGL UNICCO, 766 F.Supp.2d 544, 546 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (footnote omitted). The court in Hibbs also explained that this rule "relieves defendants from speculating about the state court's ruling or speculating about whether a plaintiff will withdraw a motion to amend if a Notice of Removal is filed." Hibbs, 842 F. Supp. at 217.2

Upon consideration of these factors, this Court agrees with the majority rule. Therefore, applying the rule to these facts, the Court finds that Defendant's removal was premature because the state court never granted the motion to amend.3 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and DIRECTS the Clerk to remand this action back to the Circuit Court of Putnam County, West Virginia. In addition, the Court finds that attorneys' fees in this case are not warranted. Although the Court rejected Defendant's arguments that removal was proper, the Court finds that Defendant's arguments were at least objectively reasonable and, if the state court would have granted the motion before removal, federal question jurisdiction would exist. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.